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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is not simply to reassess Frederick II's 
crusade and the treaty in which it resulted, but to flesh and clothe 
an episode of crusading history which, in the shadow of more 
colourful campaigns, has often suffered neglect. 
The first half of the thesis (chapters one to four) covers the 
period from the time of Frederick's assumption of the cross in 1215 
to the despatch of Thomas of Acerra to the East in 1227, although in 
its investigation of the possibility that Frederick may have 
inherited the unfulfilled vow of crusade sworn by his father, Henry 
VI, chapter one necessarily defies these parameters. Chapter two 
considers the influence of the Fifth Crusade on Frederick's crusading 
plans; chapter three discusses the preoccupations which compelled 
the emperor to delay the fulfilment of his vow until 1228, and 
chapter four looks at the military and financial preparations which 
were set in motion during this period. 
The second half of the thesis can reasonably be divided into 
two. Chapters five to seven deal primarily with the crusade proper - 
the activities of the crusaders prior to Frederick's arrival in 
Syria, the role of two leading English bishops in the crusade, 
Frederick's strained relations with the nobility in Cyprus and the 
Latin Kingdom, his presence in the Holy Land and conclusion of peace 
with the Egyptian sultan al-Kämil. The eighth and final chapter 
takes a brief glimpse at the observance of Frederick's treaty in the 
immediate aftermath of the crusade and subsequent diplomatic contacts 
between the Hohenstaufen and Ayyobid dynasties. 
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Introduction 
The Emperor Frederick II's crusade spanned the years 1227 to 
1229 but, to be specific, could justifiably be said to have lasted a 
mere eight months - the length of time from September 1228 to the 
beginning of May 1229 which the emperor spent in the Holy Land. To 
study such a narrow period of history is, of course, to ignore the 
preparations and the repercussions of the expedition, the precedents 
and experiences on which it drew. 
In writing this thesis I have sought to avoid the calendaric 
constraints of the crusade itself, but nevertheless have consciously 
attempted to limit the scope of the work to the period defined by 
Frederick's assumption of the cross in 1215 and his reconciliation 
with the pope in 1230/1. This aim is reflected in the terminal dates 
included in the title of the thesis. Even so, in order to set the 
expedition more fully in context, it was considered useful to examine 
the extent to which Frederick's father, Henry VI, played a role in 
his son's decision to go on crusade, and to investigate, if briefly, 
Frederick's relations with the Ayyübid dynasty and nobility of the 
Latin Kingdom post-1229. These are aspects which are dealt with in 
chapters one and eight respectively. The bulk of the thesis, as has 
already been implied, looks initially at the choice of destination 
for the crusade, its financial and military organisation, and the 
delays to which the expedition was subject. In addition there is 
discussion of the crusade itself, Frederick's relations with the 
nobles of Syria and Cyprus during his stay in the East, and the 
provisions of the peace settlement agreed with the sultan of Egypt. 
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The principal sources of primary literature used in this study 
were Huillard-Breholles' monumental compilation Historia Diplomatica 
Friderici Secundi, which has usefully brought together documents, 
letters and chronicle excerpts, the Scriptores volumes of the 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, the Recueil des Historiens des Gaules 
et de la France, and the Rolls Series. For the Muslim histories of 
the period I have been largely in the hands of nineteenth century 
French compilers and translators whose work is collected in the 
Recueil des Historiens des croisades. A few relevant Muslim authors 
such as MagrTi and Juvaini have been translated into English by 
modern scholars and these translations have been used where possible. 
Dr. Peter Jackson has also very kindly provided me with translations 
of certain passages from a number of published Muslim chronicles 
which would otherwise have been inaccessible. 
Although heavy reliance has been placed on printed primary 
sources, a number of unpublished thirteenth century English 
manuscripts have been consulted (see bibliography), and again I must 
thank Dr. Jackson for translating sections from the unpublished 
manuscript of the contemporary Muslim author Ibn Abi '1-Dam. 
I should point out that in referring in the text to the 
continuations of William of Tyre I have retained the very serviceable 
terms Eracles, 'Ernoul', and 'Rothelin' in preference to the more 
correct terminology devised by Dr. Morgan'. 
A further discussion of the sources appears in chapter six, and 
a full list appears in the bibliography at the end of this volume. 
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Notes to introduction 
" See M. R. Morgan, The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of 
William of Tyre (Oxford, 1973). 
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Chapter One 
The legacy of Henry VI's crusade 
Twenty years separated the crusader vows of the Western Emperor 
Henry VI and his son Frederick II. When Henry died at Messina in 
September 1197, his vow remained unfulfilled; and it appears that to 
many a vow of crusade, once taken, was held in such seriousness that 
if it were not discharged in a crusader's lifetime, his heirs were 
considered to be obligated by itl. Was Frederick's vow linked 
directly to his father's failure to depart for the East? 
Certainly a degree of papal pressure was brought to bear on the 
sons of the nobility, in particular, whose fathers had taken the 
cross but had died before they were able to set out. The decretal 
collection Compilatio tertia, compiled on the authorisation of the 
pope by the notary Pietro Collivaccino around the year 1209, included 
the decretal Licet which stated that the obligation incurred by an 
outstanding vow of crusade might be transmitted to an heir of the 
person assuming the cross, and the heir's obligation could be 
enforced, if necessary, by sequestration of the inherited estate2. 
Innocent III had already threatened to disinherit Andrew II of 
Hungary if he did not discharge the vow sworn by his father, Bela 
III3; and there are other precedents to indicate that the vow which 
Henry VI's son, Frederick, enunciated at Aachen in 1215 was the 
action of an obligated heir. For instance, Louis VII was said to 
have taken the cross in 1145 out of a desire to fulfil the vow his 
brother had sworn before his inopportune death4; and Henry III of 
England, only nine years old, but apparently already bound by the vow 
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of his father, appears to have assumed the cross at the time of his 
coronation in October 12165. 
It seems clear, therefore, that the imperial crusade of 1227-29 
had its origins in the vow of Henry VI and the ensuing German 
crusade. Or did it? Although the principle of heritability of votive 
obligations appears to have been incorporated in Justinian's Digest 
and is found in Roman inscriptions, at the time of Frederick II's 
oath of crusade the idea of the inherited vow was new to canon law6 
and had not yet been taken to the ultimate refinement of Innocent IV 
who was to interpret the vow not as having been uttered as a personal 
promise to God, but as a firm commitment to aid the Holy Land, 
carrying with it an obligation which bound the heirs of the author by 
the Roman law of succession7. In the early thirteenth century the 
vow was still essentially personal, but as the decretal Licet shows, 
it was becoming possible in certain circumstances for an individual 
who could not fulfil a vow, to entrust the obligation to his heirs. 
The canonist Damasus Hungarus writing around 1215, also touched on 
the question of heritability of vows as described in the same 
decretal. He contended that if a dying father commanded his son to 
fulfil the father's pilgrimage vow as a condition of the inheritance 
of the father's estate, there were two alternatives: first, the vow 
of pilgrimage might be satisfied by personal performance of the 
pilgrimage; or, second, the vow might be satisfied by redemption of 
the obligation. In his opinion, the former might not be imposed as a 
condition of inheritance, whereas the latter could be 
9. In other 
words, in the first decades of the thirteenth century, the 
transmission of the vow was not considered to be automatic nor 
necessarily enforceable, and although clerical opinion was moving 
towards this, it would not be properly expressed until the 
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pontificate of Innocent IV'0. Which leaves us with the apparently 
inherited vows of Louis VII, Andrew II, Henry III and Frederick II. 
If it was not possible at this time automatically to inherit an 
unfulfilled vow of crusade, why then should these monarchs have been 
obligated? 
Otto of Freising, our source for Louis VII's decision to go on 
crusade, reports the king's reasons as follows: 
'Lodewicus dum occultum Hierusalem eundi desiderium haberet, eo 
quod frater suus Philippus eodem voto astrictus morte preventus 
fuerat, diutius protelare nolens propositum, quibusdam ex 
1 
principibus suis vocatis, quid in mente volveret, aperuit'1. 
Otto implies that Louis VII did not consider himself to be personally 
obligated by his brother's vow, but was, nevertheless, anxious that 
his brother's failure to depart on crusade should not blot his 
memory. His vow was, therefore, a voluntary and not a compulsory 
act. But it seems strange that Louis should have waited fourteen 
years after Philip's demise in 1131 before making known his 
intentions, and indeed recent research has suggested that Louis's vow 
owed more to the king's reconciliation with the papacy in 1144-5 than 
to any moral obligation imposed on him by his brother's death. The 
argument runs as follows: in return for permitting the entry of the 
archbishop-elect of Bourges, Peter of La Chätre, into his see, which 
Louis had opposed in 1241, Celestine II lifted the interdict which 
his predecessor, Innocent II, had imposed. Probably Louis also 
agreed to an expiatory pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and in order to avoid 
any suggestion that he was admitting guilt, promoted his dead 
brother's unfulfilled vow of crusade as the motivation for his own 
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oathlla. Whereas, therefore, Otto of Freising's commentary might be 
taken per se as proof that Louis's vow was voluntary, circumstantial 
and chronological evidence would also appear to indicate that in no 
sense was Louis obligated by his brother's oath. 
As for Andrew II of Hungary, although his vow had been 
inherited from his father, and despite the considerable papal 
pressure brought to bear in order to compel the fulfilment of this 
vow12, the demise of King Bela had not automatically occasioned the 
transfer of the votive obligation. Rather, in anticipation of his 
death, and in line with the canonical thought of the time, Bela had 
personally entrusted the discharge of his crusader's vow to his son - 
13 a task which Andrew had solemnly sworn to execute. 
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The explanation of Henry III's first crusade vow is a little 
more difficult: there is no evidence that King John had placed on 
Henry the obligation of fulfilling his vow, and yet as soon as he was 
crowned, Henry appears to have taken the cross. A. J. Forey, without 
referring to the heritability of the obligation, suggests that Henry 
may have been persuaded by the papal legate, Guala, that it was his 
duty to fulfil his father's oath14, and Honorius III, acknowledging 
Henry as crucesignatus, in January 1217 urged him to carry out John's 
pledgei5. In April 1223, Honorius again appealed to Henry to assist 
the Holy Land, 
'cum in thronum regni crucesignato successeris, decet, ut et in 
crucis obsequium to votivum exhibeas successorem, quia si 
patris debita legitimus heres exolves, expedit non minus 
celesti quam terreno satisfieri creditori'16. 
But even the papal exhortations are insufficient evidence to prove 
that Henry was automatically bound by his father's oath, and the 
rapidity of Henry's assumption of the cross merely points to this 
possibility. A recent study by Simon Lloyd argues that Henry III's 
decision to take the cross in October 1216 was solely a political 
expedient which bore no relation to any obligation imposed on him by 
John Lackland's vow, itself a political manoeuvre. He concludes by 
suggesting that Henry's infant cross might legitimately be 
interpreted as a natural continuation of the 'political' cross of his 
father17. But here the idea of heritability must stop: Henry 
expressed concern that his father had died without discharging his 
pledge to go on crusade 
18, but was never obligated by the vow. This 
interpretation is supported by the apparent ease with which Honorius 
in the early 1220s absolved Henry, admittedly ad tempus, from his 
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crusader vow19. It could also be argued that had there been an 
automatic moral obligation on King John's heirs to fulfil the 
outstanding vow, then by the time Honorius wrote to Henry in 1223 the 
vow had already been discharged by the king's illegitimate brother, 
Oliver, who had died at Damietta during the Fifth Crusade20. 
Consequently there would have been little need for Honorius to invoke 
the memory of King John. 
The answer to our problem, therefore, is that none of the vows 
of Louis VII, Andrew II, or Henry III was the result of inherited 
obligation: all were sworn through choice, and only Andrew of 
Hungary's vow was passed directly from father to son. This in turn 
supports the conclusion that a vow could not at this time be 
inherited without the acquiescence of an heir, and demonstrates as 
inadmissable the assumption, based on these precedents, that 
Frederick II's vow had been inherited from his father. Frederick 
himself, in a letter to Pope Gregory IX dated 6 December 1227, in 
which he refers to his coronation at Aachen and his taking of the 
cross, does not mention his father's unfulfilled vow, preferring to 
explain his actions as an expression of gratitude for the divine 
favour shown him21. Nor do the two main sources for Frederick's 
coronation - the Reiners Annales and the Chronica Regia Coloniensis - 
allude to the new king of the Romans' reasons for assuming the 
cross22. Frederick's independence of action is clinched by, of all 
people, Gregory IX, whose letter to the archbishop of Canterbury in 
October 1227 said of the emperor, 
'Nam sponte, non monitus, Sede apostolica ignorante, crucem 
suis humeris affixit.. '23 
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Even so there are those who consider that, whatever Frederick's 
underlying reasons for taking the vow of crusade, he was encouraged 
23a to do so by papal agents active at his court. 
But the weight of evidence indicates that Frederick II's 
decision to assume the cross was a voluntary act which antedated the 
concept of the posthumous transfer of votive obligations as 
formulated by Innocent IV. The vow which Henry VI had sworn at Bari 
in 1195 was not binding on his heir, and played no part in the 
imperial crusade of 1227-1229. And yet it is possible to argue that 
both vows were to some extent linked in that they were sworn in a 
climate of political strife. In the case of Henry VI, it was likely 
that by vowing to go on crusade his position amongst the German 
nobility would be strengthened, the dignity of the empire in Europe 
would be enhanced, relations between the empire and papacy would be 
improved, and the pacification of the newly acquired kingdom of 
Sicily would be facilitated: well-prepared and well-managed, the 
crusade would contribute to the solidification of the German 
empire24. Frederick, too, probably envisaged his assumption of the 
cross, at least in part, as a stabilising factor in the 
re-establishment of Hohenstaufen rule in Germany25; and, as we have 
seen, Henry III's contemporaneous vow has also been interpreted as a 
political act designed to unify his realm26. 
But political expediency is not equatable with inherited 
obligation, and similarities of circumstance do not constitute a 
continuation; in which case, is there any other evidence which might 
support the view that Frederick's crusade was the heir to the German 
crusade of 1197-8? 
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One possibility would be that both ventures could be classed as 
'leaderless'. Obviously, this statement has to be qualified, in 
particular since Frederick did finally set out on crusade in 1228, 
whereas the German crusade of 1197-8 was never blessed with the 
presence of the emperor. Of course, in the case of Henry VI, this 
was due in part to Henry's premature death in 1197, but the very fact 
that he did not assume the cross in public27 could be viewed as an 
indication that Henry never intended to spearhead the expedition, 
being content to follow on at a later date. Certainly whilst 
postponing any announcement of his own personal leadership, he 
nevertheless promised Aimery de Lusignan's envoy, Ranier of Gibelet, 
that he would cross to Syria28. Such a judgement may in fact be 
harsh - Henry had yet to pacify the recently conquered kingdom of 
Sicily, and the situation in Germany was not at all satisfactory - 
but the departure of the imperial army in March 1197, minus the 
emperor, does not appear to have drawn any papal criticism. 
At the time of the Fifth Crusade Frederick II's attitude may, 
therefore, have been encouraged by his father's experiences. 
Hampered by the turbulent situation in Sicily, Frederick repeatedly 
postponed his own departure, and in his place despatched groups of 
crusaders under the leadership of Louis of Bavaria and Walter of 
Palear29. It may have been that the emperor envisaged the combined 
strength of the duke of Bavaria, the chancellor of Sicily, and 
Matthew of Apulia (who had arrived at Damietta in July 122030) as 
sufficient to render his own presence unnecessary31; and indeed, 
although from late 1218 Honorius had made frequent appeals for 
Frederick to fulfil his vow32, by April/June 1220 he was urging that 
if Frederick found it impossible to cross, he should not detain the 
other crusaders33. The presence of the emperor was still desired, 
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but it was not impossible to conceive of the crusade without his 
personal participation. 
In the wake of the Christian defeat, the pope summoned together 
the emperor and the crusade leaders in a bid to ensure Frederick's 
active involvement in any future expedition34. Even so, neither the 
agreement sworn between the emperor and the errant count of Celano in 
April 122335, nor the 1225 treaty of San Germano36, took for granted 
the emperor's own departure. And yet, when Frederick failed to 
depart on crusade in 1227 Gregory IX condemned him for deserting 
'pars residua bellatorum exposita marts periculis et fluctibus 
tempestatum, absque duce et praeceptore vel principe.. '37 
So, although the idea of a 'leaderless' crusade appears common to the 
expeditions of both Henry VI and Frederick II, it is a hasty 
classification; the concept of such an expedition came close to 
being accepted, even encouraged, by Honorius during the Fifth 
Crusade, but it was not recognised by the papacy as a long-term 
solution, and was one which was never actively pursued by either 
emperor. Both intended to fulfil their vows of crusade38, but both 
found themselves constricted by domestic upheaval. Frederick's 
delays during the period 1218-1221/7 were not a conscious emulation 
of his father's failure to depart with the imperial army in 1197. 
But if the 'leaderless crusade' is not in keeping with the 
concept of continuity between the two crusades, one area in which 
continuity might be traced is that of imperial expansion. Historians 
have emphasised Henry VI's grand plan of Mediterranean domination39 
Rene Grousset saw a vast programme of Germanic expansion which 
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included the absorption of the Latin Orient and the conquest of 
Byzantium, leading to the re-establishment (in favour of the 
Hohenstaufen) of a united 'Roman' empire40. More recently, 
J. M. Hussey has asserted that Henry planned to conquer Constantinople 
and the Byzantine empire en route to Syria and Palestine41, whilst 
G. Ostrogorsky contended that Henry aimed at world domination, the 
first step to which was the conquest of the Eastern empire42. It 
comes as little surprise, therefore, to find Frederick II portrayed 
as espousing his father's schemes, and seizing at the chance to marry 
John of Brienne's daughter, Isabella (sometimes called Yolande), 
heiress to the throne of Jerusalem43, as a means of realising 'at a 
stroke Henry VI's eastern ambition, that of subordinating or rather 
'44 annexing the Latin East to the German Empire, 
Traditionally the German empire and Norman Sicily identified 
Byzantium as the natural enemy, and the experiences of Frederick 
Barbarossa's campaign had revealed the weaknesses of the Eastern 
empire and had provided more than adequate reason for attack. But 
although Henry VI demanded the Byzantines 'return' the Balkan 
territory from Durazzo to Thessalonika which William II of Sicily had 
formerly conquered45, he had no immediate pretensions to the 
Byzantine throne. The marriage of his brother, Philip of Swabia, to 
Irene, daughter of the deposed emperor, Isaac II Angelus, serves to 
support this view46, and it seems clear that Henry never planned to 
divert his crusade against Constantinople. Allegations of this made 
by Nicetas Choniates and later Western chroniclers (writing under the 
influence of the successes of the Fourth Crusade) cannot be 
supported47. For one thing unrest in Germany and Sicily made such a 
war of conquest impossible; and to Henry it was sufficient that he 
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could exert his influence and exact tribute48. (It is perhaps 
significant that the annual tribute of 5000 pounds of gold which he 
demanded from the Emperor Alexius III in 1196 was the exact 
equivalent to the sum required to maintain in Syria the 1500 knights 
and 1500 sergeants he had pledged in 119549). Instead Byzantium 
constituted just one part of a more general imperial policy for the 
Eastern Mediterranean which sought to exercise some influence in 
affairs but which did not subordinate its various concerns to 
pretensions in any one area. These concerns included interests in 
Cyprus and Cilician Armenia, whose rulers were granted royal crowns 
by Henry VI at their own request50. 
Henry's plans for crusade, therefore, did not encompass the 
conquest of Constantinople, but relied heavily on Byzantine gold. 
Frederick maintained his father's interest in the eastern 
Mediterranean, but the Fourth Crusade and the creation of the Latin 
Empire precluded any financial support of the magnitude envisaged by 
Henry VI, and Frederick's own association with the Greeks only really 
began with the marriage of his illegitimate daughter, Constance, to 
51 the Nicaean emperor, John III Doukas Vatatzes, around 1244. 
Byzantium apart, Frederick took full advantage of Henry VI's 
policies to extend the influence of the German empire: imperial 
suzerainty was reasserted in Cyprus52, and contacts with Armenia, in 
the 1230s at least, were friendly enough53. As regards the kingdom 
of Jerusalem, Frederick followed his father's example and sent the 
imperial crusade of 1227-9 to the Holy Land (although initially it 
was by no means certain that this would be Frederick's ultimate 
destination54). In October 1197 Beirut had been recovered by the 
Germans, and in 1228 Frederick initiated a protracted campaign 
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against John of Ibelin, the Old Lord of Beirut who, it was claimed, 
did not hold the city by right. Frederick's demands may have been 
based on the view that since Beirut had been taken by the German 
crusade of 1197-8 it should have remained, by right of conquest, a 
possession of the empire55. More likely, however, is the explanation 
that by converting Beirut into a port, John of Ibelin had infringed 
royal prerogatives56. Consequently the joint focus of attention on 
Beirut was coincidental and cannot be regarded as a common factor in 
the two expeditions. 
Frederick II does appear to have become imbued with his 
father's theories of state and empire, but the course of events had 
rendered redundant any plans for Byzantium, and it is not clear to 
what extent their intentions for the kingdom of Jerusalem would have 
co-incided, had not Henry's early death cut short his crusade. But 
whilst the similarities of territorial aspirations may be difficult 
to detect, important parallels can be drawn between the political 
manipulation of the crusade by both Henry VI and Frederick II. Both 
emperors were concerned to secure the inheritance of the imperial 
crown for their sons. Henry harnessed the zeal of the German 
nobility for the crusade in an attempt to secure their approval for 
his plan to make the Western empire hereditary instead of elective. 
Using the crusade as bait he also tried to inveigle the pope into 
accepting this constitutional change. In the same way Frederick 
prevailed upon the princes of the empire to accept his son as king, 
and wrote to Honorius III making known his desire to have Henry 
crowned king of the Romans before he himself departed for the Holy 
Land58. Neither was successful, and the empire remained elective. 
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To sum up: Frederick did not inherit his father's vow; he was 
obligated solely by the oath which he swore at Aachen in 1215 on the 
occasion of his coronation as king of the Romans and which was 
renewed at his imperial coronation in Rome in November 1220 and at 
Ferentino in 1223. Although both Frederick and Henry appear to have 
favoured leaderless crusades this was never their intention, but was 
purely the result of circumstances. In Eastern policy Frederick had 
no grand designs, but sought to take advantage of his marriage to 
Isabella, and at the same time reassert lapsed rights in Cyprus. 
Undoubtedly Frederick drew inspiration from Henry VI, as in his 
attempts to secure the succession of his son to the imperial title, 
but to view Frederick's crusade as a direct continuation of the 
German crusade of 1197-8 is to read too much into the few 
similarities which exist between the two expeditions. 
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J. M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221 (Philadelphia, 1986), 
p127. 
13 PL, ccxiv. col. 8, ep. 10; ccxv col. 169, ep. 155; Röhricht, 'Die 
Kreüzzugsbewegung', p142; R. Röhricht, 'Der Kreuzzug des Königs 
Andreas II. von Ungarn, (1217)', Studien zur Geschichte des fünften 
Kreuzzuges (Innsbruck, 1891), p24; Villey, p126. Cf. J. P. Donovan, 
Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade (Philadelphia, 1950; AMS rpr. 1978), 
p29 and note. The English justiciar, William Brewer, likewise 
appears to have entrusted his nephew, the bishop of Exeter, with the 
execution of his vow - Les registres de Gregoire IX, ed. L. Auvray 
(Paris, 1890-1910; 4 vols), i. 12a(no. 24), and infra, chapter 7, n. 21- 
14 Forey, 'Crusading Vows', p230; cf. Chronicon Petroburgense, ed. 
T. Stapleton (Camden Society, Old Series, xlvii, 1849), p7 - Guala induced Henry 'ut crucem acciperet, ad majorem ipsius regnique 
tuicionem'. 
15 'Epistolae Romanorum Pontificum', Recueil des Historiens des 
Gaules et de la France [RHGF], new series, ed. L. Delisle (Paris, 
1869-1904; 24 vols), xix. 626; C. R. Cheney, Pope Innocent III and 
England (Stuttgart, 1976), p264n. 106. 
16 Monumenta Germaniae Historica [MGH] Epistolae Saeculi XIII e 
Regestis Pontificum Romanorum, ed. C. Rodenberg (Berlin, 1883-94; 3 
vols), 1.154 (no. 225). 
17 Simon Lloyd, "Political Crusades' in England, c. 1215-17 and 
c. 1263-5', in Crusade and Settlement, pp113-20. This view is given 
articulate support by Cheney, Pope Innocent III, pp262-3. Powell, 
Anatomy of a Crusade, p77, argues that although King John's 
assumption of the cross strengthened Innocent III's hand in peace 
negotiations with the English barons, as a direct vassal of the pope 
John already enjoyed considerable papal backing, the implication 
being that politically his vow was largely superfluous and was 
therefore probably a genuine act. On this see also H. Roscher, Papst 
Innocenz III und die Kreuzzuge (G6ttingen, 1969), pp156-8. 
18 To John of Brienne in the autumn of 1223 - Matthew Paris, Historia 
Anglorum, ed. F. Madden (London, 1866-9; Rolls Series; 3 vols), 
ii. 259. 
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19 Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 1251-1253 (HMSO, 1927), 
p448; Forey, 'Crusading Vows', p230. 
20 'Iacobi de Vitriaco Acconensis Episcopi Historia Hierosolimitana', 
in Gesta Dei per Francos, ed. J. Bongars (Hanover, 1611; 2 vols), 
1.1134, 'Oliuerius filius Regis Angliae.. '; 'Historia Damiatina' in 
O. Hoogeweg, 'Die Schriften des kolner Domscholasters, spateren 
Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinalbischofs von S. Sabina, Oliverus', 
Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart, ccii (1894), 188. 
No bastard could legally inherit property (see The treatise on the 
laws and customs of the realm of England commonly called Glanville, 
ed. G. D. G. Hall (London, 1965), p87), but it is debatable whether or 
not this restriction on inheritance applied to vows. Both Jacques de 
Vitry and Oliver of Paderborn refer to Oliver as son of the king of 
England [John], but neither mention his illegitimacy. 
21 MGH Le um sectio IV Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et 
regum, ed. L. Weiland et al. (Hanover/Leipzig, 1893-1927; 7 vols), 
ii. 150 (no. 116), and infra, chapter 3, p34. 
22 'Reineri Annales', MGH S[criptores], xvi. 673; 'Chronica Regia 
Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii (Hanover, 1880), 236. 
23 Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. H. G. Hewlett (London, 
1886-9; Rolls Series; 3 vols), ii. 336. 
23a H. M. Schaller, 'Die Kanzlei Kaiser Frierichs II. Ihr Personal und 
ihr Sprachstil', Archiv für Diplomatik, iii (1957), 257; Powell, 
Anatomy of a Crusade, pp3,43. 
24 E. N. Johnson, 'The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI', 
in K. M. Setton (editor-in-chief), A History of the Crusades, ii. The 
Later Crusades, 1189-1311, ed. R. L. Wolff and H. W. Hazard (2nd ed. 
Madison, Wisconsin, 1969), 117. 
25 Infra - chapter 3, pp34-5. 
26 Lloyd, pp113-20; and supra, p4. 
27 Arnold of Lübeck, 'Arnoldi Chronica Slavorum', MGHS, xxi. 202. See 
also 'Annales Stadenses', MGHS xvi. 352, and 'Annales Marbacenses', 
SRG in usum scholarum, ix (Hanover and Leipzig, 1907), 65, for 
Henry's assumption of the cross. 
28 'L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur', Recueil des Historiens des 
Croisades [RHC]. Historiens Occidentaux (Paris, 1844-95; 5 vols), 
ii. 209; Johnson, pp118,119 and p120 where he claims that following 
revolt in southern Italy, Henry abandoned all thoughts of joining the 
crusade. On this, see also H. E. Mayer, The Crusades, trans. 
J. Gillingham (Oxford, 1972), p148. 
29 'Historia Damiatina', pp257,277, and infra - chapter 3, pp51-3. 
30 'Historia Damiatina', p249. 
31 Matthew of Apulia was said to have arrived at Damietta with 8 
galleys (two of which were corsairs captured en route), and much 
military hardware ('Historia Damiatina', p249; cf. 'Eracles', p354, 
which suggests 8 galleys was the number setting sail from Italy). See 
also Leitres de Jacques deVitry, ed. P. B. C. HuJ5ens (LEiden. 1960), 
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pp135-6 (ep. 7), which is evidence that Matthew retained many knights 
at his own expense. Louis of Bavaria 'in loco imperatoris cum multo 
exercitu.. advenerat', Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum ed. 
J. Stevenson (London, 1875; Rolls Series), p189. Henry of Malta and 
Walter of Palear brought 40 galleys - 'Historia Damiatina', p277; cf. History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church [HPEC], ed. and 
trans. O. H. E. Khs-Burmester et al., iv 1, tr. p78, which puts the 
figure at 45. The Chronigue d Ernoul et de Bernard le Tresorier, ed. 
L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), pp443-4 suggests 100, whereas the 
Muslim anthologist Magrizi, A History of the Ayyubid Sultans of 
Egypt, trans. R. J. C. Broadhurst (Boston, Mass., 1980), p186, mentions 
a more unlikely fleet of 1000 vessels. 
32 Infra - chapter 3, pp49-53. 
33 Epistolae Saeculi XIII, 1.83,84 (nos. 117,118). 
34 'Eracles', p355, and see also chapter 4, n. 4. At Ferentino in 
March 1223 Frederick agreed to depart on crusade in June 1225. 
35 MGH Const., ii. 548-50 (no. 418), with particular reference to point 
5. For background details see Richard of San Germano, 'Chronica', 
MGRS xix. 340-3, and T. C. Van Cleve, The Emperor Frederick II of 
Hohenstaufen: immutator mundi (Oxford, 1972), pp136,138. 
36 MGH Const., ii. 130 (no. 102), point 6. 
37 Flores Historiarum, 11.340. 
38 For Henry VI see 'Eracles', p209, Arnold of Lübeck, MGHS, xxi. 202, 
and supra, p7. For Frederick passim chapter 3. J. L. La Monte, 
Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kin dom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1932), p58, is -of a similar opinion as regards 
Frederick. 
39 See for example, S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades (Cambridge, 
1951-4; 3 vols), 111.91. T. Toeche, Kaiser Heinrich VI (Jahrbücher 
der deutschen Geschichte; Leipzig, 1867 ppp366-7, believed that 
Henry's aspirations ultimately included the resurrection of Roger 
II's dreams of the submission of the whole North African coast. 
40 R. Grousset, Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de 
J6rusalem (Paris, 1934-6; 3 vols), 111.144. 
41 J. M. Hussey, 'Byzantium and the crusades, 1081-1204', in Wolff and 
Hazard (eds), The Later Crusades, p149. 
42 G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. J. M. Hussey 
(Oxford, 1956), p365. 
43 Frederick's marriage to Isabella was agreed at Ferentino in March 
1223 - see Epistolae Saeculi XIII, 1.152,156 (nos. 225,227), and 
chapter 2, n. 52. 
44 Grousset, 111.145,272; J. Richard, The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 
trans. J. Shirley (Amsterdam, 1979; 2 voll with continuous 
pagination), p230; cf. also J. Prawer, Histoire du Royaume Latin de 
Jerusalem, trans. G. Nahon (2nd ed. Paris, 1975; 2 vols) ii. 112-3. 
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45 Johnson, p118. For William's expedition, see H. Wieruszowski, 'The 
Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Crusades', in Wolff and Hazard 
(eds), The Later Crusades, pp36-7. 
46 There were subsequent rumours that Isaac had accepted the pair as 
heirs to the Byzantine Empire ('Annales Marbacenses', SRG in usum 
scholarum, ix. 64; Johnson, p119). But establishment of a client 
king in Constantinople would be essentially long term: Irene was not 
a direct heir and her father had already been deposed as emperor. 
Her presence in hostile hands, however, was a threat to the Byzantine 
government, creating an excuse for Western intervention in Byzantine 
affairs, and providing a focus for those who opposed Alexius III. 
Philip would be more readily received as a vassal-king by virtue of 
his wife's rights, and the claims of their children would be even 
stronger - see C. M. Brand, Byzantium confronts the West, 1180-1204 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp190-1, also K. Hampe, Germany under the 
Salian and Hohenstaufen Emperors, trans. R. Bennett (Oxford, 1973), 
p229. 
47 Brand, pp193-4, and W. Leonhardt, Der Kreuzzu s lan Kaiser 
Heinrichs VI (variously cited as Leipzig/Giessen, 1913/1923) 
[unavailable to me]. 
48 Hampe, p229; Brand, p193. 
49 Brand, p193. The money was never actually delivered. 
50'Eracles', 
pp209-12,215; 'Annales Marbacenses', SRG in usum 
scholarum, ix. 64-5,67; 'Gesta Episcoporum Halberstadensium', MGHS 
xxiii. 112; Johnson, p118-9. Leo II of Armenia had already 
approached Frederick Barbarossa in 1190 - The Cilician Kingdom of 
Armenia, ed. T. S. R. Boase (Edinburgh, 1978), ppl8,111. 
51 M. Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society 
under the Laskarids of Nicaea 1204-1261 (Oxford, 1975), pp15-6; 
A. Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea: the story of an empire in exile 
(London, 1912; rpr. Amsterdam, 1964), pp162,168,172. But see the 
'Annales Placentini Gibellini', MGHS, xviii. 479, according to which 
the imperial army besieging Brescia in 1238 included soldiers sent by 
the Nicaean emperor. Also of interest is S. Borsari, 'Federigo II e 
1'Oriente bizantino', Rivista Storica Italiana, lxiii (1951), 279-91. 
For Constance, see G. Schlumberger, Le tombeau d'une imperatrice 
Byzantine a Valence, en Espagne (Paris, 1902). The marriage was 
condemned by the pope - Chronica Majora, iv. 299,453. 
52 Infra chapter 5, ppll5-21. 
53 J. S. C. Riley-Smith, 'The Templars and Teutonic Knights in Cilician 
Armenia', in The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia, pp113-4. 
54 Passim chapter 2. 
55 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', SRG in usum scholarum, xviii. 161; 
R. C. Smail, 'The international status of the Latin Kingdom of 
Jerusalem, 1150-1192', in The Eastern Mediterranean lands in the 
period of the crusades, ed. P. M. Holt (Warminster, 1977), pp23-43; 
J. S. C. Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 
1174-1277 (London, 1973), p113. As a parallel, Frederick's attitude 
towards Toron, which he acquired by treaty with the Egyptian sultan, 
does not seem to suggest that he regarded this fief as his by right 
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of conquest - ibid., p168n. 109. Cf. John of Ibelin's claim that he had lawfully been granted Beirut by Aimery and Isabella - 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', RHC Documents Armeniens (Paris, 1869-1906; 2 vols), 
ii. 678-9, and see 'Les Lignages d'Outremer', RHC Lois (Paris, 1841-3; 
2 vols), ii. 448; H. E. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin: the struggle for 
the regency of Jerusalem, 1253-1258', Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, cxxii (1978), 26-7; P. W. Edbury, 'John of 
Ibelin's title to the county of Jaffa and Ascalon', English 
Historical Review, xcviii (1983), 121-2. John of Ibe in1 's version is 
lent weight by the fact that on its capture by German forces Beirut 
was immediately handed over to Aimery's custody - Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. W. Stubbs (London, 1868-71; Rolls Series; 4 vols), 
iv. 28-9; Ernoul, pp314-5; 'Eracles', pp224-7, but cf. the terms of 
Raymond III of Tripoli's possession of Beirut, 1185-6 ('Eracles', p8; 
Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p108), whereby he held the lordship 
only in recompense for expenses incurred as regent. 
56 Beirut was therefore forfeit - 'Le Livre au Roil, RHC Lois, 
i. 616-7. See also and cf. J. Prawer, Crusader Institutions (Oxford, 
1980), p434; J. S. C. Riley-Smith, 'Further thoughts on Baldwin II's 
etablissement on the confiscation of fiefs', in Crusade and 
Settlement, pp176-80; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp76-8. 
At my viva Dr. Peter Edbury expressed the view that Frederick's 
claims to Beirut turned on John of Ibelin's title. On consideration 
of this view I have to admit that there is a good case in its favour. 
The 'Gestes des Chiprois', p678, quote Frederick as demanding that 
John 'me rendes la cite de Baruth; car vous ne l'aves ni tenes 
raisonablement', to which John responds: 'Je ay et tien Baruth come 
mon droit fie; et madame la rayne Yzabeau, qui fu ma suer de par ma 
mere et fille dou roy Amaury, et droit heyr dou reyaume de Jerusalem, 
et son seignor le roy Amaury ensemblement o ly me dounerent Baruth en 
charge de la conestablie, quant la crestiente l'ot recovree toute 
abatue... ' In other words Frederick challenges John's title to 
Beirut, and John counters that it was a legal exchange (for the 
constableship) soon after the Christians took Beirut (in 1197). 
John, however, was still constable in October 1200 (RRH, no. 776) and 
Walter of Montbeliard appears with the title only in March 1206 (RRH, 
no. 811). John first appears as 'of Beirut' in May 1206 (RRH, 
no. 812). i. e. the exchange must have taken place some time between 
1200 and 1206. In addition despite the text implying that John had 
received the fief c. 1197 his comment that it was 'taute abatue' when 
it came into his possession would suggest a much later date. Only 
the walls of Beirut had been dismantled in 1197 (Roger of Howden, 
iv. 28; Ibn al-Athir, RHC Hist. Or., ii. 86), whereas the destruction 
to which John refers could have been caused by the earthquake of 1202 
(Ernoul, pp337-8; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p208). This might narrow 
the period of the grant to 1202-1206. John himself claims he 
received Beirut from Aimery and Isabella i. e. before Aimery's death 
in 1205, but the 'Lignages', RHC Lois, ii. 448 (cf. ibid., p458), 
states simply that Beirut was given to John by Isabel. 'Eracles', 
p305, indicates that John was given the bailliage after Aimery died 
but whilst Isabella was still alive. (It also implies John was 
already lord of Beirut when given the regency, but the MS variants 
omit his title). Could it be, therefore, that the exchange dates from 
the period after Aimery's death, but before that of Isabella in 
1205/6? and was John, like Raymond of Tripoli (supra, n. 55) intended 
to hold Beirut only while regent? In which case was John's claim 
that he was granted Beirut by Isabella and Aimery (c. 1197) an attempt 
to dissociate Beirut from the regency and give legitimacy to his 
continued possession of the fief? There is no sure proof of this, but 
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it seems clear that for various reasons John was anxious to give a 
false impression of the circumstances of his acquisition of Beirut. 
I am, nevertheless, at this stage inclined to prefer the theory 
presented here that Frederick based his claims to Beirut on its 
conversion to a port without due reference to the crown. Although 
John's speech is only reported (probably by Philip of Novara) and we 
should not take it as necessarily a reliable presentation of his 
arguments, it seems to me that John and his supporters would have 
been keen to stress the legality of his possession if only to shift 
the emphasis if his title was being challenged for any other reason, 
such as its development ss a port. Moreover I would argue that 
Beirut was not exploited as a port until the 1220s: Wilbrand of 
Oldenburg visiting Beirut in 1212 described the superb defences and 
sumptuous palace which John had built, but did not mention the port 
(J. C. M. Laurent, Peregrinatores Medii Aevi Quattuor (2nd. ed., 
Leipzig, 1873), pp166-7), and John himself says that reconstruction 
was financed by his estates in Cyprus ('Gestes', p679 [as opposed to 
coming from port dues]). Also grants of privilege by John of Ibelin 
to the Italian communes only appear to have been made after the 
Christian defeat at Damietta at a time when it was known John of 
Brienne intended to absent himself from the kingdom or, indeed, after 
he had actually departed (RRH, nos. 950,951,957,963,965 - November 1221 to September 12223; John of Brienne's intentions were 
known in September 1221 and he arrived in Europe in November 1222 - 
infra chapter 4, p69). Consequently, although there are problems 
with John of Ibelin's explanation of how, when, and from whom he 
acquired Beirut, there is also a deal of evidence to support the view 
that Frederick claimed Beirut principally because of its unauthorised 
development as a port. 
57 Prawer, Histoire, ii. 120. 
58 Brand, p191; Van Cleve, Frederick II, pp20-3,113-6; T. C. Van 
Cleve, Markward of Anweiler and the Sicilian Regency (Princeton, 
1937), pp55-61. See also Donovan, pp75-8. Henry VI's attempts to 
secure the hereditary succession may have been connected with his 
alleged offer of homage to the papacy - E. Jordan, 'Henri VI a-t-il 
offert ä Celestin III de lui faire hommage pour l'empire? ', in 
Melanges d'histoire dumoyen age offerts a M. Ferdinand Lot par ses 
amis et ses eleves (Paris, 1925), pp285-306, with particular 
reference to p288. 
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Chapter Two 
The precedent of the Fifth Crusade 
Egypt might well have been the jewel in the crown, the strong, 
wealthy heart of Islam, and the most important partner in the 
military alliance which encircled the crusader states in the East, 
but as far as we know Frederick had no say in the translation of the 
Fifth Crusade from Palestine to the Nile deltal. It was a decision 
made without his connivance, yet regardless of Frederick's own 
intentions and, in spite of the running attacks made by al-Mu `azzam, 
the ruler of Damascus, in Christian Syria, particularly during 12202, 
it was always assumed from the time of Honorius's first entreaty to 
Frederick in 1218 that the emperor would employ his troops to assist 
the crusader army already before Damietta. Frederick himself does 
not appear to have disputed Egypt as the focus of the crusade: he 
despatched contingents of troops under Louis of Bavaria (who arrived 
locum tenens imperatoris3) and the chancellor of Sicily, Walter of 
Palear; he sanctioned the involvement of his Master Justiciar for 
Apulia and the Terra Laboris, Matthew of Apulia, and on a number of 
occasions sent messengers to announce his own impending arrival at 
Damietta4. 
But with the benefit of hindsight we know that Frederick was 
never to arrive in Egypt in person, and when he did finally depart 
for the East in 1228, it was for Syria, and not for the lush lands of 
the Nile. This begs several questions: if Frederick intended to go 
to Egypt in 1218-1221 (regardless of whatever his intentions might 
have been in 1215 when he first pledged to go on crusade), what 
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factors made him switch his immediate destination to the Holy Land, 
and when exactly was this decision made? Dependent on this is what 
the crusaders in Egypt expected of their endeavours, and whether they 
saw their conquests as a permanent extension to the Latin Kingdom of 
Jerusalem through which would be engineered the final collapse of 
Islam, or as a pawn to be sacrificed in return for the immediate 
restoration of the lost Christian lands in Syria? This is perhaps 
the most important aspect of the problem, and one which underlies the 
whole of the Christian dilemma throughout the century following 
Hattin. In short, just where did the crusaders see the future of 
their eastern kingdom? 
Without doubt, despite the extreme demands which the return of 
Jerusalem, Galilee, and the Trans-Jordan would exert on the post-1187 
kingdom, it seems clear that this was the ultimate goal of the 
crusaders5. Nevertheless, how this was to be achieved proved the 
cause of major discord, exacerbated in September/October 1219 by 
al-Kämil's timely offer6 of the entire kingdom of Jerusalem, and the 
Holy City together with funds to restore its walls, providing the 
Christians would agree to withdraw. Kerak and Montreal were not 
included in the proposal, but the sultan offered annual tribute for 
them as long as the truce would last7. At this stage the army had 
been in Egypt for sixteen months and had gained few successes: the 
collapse of Damietta seemed as distant as ever. According to Oliver 
of Paderborn, King John, the French, Count Ranulf of Chester, and the 
German nobles were all in favour of acceptance8, but Pelagius, the 
patriarch of Jerusalem, the various bishops, the Templars, the 
Hospitallers, the Italians, and Oliver himself, rejected the 
approach9. A letter despatched to Honorius by certain French barons 
within days of the capture of Damietta reported that the sultan's 
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offer of truce had been rejected as totally inadequate ostensibly 
because, 'Nos autem petebamus totum regnum Hierosolymitanum.. p10: 
without Kerak and Montreal, as Oliver recognised, it was possible to 
guarantee neither the security of the Holy City nor of the rest of 
the lands which would be restored to the kingdom under the terms of 
the truce 11 . For which reason, many prudent men had advised that 
'Damietta ought to be taken before everything'12. 
Once the city of Damietta had fallen to the crusaders, 
essentially two possible alternatives for the restoration of the 
kingdom's pre-1187 frontiers presented themselves. In the first 
option it was possible that the Christians might seek a direct 
exchange of Damietta for those alienated lands previously offered by 
the sultan, al-Kämil. This time, however, any deal would have to 
include the Transjordanian fortresses; Damietta was after all, it 
was generally recognised, a highly important city, and without it the 
Ayyübid hold on Egypt itself would be threatened. If a1-Kämil had 
been ready to buy off the crusaders so generously before their 
breakthrough, how much more might he be willing to offer now that 
Damietta was in Christian hands? 
13 But the sudden successes appear, 
predictably, to have had a hardening effect on views in the Christian 
camp. The French nobles, dismissed by Oliver of Paderborn as 14 
partisans of King John in support of accepting the sultan's peace 
overtures in October, in a letter dated at Damietta on 12 November 
121915, claimed to have opposed any exchange which did not include 
the whole of the former kingdom. Even King John seems to have 
16 
modified his attitude. Regardless of whether or not al-Kämil would 
ever have been in a position to surrender Kerak and Montreal, the 
idea of a simple exchange appeared no longer reasonable17 and was 
universally discounted, although it was of course destined to be 
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resurrected in the fatal month of August 1221. Then John of Brienne 
again urged that the army avail itself of the repeated offers made by 
the Egyptian sultan. Again his advice was rejected, possibly because 
Honorius had requested that all peace proposals be referred to him18, 
but primarily because, so we are told, the emperor had forbidden any 
peace or treaty to be concluded with the Saracens19. This charge was 
repeated by Gregory IX in 122720, but Frederick countered by his 
assertion that there was no conceivable way he would have forbidden 
such an exchange since the whole object of his labours had been to 
secure the liberation of the Holy Land21. J. P. Donovan prefers to 
believe the papal version22, but the charge seems puerile, and it 
becomes apparent that Gregory's repetition of the accusation was an 
attempt to justify the excommunication of the emperor by denigrating 
his role in the Fifth Crusade whilst at the same time exonerating the 
Church and its representative at Damietta, the legate Pelagius. 
Oliver's view that in consideration 'of the critical point of our 
necessity, we made an excellent bargain [in August 1221]'23, does not 
compensate for the fact that prior to July/August 1221 the crusaders 
could probably have negotiated the return of many of their initial 
objectives. 
The second option open to the crusaders after the fall of 
Damietta envisaged the retention of the Christian conquests to force 
an Egyptian collapse which in turn would precipitate the release of 
the lost lands in Syria. Damietta was after all 'la clef, 1'entree 
de la terre d'Egypte'24, and the leaders of the crusade had already 
summarised the importance of taking the city, 'Quatenus extincto 
forte divitiarum hostilium universi rivuli exsiccentur'25. The 
so-called Chronique d'Ernoul believed that through Damietta would be 
conquered all the land of Jerusalem and Egypt26, and in a letter to 
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Honorius dated 11 November 1219 various nobles urged that if only 
sufficient crusaders arrived it would be possible to take Cairo, the 
remainder of Egypt and, as a consequence, Jerusalem27. The bishop of 
Acre, Jacques de Vitry, took this one stage further and saw in the 
conquest of Egypt the liberation of the Christian Church in that 
country and ultimately the return of all the isolated eastern 
Christians to the unity of the Faith28. The occupation of Damietta 
was therefore to be on a permanent basis: Pelagius joined the city 
and its appurtenances to the kingdom of Jerusalem for ever29, the 
Great Mosque was converted into a church, and a tower in the city was 
allocated for the use of the archbishop of Damietta30; coins were 
even struck bearing the inscription + I. OhES : REX : on the 
obverse, and on the reverse + DAMIATA 
31, 
again indicating the 
long-term nature of the Christian occupation. 
Up to this point opinion was united, but on the question of 
timescale it diverged to form two further independent alternatives - 
whether the crusaders should stand their ground, or whether they 
should launch an immediate offensive. John of Brienne preferred to 
await the arrival of the emperor before moving against the Muslims32, 
and the History of the Patriarchs portrays him as declaring that the 
Egyptians planned 
'to besiege us for a month or two or three, but they will not 
obtain any advantage over us... and we shall grow stronger, and 
our enemy will become less and will be weakened, and if we get 
possession of Egypt in twenty years, we shall have made 
33 haste'. 
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This interpretation was rejected by Pelagius who wanted to move 
against al-Kämil without delay. The difference of opinion may have 
34 
been the chief reason behind King John's departure for the Holy Land 
in the spring of 122035, ostensibly to press his claim to the throne 
of Armenia36, but if John sought to enforce a delay in hostilities 
until the arrival of the emperor, he was successful. Despite the 
legate's exhortations, a conference of knights refused to advance in 
the absence of King John37. With the arrival of the emperor's 
lieutenant, Louis of Bavaria, in May 1221, however, the knights' 
protestations that there was no leader capable of uniting the 
crusader army were no longer valid. Pelagius therefore sent urgent 
summons to King John in Acre to return to Egypt for the imminent 
expedition, and prepared to march out against the Muslims. 
38 
However one cares to look at the strange and complex tale of 
the Fifth Crusade it is clear that the primary objective was 
Jerusalem and the Holy Land. Whatever arguments there might have 
been over booty, leadership, or the means by which the lost lands 
were to be regained, the crusaders and the rest of Christendom, 
despite the occasional blurring of aims, never actually lost sight of 
this objective. In letters the emperor or pope might talk of aid for 
Damietta, but actions were always for the business of the Holy Land 
('ad negotium terre Sanctae') or for the liberation of the Holy Land 
('ad liberandam Terram Sanctam')39. If, in the meantime, it was 
possible to secure Egypt as well, then so much the better. 
Despite the unhappy outcome of the Fifth Crusade, up until 
1223/4 (and perhaps later) imperial plans do not seem to have 
precluded a return to Damietta. The Chronica Regia Coloniensis for 
1224 note that under the auspices of the emperor fifty ships of such 
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magnitude were being prepared that together they would be able to 
carry not only two thousand knights, their horses, and all relevant 
arms, but also ten thousand footsoldiers complete with weapons. Each 
single ship was so constructed as to form or include a kind of bridge 
so that the knights, should it prove necessary, armed and astride 
their horses, might leisurely and without injury exit by means of 
these bridges and advance into battle exactly as if they had been on 
land. 'And if this were to be the task, having erected sails, they 
[the ships] would be able to enter the river of Damietta, or any 
other river'40. Of equal importance is the letter of the Patriarch 
Nicholas of Alexandria sent to Pope Honorius in the summer of 1223 
concerning the sufferings of the Christians in Egypt, in which the 
patriarch proceeded to urge on Frederick's preparations for crusade 
and to outline the necessary plan of campaign in order to take 
possession of the country41. The timeliness of this unsolicited 
communication (agreement had been reached the previous March for the 
marriage of Frederick to Isabella of Brienne, which might have been 
viewed as a distraction from the goal of Egypt) and the shadowy 
identification of the Patriarch Nicholas would tend to suggest that 
the letter is a forgery intended to influence the destination of 
Frederick's projected expedition42. If this should prove to be the 
case it is nevertheless an important document, being representative 
of an Egyptian lobby undaunted by the Christian defeat at Damietta 
43 
yet fearful that the emperor might pursue a more direct line in the 
liberation of the Holy Land. The Egyptians themselves did not 
discount a renewed crusade against their ports. Certainly when Louis 
IX arrived at Damietta in 1249 he found it packed with supplies 
enough to withstand even the most demanding siege44, and it seems 
reasonable to assume that similar precautions would have been taken 
during the years intervening between the Fifth and Imperial 
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crusades45. Hans Gottschalk postulates that the reasoning behind 
al-Kämil's approaches towards Frederick was principally to avoid a 
disaster similar to Damietta46. The Venetian prohibition of trade 
with Egypt from 1224, and papal agreement in 1223 that future 
conquests in the East should acrue to King John47, could both be 
interpreted as indicating that the forthcoming crusade was likely to 
strike at the Egyptian littoral. More likely however was that the 
Venetian measure was simply to deprive the enemy of the means of 
resistance, in Syria or in Egypt48, whilst the ruling on the 
distribution of conquests was the natural solution to problems 
presented during the Fifth Crusade and during the Third Crusade when 
the vagueness of the agreement between Philip Augustus and Richard 
the Lionheart to split the profits and conquests made by their 
expeditions had led to major disagreements49. 
The post-1221 destination of the crusade may or may not have 
been one imposed on Frederick from outside - official letters again 
talk of the 'liberation of the Holy Land'50, whilst a letter to 
Honorius from Queen Russudan of Georgia in 1224 is under the 
impression that Frederick had been ordered by the pope to cross to 
Syria in pursuance of the release of the Holy Land from its 
captivity51 - but the great conference at Ferentino in March 1223 at 
which it was proposed that Frederick marry the king of Jerusalem's 
daughter, Isabella, must have prompted a serious examination of the 
primary objectives of his crusading vow52. When the wedding took 
place in November 1225 Frederick immediately took the title, king of 
Jerusalem53, and it is certainly possible that his acquisition of the 
crown of the Baldwins influenced the destination of his crusade. Any 
strategic considerations which may have dictated an attack on Egypt 
were finally overcome in 1226/7 by the arrival in Sicily of 
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al-Kämil's emissary Fakhr al-Din who was authorised to offer the 
emperor the Holy City and 'some of Saläh al-Din's conquests' in 
return for his presence in Syria54. 
The orientation of Frederick's thoughts towards the Latin 
Kingdom rather than Egypt is interesting. I have already discussed 
Gregory IX's charge that in 1221 Frederick was opposed to any simple 
exchange of Damietta for Jerusalem. It would appear, however, that 
Frederick had no undue attachment to Damietta despite his displeasure 
at its loss55. Considered in isolation the Chronica Regia 
Coloniensis and the letter of the Patriarch Nicholas would indicate 
that despite the adverse effect which the collapse of the Christian 
offensive in Egypt must have had on established preconceptions, 
Damietta remained the prime motivating objective despite the 
traditional attraction of Jerusalem and the Holy Land itself56. 
Indeed, Heyd points out that the fleeting Christian occupation of 
Damietta served as a demonstration that it was not impossible to 
occupy an Egyptian city and encouraged the belief that a vigorous 
attack could put the whole of the Egyptian coast in Christian 
hands57. But in actual fact I would suggest that throughout the 
period 1217-1229 the ultimate objective which lay behind the 
crusading movement was the liberation of Jerusalem and the lost lands 
of its kingdom. Although the decision to invest Damietta was not 
made in consultation with the emperor, he was willing to support the 
expedition with arms and men, and with his own presence, had 
circumstances permitted. Nevertheless despite the possibility that 
the objectives of the imperial crusade might be achieved by way of 
Egypt, the various preoccupations and opportunities - problems with 
the Saracens in Sicily, the first tentative approaches concerning 
Frederick's marriage to Isabella, the 
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diplomatic contacts with al-Kämil, all combined to convince Frederick 
that his crusade should be directed towards Syria. Such a 
destination would not only bring the kingdom of Jerusalem within the 
bounds of imperial policy58, extending the imperial conception way 
beyond that of Charlemagne, but would also, by agreement with 
al-Kämil, virtually guarantee the return of the Holy City to 
Christian control, and with minimal effort. 
Palestine as the primary destination of Frederick's crusade was 
probably therefore under consideration at least as early as 1223 when 
the marriage to Isabella was first mooted, and certainly before 1225 
when the marriage was celebrated. Any surviving lobby in favour of a 
first strike at Egypt was thwarted ultimately by the Egyptian sultan; 
by falling in with al-Kämil's proposals Frederick would not only be 
able to fulfil his longstanding vow of crusade, but the campaign was 
likely to be both swift and successful, thus parting him from his 
European possessions for a minimal amount of time, a highly necessary 
requirement if he was to combat the aspirations of German princes, 
Sicilian nobles, and papacy alike. Jerusalem, and not Damietta, would 
therefore be the primary goal of the imperial crusade. 
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Chapter Three 
Frederick's preoccupations in advance of the imperial crusade 
Frederick II's assumption of the cross at his coronation as 
king of the Romans on 25 July 1215 was, so we are encouraged to 
believe, a spontaneous and totally unanticipated act of devotion. In 
1227 on the very eve of his departure on crusade, Frederick was to 
write 
'... considering devoutly how we might repay God for the many 
gifts conferred upon us, as soon as we received the crown at 
Aachen, we took the cross, though this was not an equal payment 
to him, offering ourselves and our power not just in sacrifice 
but in the Holocaust to God, with pure and sincere spirit, that 
we might work for the recovery of the Holy Land with the 
efforts we had vowed and owed". 
It was, according to one recent biographical work, 'a brilliant 
diplomatic stroke', simultaneously an expression of a 'deep sense of 
gratitude for the many blessings bestowed upon him by divine 
2 favour' 
The political motivation of the act is incontrovertible, but the 
innate turbulence of western Europe as a whole was too great to be 
pacified by a single oath of crusade. Indeed, thirteen years were to 
elapse between Frederick's initial announcement of his intention to 
reclaim the Holy Land 
3 for Christendom and his actual departure from 
the shores of Italy, giving rise to much speculation in some quarters 
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that Frederick's vow had been purely and simply political, and that 
the perennial postponement of his expedition was clear proof that he 
had never seriously intended to undertake a crusade in any form 
whatsoever. Such criticism, however, failed to take account of the 
circumstances in which the young Frederick found himself - an 
insecure monarch of a semi-Christian island kingdom and the invited 
head of an 'anti-imperialist' faction in Germany. To say then that 
Frederick was making promises from a position of stability and power 
is totally misleading. The kingdom which he ruled, and the empire to 
which he aspired, were far from tranquil and presented innumerable 
problems which had to be surmounted before Frederick could even 
consider the fulfilment of his pledge. As a consequence it was 
impossible for Frederick not to force certain delays in his 
departure. That these delays totalled thirteen years is entirely 
circumstantial. 
After Frederick's election as king of the Romans--in 1212 his 
policies centred essentially on the kingdom of Sicily, Germany and 
the bridge between the two - northern and central Italy. Later he 
would be concerned with imperial rights and prerogatives in the 
kingdoms of Cyprus, Armenia and, more latterly, Jerusalem. But, 
before Frederick could exercise imperial authority in Europe or exert 
his influence in the eastern Mediterranean, he had first to pursue 
two basic objectives - the restoration of order, and the restoration 
of royal rights, in his European dominions. In this he was motivated 
by the lost rights of his ancestors, as he saw them4. Frederick's 
hasty departure for Germany in 1212, against the better judgement of 
a number of his advisers and of his consort, Constance, suspended 
what little royal progress had been made against the semi-anarchic 
tendencies in the kingdom of Sicily in favour of an eight-year 
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absence in, and preoccupation with, Germany. This was not to say that 
Frederick ignored his maternal inheritance, but the simple fact of 
his presence elsewhere encouraged baronial presumption. 
As for Germany, the death of Frederick's father, the Holy Roman 
Emperor Henry VI, had instigated a long period of struggle between 
the papal candidate Otto of Brunswick, elected emperor on 9 June 
1198, and Henry's brother, Philip of Swabia, who had initially hoped 
to act on his infant nephew's behalf. The convenient death of Philip 
in 1208 was sufficiently belated to render the 'boy from Apulia' 
forgotten and leave Otto more or less unchallenged as emperor. Such 
a situation however, was evidently too much of a temptation for the 
Welf emperor who, secure in his office, rode roughshod over the 
accrued rights and privileges of the German nobility. His arrogant 
manner and injudicious acts alienated a good many of his former 
adherents. His increasingly apparent intention of depriving 
Frederick of the Sicilian crown, and his open defiance of promises 
made to the pope concerning the sanctity of the papal state, in 
particular the grant of privileges in the March of Ancona, the Duchy 
of Spoleto, and the 'Mathildine lands', prompted Innocent to withdraw 
his support from the discredited Otto and to incite the German 
princes to revolt against the legitimately elected sovereign. Otto's 
excommunication, and that of his supporters, first published 18 
November 1210, was widely publicised on 31 March 1211 following the 
failure of negotiations. 
As a result the Germany which Frederick was to encounter in 1212 
was one racked by civil war, and the methods which he employed in 
Germany (essentially the concession of privilege to the firmly 
entrenched princes) during the 'initiation period' of 1212-1215 were 
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aimed to pacify the country and to secure and extend that support 
which already existed. The declaration at his coronation of 
Frederick's willingness to depart on crusade can be interpreted as a 
simple extension of this policy. Certainly it was patently obvious 
that Frederick's early departure on crusade was a sheer 
impossibility, and recognised as such by both Innocent and Honorius5. 
In the first instance, despite waning opposition, and the decreasing 
amount of land under Welf control, Frederick's absence in the Holy 
Land was inconceivable as long as Otto IV remained alive to serve as 
a focal point for the rebel princes. Continued defiance was also made 
feasible by financial support for Otto from his uncle King John of 
England, who, irrespective of familial ties, no doubt viewed the 
conflict in Germany as beneficial to his own cause in France, since 
any unrest amongst the German princelings could not be dismissed by 
Philip Augustus as totally inconsequential. And although the 
crushing French victory at the battle of Bouvines (27 July 1214) had 
utterly shattered Otto's prestige, it had by no means removed him as 
an effective ally and opponent. This is emphasised by the fact that 
despite the continued depletion of Otto's territory and support 
throughout 1216 and 1217 (until in 1217 he had the support of the 
Margrave of Brandenburg alone) in July 1216, when Frederick summoned 
his wife Constance and son Henry to Germany, it was considered safer 
that each should travel by separate routes. Ironically it was 
impossible to strike a decisive blow against Otto and his supporters 
since the crusade of 1217 had deprived Frederick of much military 
support. Only with Otto's revolting, and apparently needless, death 
on 13 May 1218 was the chief difficulty in the path of Frederick's 
departure removed6. Even this did not immediately release Frederick 
from his problems in Germany as unrest in many areas, often the 
result of trifling local disputes, was capable of developing into 
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widespread confusion, and so common that it proved a major temptation 
to the enemies of the Hohenstaufen and a major obstacle to the 
maintenance of central authority. Other threats to order were 
serious ecclesiatical quarrels in Regensburg, and a conflict between 
the king of Bohemia and the bishop of Prague, which threatened to 
upset relations between Frederick II and the pope7. Border disputes 
between France and Germany, together with the longstanding feud 
between the counts William of Holland and Louis of Loos, and the 
death of Berthold V of Zähringen, rector of Burgundy, without a 
direct heir, were major preoccupations. 
Germany was a huge conglomerate of disparate views and opinions, 
the total placation of which, it goes without saying, was both 
impractical and unfeasible. Frederick's policy, however, as a means 
of facilitating the restoration of order and the consolidation of his 
support, was to surrender the rights of the feudal lord in return for 
sovereign rights; this was to result in increased sovereign 
authority by which royal officials (advocatus, Schultheiss, or 
Burggraf) could be instituted who exercised authority not as feudal 
vassals, but as direct agents of the king. Since this policy 
integrally involved an ever-increasing principality for Frederick 
himself (who was primarily regarded as a territorial prince amongst 
numerous other territorial princes) Frederick's policy included not 
merely the concession of privilege and grants, but the sanction of 
existing privilege and the conferring of jurisdictional rights. 
8 
The various problems and political machinations in Germany 
occupied Frederick from 1212 to 1220 when he returned to Italy, and 
to Rome in particular, for his imperial coronation on 22 November 
1220, before moving on to the kingdom of Sicily. Sicily had suffered 
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particularly badly during Frederick's absence in Germany. One reason 
for this was that the long years of Frederick's minority had already 
ensured a weakening of royal authority, which was inevitably to 
continue during the precipitate departure of the king in 1212, 
exposing the kingdom as it did to the depredations of a host of 
self-seeking enemies determined to seize every opportunity which 
these conditions might provide. The loss and usurpation of royal 
rights and authority which characterised the whole period of 
Frederick's minority was stemmed only momentarily by the king's 
majority. Some semblance of continued royal authority was obtained, 
despite his absenteeism, until 1216, but on Constance's departure for 
Germany the kingdom was once again at the mercy of its 
self-interested lords. 
One major problem which faced Frederick was the fact that 
despite the undisputed legitimacy of his claim to the Sicilian crown9 
his views concerning the status of the kingdom were in dramatic 
conflict with those of the pope. Innocent III had considered the 
rightful place of Sicily as a feudal principality subject to the 
suzerain authority of the Holy See, and during the papal regency for 
Frederick II the kingdom had been administered 'not as the 
disinterested guardianship of a sovereign state, but as a 
protectorate over Church property whilst awaiting an opportunity for 
its restoration to papal control'10. It was predictable, therefore, 
that Frederick's all-encompassing policy of retrieving lost and 
alienated rights would, sooner or later, bring pope and emperor into 
direct conflict. Eight years of absence had obliterated any advances 
which the crown had made against its 'competitors' in the kingdom, 
and the restoration of order there was to prove a three year 
struggle. Frederick's immediate tasks were to regain the dissipated 
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crown lands and to seize all castles and fortifications essential to 
royal interests, as a precursor to the subjugation of the powerful 
feudal barons whose undisguised independence threatened the unity and 
orderly government of the kingdom. Orderly administration also 
demanded the suppression of the Saracen community on the island of 
Sicily which had been in continuous revolt since the death of the 
Emperor Henry VI, aided and abetted by their fellow Muslims in North 
Africa. In addition the powerful commercial cities of northern Italy 
which had entrenched themselves in the Sicilian coastal areas, 
including her vital seaports, had to be combatted and their 
l l. 
privileges cut back 
But whereas in Germany Frederick had sought to restore the power 
of the crown by yielding feudal rights as a means of securing 
sovereign rights from the firmly entrenched princes, in Sicily 
similar groups were restricted and forced into a subservient position 
under royal power12. Again, however, the implemented policies 
encompassed quintessentially the aims of securing authority and 
'restoring' royal rights, in particular those which Frederick 
believed to have been held by the Norman kings until the death of 
William II (1189), together with the recovery of all dues, rents, 
services and prerogatives adjudged to have been usurped from the 
crown during the period 1189-1209i3. It was in order to facilitate 
the restoration of the fabric of Norman government that new laws were 
promulgated at the Capuan assises in mid-December 1220. As 
J. M. Powell points out, this legislation was designed to restore the 
traditional framework of government, not initiate new administrative 
practice14 and, indeed, in many instances what was once custom now 
became written law with Frederick enjoining his subjects to observe 
strictly all good usages and customs current in the time of King 
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William15. In effect Frederick was employing the indigenous 
resources of the kingdom to achieve his own ends, appealing to the 
ever-present conception of a 'Golden Age' in order to avoid the need 
to resort to military might. In line with this all privileges 
granted by Henry VI, Constance, and Frederick II himself prior to the 
Diet of Capua were to be submitted for inspection and verification, 
ostensibly to ward against unauthorised grants of privilege during 
the troubled period following William's death. By this method 
Frederick recovered much crown property, whilst other privileges were 
granted post curiam Capuae, although sometimes with clauses of 
reservation - salvo mandato et ordinatione nostra - thereby 
subordinating a grant's duration to a new examination of the 
pretensions of the holder. Such a qualification had particular 
significance since it meant that Frederick need not deal with the 
violaters of royal rights as a group, but could negotiate with them 
individually 16. Despite the obvious advantages for the crown, such a 
policy of fragmenting the opposition into individual dealings was 
inevitably long-term, if effective. In comparison, in order that the 
royal domain might be 'entire and complete', feudal estates were 
required to be surrendered pending a redistribution, the weaker 
barons being employed against the more powerful in the event of 
resistance17. As a result Frederick achieved control of all the 
major fortifications, castles and cities within a few months of his 
return to Sicily. From now on the grant of Sicilian fiefs became 
based exclusively on services to the state, with the crown as supreme 
overlord18. Other measures were taken to ensure the maintenance of 
peace, the honest administration of justice, and the implementation 
of a system of taxation; again all directed towards the 
re-establishment of the central administration and the prerogatives 
of the king. 
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Virtually of equal importance to the subjugation of the feudal 
group was Frederick's recovery of the Sicilian cities from the 
powerful maritime communes of northern Italy. Foremost amongst the 
culprits was Genoa whose former privileges in the kingdom were 
revoked, a factory at Palermo seized, and those representatives who 
had overreached themselves deprived of office19. As for Pisa, 
although in April 1219 Frederick had promised full freedom of trade 
in his kingdom, mentioning specifically Messina and Palermo as 
trading centres open to them, the phraseology of the privilege 
proferred to her in November 1221 read 'throughout the whole empire', 
with no mention of the Sicilian kingdom. To Venice and all other 
cities Frederick applied the formula which underlay his entire policy 
of rehabilitation i. e. a return to the norms and standards prevailing 
under his Norman predecessors. In general no favouritism was shown 
to any of the northern commercial communes, and the restrictive 
measures taken against them now made it possible to open the way for 
the future prosperity of the Sicilian cities through mercantile 
activities. In this way Frederick's commercial policy could be 
classed as 'enlightened', depriving the communes of political 
influence whilst encouraging them to continue their maritime trade. 
But native merchants do not seem to have been rewarded with any 
advantage over their better organised competition, and the immediate 
effect of Frederick's economic policies, although achieving their 
initial aim of securing adequate revenue for the crown20, was 
injurious to the domestic agrarian economy and to Sicilian commercial 
interests21. These restrictions did, however, facilitate the 
re-introduction of the old Norman official, Admiral of the Kingdom, 
an authorised`pirate-in-chief empowered to confiscate property of 
foreign communes resident in the kingdom who offended against its 
laws and persons, and who, in the person of Henry of Malta, built up 
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a royal navy which greatly surpassed that of its Norman predecessor. 
It is remarkable (as Van Cleve points out) that within a month of his 
arrival in the kingdom Frederick was able to despatch forty ships 
with reinforcements for the Holy Land22. 
The Capuan assises and Frederick's presence in the kingdom of 
Sicily were of prime importance to the establishment of peace and 
order on the Sicilian mainland, and the restoration of royal power 
there was to all intents and purposes achieved by mid 122123. This 
did not mean, however, that the crown had re-asserted an unassailable 
position; the towns, which had wrung from Tancred privileges to the 
point of semi-independence from royal authority and which Frederick 
had wooed during his protracted absence in Germany as a means of 
preventing the nobility from becoming all-powerful, were at last 
subordinated to the crown24, but in spite of the measures taken 
against the Italian communes, Sicilian merchants held no advantage, 
and were compelled to trade on an equal, if not weaker, footing than 
the north Italian powers25. The Sicilian nobility had been dislodged 
from their position of superiority but had been treated with extreme 
lenience - of the chief offenders Ranier, count of Sartiano, was 
compelled to surrender the landed estates held by his family in 
Sicily26; Diepold of Acerra and count of Spoleto, the former 
henchman of Otto IV, was permitted to live out an exile with the 
Teutonic Knights in Germany, if only after his brother had 
surrendered the castles of Cajazzo and Alife in the valley of the 
Volterno27. Only Thomas of Celano, count of Molise, was treated with 
any contrasting severity, being besieged in Celano for three months 
before a pardon was arranged for himself and his adherents in return 
for the surrender of the tower and castle of Celano, plus the 
strongholds of Orindole and San Potito. In addition Thomas was 
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obliged to depart on the next passage for the Holy Land where he was 
to remain for a period of three years, unless recalled by the 
emperor. The agreement did not, however, prevent the king's 
justiciar, Henry of Morra, from expelling the citizens of Celano and 
destroying their city, with the exception of the church of St. 
John28. As a consequence of the limited retribution which Frederick 
pursued the nobility remained powerful, as did the Church. 
The Church was a potential rival to the monarchy in the kingdom 
of Sicily and the authority of the papacy had been greatly increased 
during Innocent III's regency for the young Frederick (1198-1209). 
But whilst Frederick's basic aim was to restore the prerogatives and 
authority of the crown, his attitude was motivated by practical 
considerations, not anti-ecclesiastical or anti-religious bias; on 
the other hand he was not swayed by religious sentiment. He 
apparently intended to apply the law of privileges equally against 
ecclesiastical and lay holders of privilege, but was prevented from 
doing so mainly because he needed the support of the Church, perhaps 
even the active assistance of bishops and abbots within the kingdom. 
From 1223 to 1239 Frederick was extremely generous in the 
distribution of privileges, and was on good terms with most of the 
bishops, retaining the support of the churchmen even during Gregory 
IX's invasion of the kingdom in 1229. But this was only after the 
failure of the initially strict policy of attempting to impose the 
salvo mandato clause (1220-1223), when Frederick wished above all to 
restore relations between the monarchy and ecclesiastical holders of 
privileges to the situation as it had existed prior to the death of 
William II29. Although, therefore, the Capuan assises appeared to 
have achieved the goal of restoring the position of the crown in 
Sicilian politics to that which it had held in 1189, all the evidence 
- 44 - 
points to the fact that all the turbulence of the previous years 
might just as easily be rekindled should the immediate and prolonged 
absence of the emperor on crusade prove unavoidable. Indeed there is 
evidence to suggest that the consolidation of authority which 
Frederick sought to achieve in his kingdom was seriously hampered by 
the preoccupation with a crusading expedition and by constant 
prodding from the Church and curia30. What is more, although Powell 
considers that by 1224 the aims of the Capuan laws were fulfilled 
permitting Frederick to turn to the reorganisation of the Regnum 
Italicum and the recurring problem of the crusade31, the island of 
Sicily remained far from pacified, an irritating and potentially 
dangerous distraction. 
As has already been noted32, the Saracens on the island had been 
in continual revolt since the death of Henry VI and had played an 
active part during the civil war by their provision of support for 
the German faction headed by Markward von Anweiler. By the time of 
Frederick's return in 1221, the Muslims controlled much of the 
mountainous interior of Sicily including a number of important 
strongholds. It was not uncommon for Christians to be driven out, 
their lands seized and reapportioned amongst the Saracens33. In 1221 
the Muslim rebels were estimated at between twenty-five and thirty 
thousand34. Documents dated 1220-1221 restoring to the archbishop of 
Monreale land seized by the rebels, and regranting rights to the 
church of Monreale previously enjoyed under William II, Henry VI and 
Constance, were a strong indication of Frederick's intentions. In 
May 1222 he moved against the Muslim commander, Ibn-tAbbäd of the 
Banü cAbs35 at Giato. After a two month siege the emir was captured 
along with his Christian allies, William Porcus and Hughes de Fer, 
and executed. The rebellion, however, continued, and subsequent 
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expeditions of 1222-4 succeeeded only in driving the rebels further 
into the mountains. An attempt was made in the autumn of 1223 to cut 
the Saracen routes of communication and aid with North Africa by the 
sacking of Jerba, but the rebellion continued well into 1225, and new 
taxes had to be levied 1224-5 in order to finance the continuation of 
the struggle before the Muslims could be compelled to surrender 
piecemeal36. 
Frederick's solution was to undertake the forcible exile of some 
sixteen thousand Saracens (mainly able-bodied men and their families) 
to a military colony at Lucera, a few miles north of Foggia. Here 
they were permitted the maximum of freedom, with a degree of autonomy 
under their own officials, in return for the payment of a special tax 
(Jizyah). Two other smaller Muslim colonies were organised on the 
Italian mainland at Girofalco and Nocera37. Despite the effectiveness 
and enlightened nature of the move, and its importance for the 
progress of Frederick's crusade, it was viewed with suspicion by the 
pope and curia, and the existence of the Saracen enclave was 
condemned by Gregory IX on more than one occasion, to whom it 
appeared the blatant fostering of the Islamic religion and its 
adherents38. For its time 
of the last steps necessar; 
previous thirty years. At 
Sicily were in as peaceful 
ever hope to achieve. Now 
and central Italy. 
it was indeed a drastic solution but one 
to overcome the chaotic conditions of the 
long last both Germany and the kingdom of 
a condition as Frederick could possibly 
he could turn his attention to northern 
In Italy Frederick sought essentially two things: first, the 
establishment of peace between the perennially warring cities, and 
second, the formal recognition by each of them of his imperial 
- 46 - 
sovereignty. In general unrest in Italy during the period 1212-18 
had been kept in check to some degree by Frederick's agents 
Aldobrando of Este (d. 1215) and Bishop Ludolf of Worms (d. 1217). The 
implications of Frederick's concept of the imperium for the communal 
independence of the northern Italian cities, however, threatened to 
upset not only the communes but also the pope. For this reason he 
was careful not to display any aggressive intentions to the Lombard 
communes or to the Duchy of Spoleto and March of Ancona during his 
passage from Germany to Sicily in 1220, and throughout the five years 
he spent engaged in the reorganisation of the kingdom. The Duchy of 
Ancona was of particular advantage to Frederick as a corridor between 
Sicily and the imperial possessions in northern Italy. His first 
move was to summon a diet for Easter 1226 at Cremona, traditionally 
loyal to the emperor and chief of the Lombard cities hostile to the 
Milanese group. The choice obviously aroused suspicions and in March 
1226 the Lombard League was reconstituted. Van Cleve puts forward 
three reasons why this might have been: first, a consciousness of 
guilt in encroaching upon the imperial regions of Italy, second a 
marked growth in the sovereign pretensions during the preceding 
decades of imperial weakness, and third an awareness of the success 
of the Capuan legislation in Sicily39. Frederick ordered the vassals 
of the kingdom to accompany him into Lombardy, and Spoleto and Ancona 
were apparently mobilised. This was an encroachment on the Papal 
State, and the pope's remonstrations compelled the emperor to 
yield40. Apparent from this episode is the fact that, despite his 
promises, Frederick did not regard the separation of central Italy 
from the empire as irrevocable4i, and this is exactly what Honorius 
feared42. A letter of Frederick's stated that he wished to reform 
the political status of the empire43, and there is no reason to 
assume otherwise since indeed the next logical step would be to 
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establish imperial dominance in northern and central Italy as a 
natural bridge between Sicily and Germany. 
Van Cleve claims that during his eight years in Germany, 
Frederick must have perceived that 'the goal of universal empire was 
to be attained only if first the Roman Church and the Lombard cities 
could be integrated within the fabric of the Empire in such a manner 
that temporal sovereignty would rest solely in the hands of the 
Emperor'44. It was a partial aim of the Diet of Cremona to restore 
imperial rights45, and inevitably the members of the Lombard League 
feared their subjugation comparable to that already achieved in 
Sicily. But the independence of the communes was already too far 
advanced to be effectively checked, by the resources available to a 
thirteenth-century emperor. The League successfully blocked King 
Henry's march south to join his father in Lombardy, and after several 
months of virtual inactivity Henry returned to Germany and Frederick 
46 to Sicily. 
As a result of the stalemate in Italy Frederick sought to reach 
agreement with the Lombard League, and in August 1226 a conciliatory 
letter was despatched to Honorius, agreeing in the interests of the 
crusade to submit the conflict between the Lombards and himself to 
the arbitration of the pope and his cardinals47. Agreement was 
reached with surprising speed and guided by this accord the pope 
formulated his judgement which he submitted to the emperor and cities 
of the League on 5 January 122748. Amongst the stipulations of the 
agreement was one that the communes were to levy and maintain at 
their own expense 400 mounted troops for the use of the emperor in 
the Holy land for a period of not less than two years49. Frederick 
formally accepted the judgement on 1 February 1227, but the Lombards 
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delayed, submitting their acceptance only on 26 March 1227 -a week 
after Honorius's death50. The implementation of Frederick's policies 
in Italy had not yet been successful, but at least the accord with 
the Lombards, superficial as it was, yet apparently guaranteed by the 
pope, provided for an uneasy peace in Italy, the final prerequisite 
for Frederick's departure on crusade. 
This then was the backdrop to the emperor's longrunning concern 
with and preparation for the crusade. The invitation to become king 
of the Romans had been too good an opportunity to pass up, despite 
the fact that Frederick's own kingdom of Sicily had still to be 
pacified. The task of reconstruction and restoration in both Germany 
and Sicily amply filled the years 1212-1225, and had not the Lombards 
proved so unreceptive to Frederick perhaps his active involvement 
there would have been extended beyond the summer of 1226, causing yet 
further delay in the fulfilment of the crusading plans nurtured by 
the pope. With the huge scale of the emperor's preoccupations in 
mind we can now turn, perhaps with some sympathy, to consider the 
individual delays and problems which prompted the series of 
infuriating postponements from 1219 to 1228. 
Although Frederick took the crusader's vow at an early stage of 
the preparations for the Fifth Crusade the papacy apparently made no 
attempt to enforce the execution of his pledge until late 121851. 
One reason for this may have been that Innocent III conceived of the 
crusade originally as a purely papal enterprise52. Recent 
scholarship, however, has argued that while Innocent did not regard 
Frederick as the probable leader of a new crusade, he nevertheless 
covertly encouraged Frederick's assumption of the cross, and it seems 
possible that his successor, Honorius III, was already working to 
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involve Frederick in the crusade as early as April 121752a. Yet at 
the same time it was clearly recognised that in the current German 
political climate no crusading expedition could be expected of 
Frederick. Only with the arrival of the legate Pelagius in Egypt and 
his first-hand account of the stalemate at Damietta did Honorius see 
52b the need to force Frederick's hand. 
The pope's appeal to Frederick II has not survived but it is 
obvious from Frederick's reply of 12 January 1219 that Honorius had 
urgently requested assistance and that both pope and emperor were 
fully aware of the situation in Egypt. It was now that Frederick 
first committed himself to a definite departure date, advising the 
pope that at the Diet of Fulda (December 1218) a second meeting had 
been summoned for Magdeburg the following March to arrange details of 
the crusading expedition and to make the choice for viceregent; all 
crusaders had been informed of the imperial schedule, and he urged 
the pope therefore to threaten with excommunication all those who had 
not set out by the feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June]1219 
53. At 
the same time, however, Frederick's letter clearly indicates the 
problems with which he was currently occupied. Although the Welf 
threat to Germany had been more or less removed by the death of Otto 
IV the previous May, his brother Henry of Brunswick still retained 
the imperial insignia which were essential to any monarch wishing to 
impress his subjects with his authority, and more importantly a 
necessary part of the regalia for imperial coronation. Frederick 
therefore requested the pope that Henry be compelled to give up the 
insignia, and in addition that the pope accept into his protection 
the empire and kingdom. The latter request was met immediately 
54 
but it was not until June 1219 - an interval of six months - that 
Henry was reconciled with Frederick and the insignia delivered up, 
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despite the early despatch of the Prior of Santa Maria Nova de Urbe 
who was commissioned with this task55. The delay in the success of 
the papal mission may have been the reason behind the non-occurrence 
of the Magdeburg meeting arranged for March 1219, and Frederick's 
first request for a postponement of departure to the feast of St. 
Michael [29 September 1219]56, although it was soon to become 
apparent that he aimed to consolidate and secure his authority in 
Germany by having his son elected king of the Romans and himself 
crowned emperor before his departure on crusade57. A further 
postponement was requested in early September 1219 when Frederick 
probably again took up the subject of his son's coronation58. The 
start date was now to be 21 March 1220, later altered to 1 May, not 
without complaint from Honorius, who accused the emperor of being 
lukewarm in the business of the Holy Land59. 
In the meantime Frederick was working hard to secure his goals, 
and the abbot of Fulda was sent to Rome to negotiate on the imperial 
coronation. In Germany the princes were won over to the idea of 
Henry as king of the Romans by the Confoederatio or Privilegium in 
Favorem Principum Ecclesiasticorum of 26 April 1220 - an extensive 
grant of concessions to the spiritual princes, although in actual 
fact little was innovative, being in the most part a summation of 
previously existing customs and a universal application of privileges 
formerly granted to individual princes. The temporal princes feared 
the establishment of an hereditary succession, but yielded perhaps to 
the belief that their own position might be advanced during 
Frederick's absence on crusade60. In order to allay papal 
suspicions, the princes had already written to the pope on 23 April 
asserting that the empire would never be united with, or have 
jurisdiction over, the kingdom of Sicily61, and Frederick himself 
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wrote on 13 July that the election of his son had taken place in his 
absence and without his knowledge, and that even so Germany and 
Sicily would remain separate in every respect62. But despite these 
assurances, the election was still greatly disturbing for the papacy 
since in the event of Frederick's death there would be little 
obstacle to Henry becoming the personal sovereign of both Germany and 
Sicily, creating a dangerous precedent for the hereditary union of 
the two monarchies. 
Having achieved the election of his son in Germany, Frederick 
delayed at Augsburg from the end of July 1220 to early September, 
sorting out numerous petty quarrels and arranging for his passage 
through Italy63. In June he had written to the pope informing him 
that he would not be in Rome before the end of September64 and on 
July 13 he wrote explaining this delay as being due to an unresolved 
conflict between the Archbishop of Mainz and the Landgrave of 
Thuringia65. Despite the uncertainty of the timescale Honorius wrote 
to Pelagius at Damietta that Frederick would be crowned around 29 
66 September, and would thereafter cross to aid the Christian army. 
In actual fact Frederick did not arrive in Rome until November 
1220. Once crowned, however, he swore himself ready to cross to 
Damietta the following August, and to send reinforcements in March 
122167. In December 1220 this news was faithfully reported to 
Pelagius, although less than a month later Honorius urged the papal 
legate to try to obtain a short truce with the sultan. The final 
decision on any truce, however, was to lie with the pope68. 
J. P. Donovan suggests that this illustrates a continuing lack of 
confidence in Frederick, but it might equally be seen purely as an 
interim measure until the emperor could arrive in the East69. In 
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conformance with his undertaking to Honorius the previous year, 
Frederick supervised the despatch of a group of crusaders under Louis 
of Bavaria in April 1221 and later, following an urgent request from 
the pope, a fleet of forty ships under Henry of Malta and Walter of 
Palear. By this time, however, Frederick was totally embroiled in 
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the re-organisation of the kingdom of Sicily, and a further letter 
from Honorius to Pelagius informed him that the emperor would not be 
crossing until March 122271. By then of course it was too late, and 
there was no Christian army for Frederick to assist; consequently 
the urgency for his departure was reduced, and although still 
committed to the crusade Frederick could, almost for the first time, 
concentrate exclusively on the problems of the empire. Nevertheless 
it is significant that the peace negotiated with the Muslims made 
provision for an eight-year truce which might be broken by the 
arrival in the East of a crowned head72 - clearly a reference to 
Frederick himself and the continued expectation of the fulfilment of 
his crusading vow. 
Concerning the failure of Frederick to depart for the East 
during the time of the Fifth Crusade, Donovan remarks, ' It was one 
of the great misfortunes of the crusaders that they deceived 
themselves with false hopes centred on mysteries - especially Prester 
John and Frederick II'. He continues by saying that although 
Frederick was probably sincere in his early promises it was a mistake 
to continue to believe them even when they had been subordinated to 
his Hohenstaufen ambitions. The crusade was used by Frederick to 
barter promises for papal concessions, whereas 'Honorius probably 
hoped to distract Frederick from the imperial schemes by interesting 
him in the Holy War. ' On the other hand the emperor 'shrewdly misled 
the pope by alternating earnest repetitions of his enthusiasm for the 
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crusade with humble delays in undertaking it'73. 
The idea of a mysteriousness compatible with Prester John is 
completely fallacious; there is no mystery whatsoever surrounding 
Frederick's failure to depart on the Fifth Crusade. In the first 
instance it is quite obvious that Frederick approached his office in 
a highly realistic manner and was guided throughout by a realisation 
that it was essential to ensure royal authority and power and the 
means whereby these were maintained. The impetuous monarch who had 
been willing to risk the little he then had in a precipitous dash 
from Sicily to Germany in 1212 had developed into a highly astute 
king who realised that possessing a crown was meaningless if steps 
were not taken to secure that possession. Although Honorius 
recognised the necessity of Frederick's early delays in Germany74, 
when it came to the rehabilitation of Sicily as a sovereign state the 
Apostolic See was much less sympathetic, viewing the kingdom as a 
feudal principality subject always to the overlordship of the 
Church75. It is true however that the repeated pronouncement on the 
part of the emperor of totally unmeetable dates of departure proved a 
great disservice to the Damietta campaign in particular, encouraging 
overconfidence in some and idleness in others76, but Frederick was 
only responding to the incessant papal pressure to announce the 
schedule of the crusade, and was by no means the first, or last, 
monarch to manipulate the dependence of the Church to his own ends. 
We must also keep in mind the lessons which the kingdom of Sicily had 
already furnished for an absentee king, and from this point of view 
the attention which Frederick lavished on each and every possible 
source of unrest and opposition, even to the detriment of wider 
interests (in the papal view) of Christendom, must come as no great 
surprise. 
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The years 1222-1227/8 saw renewed papal activity with regard to 
the crusade; and scarcely had Honorius upbraided the emperor for his 
failure to go to the aid of the Christian army than he sent to him 
the papal legate, Nicholas bishop of Tusculum, to urge the 
publication of yet another departure date77. This was swiftly 
followed by a conference between Frederick and Honorius on the 
subject at Veroli in April 1222, where a second conference was 
arranged for November, when the crusade leaders John of Brienne and 
Pelagius would be present and a definite date for Frederick's crusade 
would be set78. But illness compelled Honorius to postpone the 
November meeting until March 1223 at Ferentino79, after which it was 
ultimately announced that Frederick would undertake the long-awaited 
expedition on the feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June] 1225, and 
that he was to marry the daughter of King John of Jerusalem80. It may 
have been that by this union Honorius hoped to secure at long last 
the fulfilment of Frederick's vow (certainly after Ferentino the 
scope of Frederick's plans was extended to include the Latin Kingdom 
of Jerusalem)81, but the new papal initiative for the crusade had 
coincided with the commencement of Frederick's operations against the 
Saracen rebels on the island of Sicily. Despite initial successes in 
1222, the campaign continued well into 1225 - the year most recently 
designated for the despatch of the imperial crusade. An added 
complication for the emperor was the imprisonment in 1223 of Waldemar 
king of Denmark by Count Henry of Schwerin, an act which threatened 
to involve the German princes in a major conflict with the Danes82. 
Inevitably Frederick was again compelled to appeal for a postponement 
of the crusade, and at San Germano on 25 July 1225 this was granted. 
The crusade would now depart on 15 August 1227 with one thousand 
knights to be maintained in the Holy Land for two years. Ships were 
to be provided for the 
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transport of two thousand men, each with three horses, squires and 
valets. As a guarantee of good faith 100 thousand ounces of gold 
were to be given up by Frederick into the custody of Hermann von 
Salza, John of Brienne and Gerold of Lausanne, to be restored on the 
emperor's arrival at Acre83. 
his way clear to meeting a d, 
Reginald of Spoleto to swear 
terms of the agreement would 
84 
reservations. 
For the first time Frederick could see 
eadline and authorised his lieutenant 
'on the soul of the emperor' that the 
be executed in good faith and without 
J. M. Powell, however, places a different interpretation on 
events, arguing that whereas Honorius was initially willing to 
countenance compromise and conciliation in a bid to secure 
Frederick's co-operation with regard to the crusade, San Germano 
signalled a tougher line, the threat of excommunication being a 
penalty clause insisted upon by the pope himself84a. The theory is 
very attractive but, although Frederick's extreme guarantee of good 
faith may indeed have been one demanded by the papacy in response to 
criticisms from within the ranks of the Church itself, the papal 
correspondence of the previous six years incorporates at least one 
threat of excommunication and expressions of disillusionment which 
suggest exasperated, rather than cheerful, compromise. 
At San Germano Frederick had gained two years to tidy up loose 
ends in the empire, and in 1226 set out for Lombardy. As we have 
seen, the expedition itself was from the imperial point of view a 
failure, but it benefited the crusade in that the Lombards were sworn 
by their agreement with the emperor to furnish four hundred knights 
for the expedition85. As an integral part of the crusading plans 
Thomas of Acerra was despatched to Syria in July 122786, whilst 
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during the summer crusaders from all over Europe began to assemble at 
the Apulian ports to await the ships which would take them to the 
Holy Land. Numerous contemporary writers attest that the weather, 
numbers and lack of fresh food combined to decimate those who had 
gathered87, and although a great many crusaders did actually arrive 
at Acre, Frederick himself was taken ill and within days compelled to 
turn back88. The response of the new pope, Gregory IX, in line with 
Frederick's own undertakings and the oath sworn by Reginald of 
-56a- 
Spoleto, was immediately to excommunicate him89. 
The action of Pope Gregory was quite justifiable: Frederick 
had assumed the cross at his coronation in 1215 in complete 
independence of the pope, and in spite of numerous promises to depart 
on crusade had failed to do so. Anyone less patient than Honorius 
might with impunity have subjected Frederick to the papal anathema 
long ago. Indeed it was Frederick who had laid himself wide open to 
the ultimate spiritual sanction with which he had so often been 
threatened. In fact he had no grounds for complaint whatsoever. And 
yet there was every reason to believe that Frederick had intended to 
meet his obligations and fulfil his vow. Certainly the objectives 
which Frederick must have held at the time of his coronation as king 
of the Romans had been reached for the most part: royal authority 
had been restored in Germany and his son elected king; in Sicily the 
barons had been brought to heel, the Italian communes had been 
ejected from their position of power in the kingdom, and the problem 
of the Saracens had been virtually obliterated. Only northern and 
central Italy remained a thorn, but the agreement with the Lombards 
in early 1227 had at least lessened any immediate threat to imperial 
authority. Consequently the various areas of imperial interest were 
as stable as they were likely to be, with the result that there was 
no reason to delay any longer. 
In setting out for the Holy Land in September 1227 Frederick 
met the deadline which had been set at San Germano two years 
previously, but did not cross on account of a 'sudden infirmity'. 
Alberic of Trois-Fontaines was unsure whether the illness was real or 
pretended90, but the circumstantial evidence is that it was a genuine 
malady as not only do the chronicles speak of an epidemic which hit 
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the crusaders in the Italian ports, but we are told that whilst 
Frederick survived the Landgrave Louis of Thuringia, struck down at 
the same time, did not91. In order that the expedition as a whole 
might not be delayed, fifty galleys were placed at the disposal of 
Hermann von Salza and the Patriarch Gerold, and Henry duke of Limburg 
designated the emperor's deputy pending his own arrival in Syria92. 
In this Frederick was doing exactly as Pope Honorius had urged him to 
do in 1220 - if the emperor found it impossible to cross then he 
93 
should not detain the other crusaders. It would seem therefore, 
that whereas Gregory IX was quite at liberty to promulgate the 
emperor's excommunication, it was nevertheless an injudicious and 
precipitate act. On the other hand, Gregory may have seen in the ban 
a move of equal advantage to the emperor's absence on crusade. 
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With the exception of Frederick's illness all the delays in his 
departure were essentially of political making. One other factor, 
however, did have a bearing on the emperor's plans, and this was a 
general apathy towards the crusade. Such an attitude might have been 
expected from England, France and Spain, whose diversions might 
respectively have been listed as feuding barons, heresy and Muslims, 
but views were changing and even the Germans who had provided so many 
crusaders in 1217 had to be threatened with excommunication in 1219 
as a means of motivation95. On 19 February 1220 Frederick reported 
to the pope that the crusade could not be launched because the German 
nobility had proved so apathetic, an excuse which Honorius accepted, 
suggesting that he must have been aware of some indifference in 
Germany and Europe96. The changing attitude towards the crusade 
became more apparent with the collapse of the Fifth Crusade, and 
papal appeals for a renewed campaign met with resistance. At 
Ferentino in March 1223 although Honorius, Frederick, John of Brienne 
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and Hermann von Salza were present, together with other nobles and 
prelates, there were few princes of the empire. John of Brienne, 
soon afterwards visiting France, England, Germany and Spain, found 
little enthusiasm. In Germany John and Hermann reported that few, if 
any, were prepared to take the cross97. The widespread apathy (if 
not hostility) was due in part also to the nature of the 
propagandists: preachers were said to be of lowly origin and lacking 
in ecclesiastical dignity and authority; but even the pious were 
unsuccessful and Oliver of Paderborn, whose preaching in 1214 had 
proved so fruitful, was met in 1224 with indifference 98. No doubt 
the reaction was in some degree pleasing to Frederick, whose 
continued preoccupations in Sicily prompted him to write to Honorius 
on 5 March 1224 that it was not yet wise for him to leave the 
kingdom". In the meantime the pope reluctantly began to recognise 
that the widespread apathy would seriously jeopardise the expedition 
timetabled for 1225. It is probable also that the pope's special 
representative in Germany, Conrad bishop of Porto, acquainted 
Honorius with the difficulties which had presented themselves100. 
This led to the final official postponement of the crusade at San 
Germano in July 1225. 
The apathy towards the crusade which the papal representatives 
discovered in 1224-5 was very convenient for Frederick, as the final 
thrust of imperial policy against the Saracens on the island of 
Sicily had met with stiffer resistance than had been anticipated. A 
more lasting solution had to be sought - the forcible exile of the 
vast majority of the Saracens to Lucera on the Italian mainland. In 
addition Frederick had still to turn his attention to north and 
central Italy. Such a programme required time, a requirement which 
was met at San Germano, and was facilitated by the failure of the 
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crusade preachers. 
One question now remains to be answered: if Frederick knew 
that entanglements in Germany, Sicily and the Holy Roman Empire in 
general would probably keep him occupied for a good many years, why 
did he announce his intention to undertake an expedition to the East 
when he did, rather than wait until his immediate policies had 
achieved success? As has already been suggested, the oath of crusade 
was in part a political act which, although it failed to achieve its 
immediate objective101 - the unification of Germany behind a common 
monarch and a common ideal -, emphasised Frederick's emergence from 
papal tutelage102 and must be construed as an unmistakable 
declaration of his accession to the political leadership of 
Europe103. It was therefore a move essential to the dignity of the 
imperial office and one which was consciously intended to signal the 
renewal of the Holy Roman Empire. At the same time, however, as 
Frederick himself explained, it was an act of genuine devotion in 
thanksgiving for the success of the expedition to Germany and the 
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gift of the crown at Aachen. This explains the timing of his vow 
and his commitment to the crusade, a commitment which is evidenced by 
the reiteration of his promise at the time of the imperial coronation 
at Rome in 1220. It is true that Frederick's departure suffered 
innumerable delays, but these were not of his own making. Troubles 
in Germany and Sicily, the need to establish peace and imperial 
sovereignty in northern and central Italy, and concerns over the 
hereditary succession to the empire combined to delay the fulfilment 
of his vow, whilst the depleted manpower available to Frederick 
caused by the Fifth Crusade, and the continual pressure imposed by 
the papacy (insensitive as ever to the demands of the empire105) did 
nothing to alleviate the problems with which Frederick was 
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confronted. 
In consideration of all these factors it is perhaps surprising 
that Frederick ever found the opportunity to depart on crusade. But 
Frederick was determined to fulfil his vow; had he not been, there 
existed a wealth of legitimate excuses to justify his continued 
presence in Europe. 
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Chapter Four 
Finance and organisation of the imperial crusade 
Part 1: John of Brienne in the West 
The ignominious defeat of the Christian forces in Egypt and the 
return of Damietta to Muslim control was a bitter blow to papal plans 
which had first been mooted during the pontificate of Innocent III 
The recriminations which ensued were inevitable, but not 
insurmountable: Honorius was determined that in spite of everything 
the Nile d6bäcle must not mean the termination of Christendom's 
military exertions for the recovery of the Holy Land. Before the 
close of 1221 papal letters had been despatched to all European 
prelates, exhorting them to rouse the faithful to renewed crusade 
against the infidel2; whilst Frederick II, fearful that his personal 
neglect of the beleaguered army at Damietta might provoke damaging 
criticism3, sent representatives to Honorius offering whatever aid 
might be considered expedient to obliterate the shame of defeat4. 
The lessons of the Fifth Crusade seemed to point to the participation 
of the emperor as an essential prerequisite if a future expedition 
against the Muslims was to be successful; and so Honorius summoned 
the emperor to conference. 
The talks which took place at Veroli in April 1222 failed to 
set any firm date for the departure of the proposed imperial crusade, 
but as a preliminary it was agreed to invite John of Brienne and the 
legate Pelagius, the former leaders of the Fifth Crusade, to a second 
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meeting planned for Verona in mid-November, when their explanations 
5 
and advice might be sought. To that end a fleet of four imperial 
galleys was sent to the Holy Land, and in November 1222 the king of 
Jerusalem and his party stepped ashore at Brindisi6, too late, 
according to John's biographer, to attend the conference, which was 
postponed until the following March7. 
But John of Brienne's arrival in the West was not prompted by 
any papal summons. In September 1221, soon after the surrender of 
Damietta, Philip d'Aubigny had written to Earl Ranulf of Chester that 
it was John's intention to visit England, and he urged Ranulf to make 
good the promises he had rendered the king, presumably whilst still 
in EgyptS. In the meantime Hermann von Salza, Master of the Teutonic 
Knights, was sent to Europe to convey in person news of the Damiettan 
disaster9. His shared captivity with King John10 must have made him 
aware of the king's intentions, and it is likely that in his 
audiences with both Frederick and Honorius he passed on details of 
the proposed royal peregrinationsll. It was the timing of the visit, 
therefore, not the visit itself, which was determined by the 
pontiff's summons. 
There were two principal reasons why John of Brienne undertook 
to visit the West at this stage. The disaster of the recent crusade 
had depleted the kingdom of Jerusalem of virtually all its financial 
and military resources. It was of prime importance, therefore, 
firstly that these stocks be recouped 
12, 
and secondly, that John 
ensure all future military efforts in the East, and consequently the 
continued replenishment of Western financial and military support, 
would not be undermined by divided leadership, nor by differing 
opinions of war aims. John's complaints concerning the prosecution 
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of the Fifth Crusade had their effect, and as a result it was agreed 
that all future conquests in the East should accrue without exception 
to the king of Jerusalem13. In addition King John may have been 
motivated by the need to seek a solution to the quarrels which had 
erupted between Pisan and Genoese merchants in his kingdom, and to 
secure a husband for his daughterl3a. 
For their part the pope and emperor saw in John's visit not 
only a means of obtaining first-hand information and advice 
concerning the dismal display of the Christian army at Damietta, but 
also an effective propagandist who might be manipulated for the 
benefit of the crusade14. And although Frederick's vision of John's 
role may not have encapsulated exactly the same tenets as that of 
Honorius - the emperor's concern was less for an immediate resumption 
of the crusade than the suppression of rebellion in his troublesome 
Sicilian kingdom15 - he nevertheless authorised John of Brienne to 
recruit whomsoever he might wish for the projected crusade, and to 
offer on his behalf inducements of passage, sustenance and other 
necessities as he saw fit16. 
The tripartite talks which took place at Ferentino in March 
1223, therefore, were, for the most part, profoundly satisfying for 
all sides. Not only did the meeting endorse King John's propaganda 
mission in Europe and rule in his favour on the distribution of 
future crusader conquests, but more importantly, from Frederick's 
point of view, it was agreed that the imperial crusade should not 
17 
depart until 24 June 1225. The negotiations also marked a minor 
victory for Honorius who saw in Frederick's agreement to marry 
Isabella a means of guaranteeing the emperor's participation in the 
18 
forthcoming venture 
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When Frederick had joined the pope for negotiations at Veroli 
the previous April, two weeks had been spent in discussing a variety 
of subjects including the ways and means of assisting the Holy Land, 
19 
and of financing the crusade. But these cannot have been the sole 
points of discussion on the agenda at Ferentino, and by way of 
confirmation the Eracles continuation of William of Tyre tells us 
that the date of departure and the proposed marriage union were 
amongst a number of items under consideration20. Indeed it was of 
great concern to Honorius that whilst the Holy Land lay in Muslim 
captivity, Christian kingdoms bickered and fought amongst themselves, 
to the detriment of Christendom. That this was an item included on 
the draft agenda for the talks is made plain in a letter from 
Honorius to Philip Augustus, in which he appealed for the 
establishment of, if not a permanent peace between England and 
France, then at least an extension of the truce already in 
existence21. As a means of achieving this it is probable that 
Honorius, knowing of John's intention to visit both England and 
France, sought to recruit the king of Jerusalem as a mediator between 
the Angevin and Capetian courts22. The choice could hardly have been 
less politic; as a Frenchman by birth, John's motives would have 
been immediately suspect23. It was apparently a role which he did 
not relish and, disregarding his avowed intention of travelling to 
24 
England, John apparently decided to return home to the East. 
But the king of Jerusalem was dissuaded from precipitate 
departure and in May/June 1223 began his journey to France. Even 
without his willing co-operation as a peacemaker, John would be an 
excellent propagandist for the crusade, a point which must have been 
uppermost in the minds of the pope and his cardinals. Indeed, it may 
have been Honorius who encouraged John to extend his itinerary to 
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incorporate not only France and England, but also Castile and 
southern Germany. 
John of Brienne's arrival at the French court in June 1223 was 
greeted with great ceremony and rejoicing25, but despite the high 
esteem in which he was held neither Philip Augustus nor his magnates 
were prepared to commit themselves to participation in the crusade as 
long as the truce with the English remained unstable and without 
26 
guarantee. The untimely death of Philip Augustus and the 
succession of the inflexible Louis VIII did nothing to soften 
attitudes27. 
In England the response was much the same. John, who appears 
to have arrived in late August27a, was received with all due honours, 
and royally entertained, by Philip d'Aubigny amongst others28, yet 
the 'difficult matters' which he sought to discuss29 failed to 
produce the results for which he had hoped. A letter of Frederick II 
to Honorius dated March 1224 reported that the king had found the 
English magnates, like their French counterparts, totally unwilling 
to set out on crusade30. But, despite the complete lack of 
enthusiasm displayed for the crusade by the English baronage, King 
Henry, whose youth militated against his own participation (even had 
not the French threat been sufficient deterrent), in memory of his 
father John Lackland, who had died leaving his vow of crusade 
unfulfilled, conferred numerous honours and gifts on the royal 
visitor. The barons and clergy were said to have more than matched 
Henry's munificence, but remained steadfast in their resolve31. The 
probable reasoning behind the English generosity was a desire to win 
an ally at the French court: an embassy consisting of the Archbishop 
Stephen Langton, and the bishops of London and Salisbury, had already 
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demanded that the new French king restore Normandy, Anjou and 
Aquitaine to Henry, but Louis VIII had deferred any decision until 
November32. The claim of the annals of Dunstable, therefore, that 
the king of Jerusalem received smaller gifts than he might have done 
because he had advised Louis against the restoration of the rights of 
the king of England, seems premature33. Prompted perhaps by a desire 
to ingratiate himself with the French crown (having incurred the 
wrath of Philip Augustus for arranging the marriage of Isabella 
without his knowledge or advice33a), it is evident that King John did 
support Louis in his refusal to concede any of the English demands 
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but he is unlikely to have committed himself until after his return 
from England. In the meantime John had no qualms about exploiting 
the situation, and took the opportunity to urge Henry III to grant 
protection to two merchants coming to England from Cahors in southern 
France35. Before taking his leave, John made a pilgrimage to the 
shrine of St. Thomas 
a Becket at Canterbury, where he offered four 
36 
enormous sapphires. 
With the exception of his pilgrimage, the king of Jerusalem's 
mission to England had been particularly unrewarding. Although 
Louis's attitude towards the truce did not bode well for recruitment 
amongst the English barons, John was, nevertheless, distressed by 
their feeble excuses. The near complete failure of his efforts 
convinced him that he could not obtain anything for his kingdom in 
the West, and he resolved to return home. Only the urgent appeals of 
the emperor dissuaded him37. Even 
unwilling to remain long in France, 
pilgrimage, this time to the shrine 
Ludwig Böhm maintains that, putting 
diplomatic overtures in England and 
so, the itinerant king was 
and again sought consolation in 
of Santiago de Compostela. 
behind him the wreck of his 
France, John nurtured the hope of 
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assistance for the crusade emanating from Spain38, but this seems 
unlikely. Although John's marriage to King Ferdinand's sister, 
Berengaria, linked him closely to the royal families of both France 
and Castile (and England), the marriage was unlikely to influence 
Louis favourably, and the situation of Castile on Christendom's 
frontline precluded all but the most symbolic aid. 
39 
The response was much the same when King John arrived in 
Cologne during August 1224: beyond the customary gifts there lurked 
no offers of tangible aid40, and disillusioned he slowly made his way 
back to Rome, where he arrived in December 122441. 
*** 
In terms of promoting the necessity of renewed crusade and 
thereby encouraging the commitment of the European nobility to active 
involvement, John of Brienne's mission was notably ineffective. In 
terms of securing pledges of financial aid, the king fared only 
slightly better. Philip Augustus, on his deathbed, bequeathed 50,000 
marks to King John, a second 50,000 to the Hospital, the same sum to 
the Temple, two thousand marks to the Teutonic Order, and two 
thousand to the Order of St. Lazarus, in acceptance of which each 
organisation or individual swore that this money would be expended 
for no other purpose than the assistance of the Holy Land42. But if 
Cono, the rp evöt of Lausanne, is correct, this represented a disaster 
for the Latin Kingdom since his account indicates that all the 
bequests which the king of France made were to be met from money 
already assembled for the succour of the Holy Land, and whilst around 
167,000 marks were allotted to the defence of the kingdom of 
Jerusalem, a further 700,000 were reserved to protect the interests 
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of the kingdom of France43. This was the most substantial financial 
aid which John was to receive, however, for although throughout his 
peregrinations he was invariably received with the honour due to a 
king, the frequent gifts which he acquired from both the clergy and 
secular rulers can only have been sufficient to underwrite the 
44 
expenses of his mission. 
In apparent conflict with this view, Ralph de Coggeshall records 
that following the arrival of John of Brienne in England, King Henry 
was moved to publish a general edict defining the contributions which 
each subject should make for the assistance of the Holy Land45. 
Unfortunately the chronology of Ralph's account is here in error; 
the subsidy to which he refers was decreed in June 1222 and could not 
have been a direct consequence of King John's personal presence in 
England46. Instead the decision to implement a levy may have been 
connected with an earlier appeal from the king of Jerusalem, whose 
messengers were at Westminster in May 122147, or more likely a direct 
response to the defeat of the Christian army at Damietta. However, 
the fact that the decree of the Great Council in June 1222 indicated 
that the subsidy was to be conceded to the lord king of Jerusalem as 
opposed to the kingdom of Jerusalem itself, suggests that some one 
may have been agitating on the king's behalf48. This person, or 
persons, could well have been Ranulf of Chester, and his associates, 
since, as we have already seen, Ranulf appears to have made several 
promises of aid to King John whilst still on crusade in Egypt 
49 
V 
although the annals of Dunstable assert that the levy was voted at 
the request of the papal legate Pandulf50, whilst the annals of 
Waverley report that the royal concession was made on the advice of 
Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, and other unnamed magnates 
51 
of the realm. 
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The form of the subsidy was such that each earl should 
contribute to the aid of the Holy Land three marks, each baron one 
mark, each knight one shilling, each free tenant one penny, and 
anyone who held no land but owned chattels to the value of half a 
mark, likewise one penny. Should any individual wish to give more, 
they might do so in the name of the Lord52. Tenants of churchmen, 
inhabitants of cities, boroughs, and the rest of the king's demesne 
were included53, but the Templars were exempt54. In each vill the 
chaplain, the sergeants of lords in the vill, and two legal men were 
to assess and collect the tax55, whilst in the cities and boroughs 
this work was to be carried out by two legal men of the 
corporation56. Receipts were to be deposited in each county with the 
Templars, or with the Hospitallers, or at religious houses should 
there be no Temple or Hospital in the area57. From there the money 
was to be conveyed in sacks bearing the name of each vill, together 
with a note of the amount collected, to London to be lodged at the 
New Temple, each sheriff being required to ensure the security of its 
transportation58. 
But despite the obvious merit of the levy, it met with 
strenuous resistance: the annals of Waverley note that 'the grant did 
little or no good, because soon afterwards it was opposed, and hardly 
came to fruition'59. The date set for the collection of all the 
monies at the New Temple -1 November 122260 - came and went, and on 
3 November King Henry was compelled to issue a fresh writ declaring 
that payment was to be made voluntarily61. Towards the end of the 
same month the Great Council decision of the previous June concerning 
the imposition of the Holy Land levy, was reiterated, but with subtle 
6la 
changes as to the classes subject to the tax. All receipts should 
now arrive in London by 28 January 122362. Not surprisingly the 
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supposed voluntary nature of the contributions militated against the 
smooth exaction of the tax, and royal letters were still being 
despatched urging its collection as late as April 122463. 
But this was not to say that none of the tax was ever 
collected64; in March 1225 Stephan le Gras and Gerard Bat are 
recorded as having delivered 300 marks to the royal treasurer from 
the money collected for the Holy Land, and in the following May they 
paid a further 500 marks from the same source into the hands of Henry 
of St. Albans, a citizen and merchant of London, specifically for the 
business [opus] of the kingdom of Jerusalem65. But at the same time 
as the money was being gathered in London, it was already being 
mobilised for the king's own use. In March 1225, £124 and 10 
shillings of the money collected ostensibly for John of Brienne were 
released from the Exchequer to Walter of Brackley, keeper of the 
king's wardrobe, in apparent payment of royal expenses66. Once 
again, just as in France, it appears as if money intended for use in 
the Holy Land was diverted to the benefit of the crown. 
Even so there seems no reason to suggest that when originally 
proposed it was not intended that the money should go to the king of 
Jerusalem; the circumstances of the decree indicate its integrity. 
Nevertheless it is difficult not to construe the first ever graduated 
poll tax as simultaneously an intentional experiment in taxation for 
the future guidance of the crown and its treasury67. Indeed it was 
one of the declared aims of the tax to discover exactly what, and how 
much, might be collected68. Hence the specification that the 




The tax levied in the king of Jerusalem's name benefited 
neither him nor his kingdom70. It was not imposed at his personal 
insistance, but predated his arrival in England. Although it was 
collected, the sum total, even had the exaction been deemed 
compulsory, was never likely to amount to a figure of immense 
significance and could not have matched those disbursements made by 
the testament of Philip Augustus. Indeed it may have been John's 
visit to England in the autumn of 1223 which convinced him that not 
only was military aid unlikely to be forthcoming, but also the 
promised financial aid was likely to be insubstantial. Hence there 
would be nothing to lose by not supporting Henry's demands for the 
return of lands now held by the king of France. In turn it is 
probable that the failure of John to represent effectively English 
interests at the French court released Henry from any sense of guilt 
he might have felt for diverting the money raised. 
Part 2: Money and Manpower 
The elaborate provisions of the decree Ad liberandam published 
by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 signified the final stage in 
the development of a system of public finance for the crusades. 
Until then, with the exception of the ecclesiastical fortieth levied 
in aid of the Holy Land by Innocent III in 1199, monetary support had 
been derived largely in isolation of the Holy See7l. Although even 
in the thirteenth century a great deal of financial organisation was 
carried out by the crucesignati themselves - visible for instance in 
the crusade of Louis IX and the records of his brother, the count of 
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Poitiers - and was therefore only indirectly related to papal 
policy72, the disbursements from the papal camera nevertheless formed 
an essential aid to the crusade movement. Nor were such 
disbursements insubstantial: the decree of 1215 declared a triennial 
twentieth on all ecclesiastical revenues but, lacking the 
administrative sophistication of later decrees, failed to detail the 
manner of collection or mode of distribution. Local collectors 
therefore improvised by disbursing the proceeds of their collections 
direct to local crusaders, or by forwarding their contributions 
straight to the Holy Land, with the pope receiving merely statements 
of account. Such independence of action was soon curtailed and by 
1220 Honorius III was overseeing the transmission of monies. By 
mid-century it was accepted practice to hand over the money raised to 
kings or lords who had taken the cross73. 
Throughout the thirteenth century therefore the role played by 
the ecclesiatical arm in the support of crusades and crusaders became 
increasingly important. And yet, despite the gradual establishment 
of the idea of public finance spearheaded by the Church, Frederick II 
did not benefit, and between the years 1221 and 1228 there was no 
ecclesiastical impost directed towards the assistance of the proposed 
imperial crusade74. Instead, in 1223, immediately after the talks 
held at Ferentino, Honorius wrote to various prelates of Europe 
requesting that they decree in aid of the Holy Land a payment of one 
denier Tournois to be made each month by each household for a period 
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of three years. 
This subtle deviation which transferred the main burden of 
taxation and the onus of collection from the Church to the laity may 
have had its origins in the same smouldering resentment which later 
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in the century compelled Clement IV to promise a general exemption 
from crusading tithes for ten years after the expiry of the current 
imposition76; clerical dissatisfaction with the scale and frequency 
of papal demands during the course of the Fifth Crusade - the last 
expression of which is recorded to have been shipped to Damietta with 
Walter of Palear and Henry of Malta77 - may have convinced Honorius 
that a general crusade levy at this stage would have been far from 
welcome. Even so a non-mandatory papal request was an extremely poor 
substitute and unlikely to realise anything but minimal co-operation, 
from France and England in particular78; indeed, there is no 
evidence to suggest that any collection was ever made79. 
Consequently the problem of raising money to finance the imperial 
crusade was one with which Frederick, like his twelfth century 
predecessors, had to contend virtually alone. The problem was 
compounded by continued rebellion in his Sicilian kingdom which 
proved a severe drain on the kingdom's financial resources80, whilst 
the protracted nature of the revolt compelled Frederick to urge a 
postponement of the crusade for a further two years81. In order to 
secure this delay Frederick had to agree, at San Germano in July 
1225, to numerous papal demands. Not only was the emperor obligated 
to maintain one thousand knights in the Holy Land for a period of two 
years and reaffirm his commitment to provide ships and transport for 
two thousand knights, but he also had to swear to deliver one hundred 
thousand ounces of gold in the next five passages82. 
In this sense Van Cleve was right to pay tribute to the 
strength of the Sicilian economy in that it was able to meet promptly 
the instalment payments required of Frederick83, but the strain of 
the imposition was nevertheless tremendous, since whilst money was 
being syphoned off for the Holy Land, yet more had to be raised to 
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support the continuing efforts of the Sicilian kingdom towards the 
crusade, and in 1226 to finance the campaign in Lombardy. Money, 
therefore, became imperative, and the quest for money began to 
dictate the course of many of the emperor's actions. 
The concern for an adequate crusade income was not a new 
phenomenon. Any crusade demanded resources far in excess of normal 
royal revenues, and letters written by both Louis VII and Conrad III 
whilst en route to the East show that they were chronically short of 
cash84 -a situation which Frederick was anxious to avoid. In order 
to escape this it would be necessary to exploit effectively all 
available monies, even those voted in aid of the Holy Land but not 
directly linked to Frederick's crusade. Such a policy would have 
important consequences for John of Brienne as, although both John and 
the emperor were theoretically united in their aim to raise an army 
for the East, what little money the king of Jerusalem had been able 
to secure on his travels in Europe had been granted in his name and 
not in the name of the imperial crusade. In addition, if the 
expedition was not to conflict with Frederick's own plans and the 
restrictions placed upon him by the empire, then the organisation and 
finance of the crusade must ultimately be under his sole direction. 
It was with this in mind that Frederick, immediately after his 
marriage to John's daughter, Isabella, and in violation of 
undertakings given by Hermann von Salza, declared himself king of 
85 Jerusalem. 
The legal thinking behind the coup was sound enough: John 
himself had held the throne purely by right of marriage, and it was 
on this basis that the emperor displaced him86. To give weight to 
his declaration Frederick sought, and obtained, the homage of the 
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Syrian nobility87. It was only sensible, therefore, that all monies 
rendered the former king of Jerusalem for the benefit of the Holy 
Land should now accrue to Frederick who personified the interests of 
both kingdom and crusade. John, however, obviously thought 
otherwise, and Frederick's demand for the fifty thousand marks 
bequeathed the ex-king by Philip Augustus, specifically for the 
assistance of his kingdom, was refused outright88. 
It was this preoccupation with money which in many ways 
characterised the imperial crusade. Although Frederick claimed to 
have despatched the full 100,000 ounces of gold to which he was 
obligated under the terms of the San Germano agreement89, the 
postponement of his departure for the East until 1228 probably meant 
that, in accordance with this agreement90, by the time of his arrival 
much of the money had already been expended in works of 
refortification and maintaining the army for a year. Consequently, 
whilst the arbitrary impositions in Sicily mainly on the great 
monastic foundations during 1227-891 were sufficient to finance the 
emperor's own crossing, what should have been a relatively restrained 
policy in Cyprus aimed primarily at re-establishing imperial rights 
of suzerainty was converted into an aggressive demand for money92. 
Three thousand armed serjeants, crossbowmen and sailors93 were said 
to have pressed home Frederick's claim for the royal revenues of 
Cyprus which, he argued, should legally have accrued to him during 
the minority of the Cypriot king94, and before leaving the island 
imperial officers were appointed to collect the rents and send them 
to Syria95. In Syria the story was much the same: alms and customs 
dues were requisitioned to meet short-term needs96, and ultimately 
Frederick arranged to farm the bailliage of Cyprus for ten thousand 
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marks of silver97. 
The financial organisation of Frederick's crusade was poor, ill 
thought out, belated, sometimes piratical. In theory Frederick's 
position as Holy Roman Emperor, king of Sicily and of Jerusalem, 
should have guaranteed vast resources, but in practice his rank 
disproportionately dissipated his revenues. Campaigns in Sicily and 
in Lombardy served to deplete resources already strained by the 
demands of the San Germano agreement. In addition Frederick had to 
contend with resentment of renewed impositions so soon after the 
Fifth Crusade, together with changing attitudes towards the crusade 
itself. Moreover the failure of the papacy to adequately provide 
financial backing, Frederick's own failure to depart in 1227 (when he 
could have exploited the 100,000 ounces of gold), and his 
debilitating sentence of excommunication, sorely restricted his 
options. It is not surprising that Frederick complained to the 
Syrian feudatories of his poverty98, but although his impoverished 
status was recognised by the patriarch of Jerusalem99, it was 
predictably blamed not on any papal shortcoming, but on Frederick's 
own deliberate intent. 
Frederick's departure for the East with only minimal resources 
was a calculated decision which anticipated the acquisition of 
unclaimed rents accumulated during the minority of King Henry, an 
intention which had presumably already been communicated to the 
Ibelins by Frederick's marshal, Richard Filangieri100. The 
unreadiness of the Ibelins to produce this money provoked the emperor 
to violence which in turn alienated many potential allies and further 
restricted his scope for manoeuvre. Unlike those of St. Louis100af 
Frederick's plans had not been meticulously laid, and despite aiming 
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to avoid the cash shortages which had beset leaders like Louis VII 
and Conrad III, Frederick found himself in much the same straits. 
In terms of manpower the emperor also had problems. It is 
difficult to assess just how many crucesignati Frederick had under 
his command (although many historians have tried to do this101), if 
only because, like every crusade, the numbers were often exaggerated 
and in almost constant flux. In England, for instance, as many as 
sixty thousand men were said to have taken the cross102, whilst of 
the huge numbers of crusaders reported to have set out from all over 
Europe in 1227103, forty thousand were rumoured to have been struck 
down by hunger and disease104. Of those who actually reached the Holy 
Land in the autumn of that year it was claimed that a further forty 
thousand, on hearing that the emperor had not yet crossed, returned 
105 by the same ships in which they had arrived. 
The figures are unconvincing, yet behind the exaggeration it 
seems clear that the ultimate magnitude of the crusade, depleted by 
epidemic and desertion, fell short of what had been originally 
planned. Indeed, Frederick himself asserted that so many crusaders 
were affected by the 'corruption of the air' that many of the ships 
provided for them were rendered superfluous and remained in port106. 
The fleet itself had been in preparation since at least 1224 when 
Frederick had advised Pope Honorius of the inauguration of a 
programme of shipbuilding. One hundred galleys and fifty large 
barges capable of carrying two thousand knights, their equipment and 
horses, were being prepared in Sicily under the direction of two 
brothers of the Teutonic Order, and would be available for the 
crusade together with limitless other ships and vessels of the 
kingdom107. Consequently Frederick's agreement at San Germano to 
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supply one hundred chellanders and fifty galleys for the 
transportation of the same number of knights to Syria was no great 
inconvenience, although the scale of the marine operation may 
possibly have been extended as in 1227 Frederick reported that eight 
hundred chellanders under construction had been delayed by bad 
weather and disease (and consequently not all of them would be 
completed in time)108. Eventually just fifty galleys set sail under 
109 the captaincy of Henry of Limburg. 
In addition to the supply of transports, the San Germano 
agreement had obligated the emperor to maintain one thousand knights 
at his own expense in the Holy Land for two years. Pope Gregory 
claimed this he had not done, but according to Frederick's own 
estimates seven hundred knights had been recruited in Germany by 
Hermann von Salza, whilst two hundred and fifty knights, formerly in 
the pay of the pope, had been hired in Sicily. One hundred knights 
were also said to have been drawn from the imperial retinue and 
Sicilian baronage, in addition to which four hundred knights had been 
promised to the expedition, at the pope's own mediation, by the 
Lombards 110. But the Lombard knights were not forthcoming 
111, 
and 
the inauspicious beginnings of the crusade dissuaded many from 
undertaking the crossing112. Some, as has been noted, on reaching the 
Holy Land, refused to stay, so that in November 1227 barely eight 
hundred knights remained113. Others still, stayed on only until the 
114 
arrival of the emperor. 
The composition of the army was thus never really static and 
its size cannot be estimated with any degree of certainty. When 
Frederick disembarked at Acre in September 1228 with a force of 
between forty and a hundred knights115, he was said to have been 
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greeted by eight hundred knights and ten thousand footsoldiers. As 
there is no indication whether or not this figure took into account 
immediate departures, or included knights furnished by the military 
orders and kingdom of Jerusalem itself, or even the five hundred 
knights sent out with Filangieri the previous April116, it becomes 
obvious that estimates of the size of the army for the period 1228-9 
could vary dramatically. Indeed it is probable that the figure of 
eight hundred knights and ten thousand infantry, so often quoted by 
historians, is in itself unreliable, being computed by Roger of 
Wendover from the patriarch of Jerusalem's letter of November 1227, 
which is also included in his chronicle and which quotes only the 
117 
number of knights. 
The logistics of the imperial crusade had been well in hand for 
several years, As early as 1224 Frederick had authorised the 
construction of special ships for the transportation and rapid 
deployment of his army118. Following the treaty of San Germano he 
had contrived to meet the demands for ships and men placed upon him, 
but his plans lacked depth and dealt solely with the letter of the 
agreement. The failure to provide adequate food supplies for the 
crusaders massing at Brindisi contributed to the wildfire spread of 
disease which in turn seriously disrupted the crusade's organisation 
and departure. Gregory IX argued that Frederick should have been 
responsible for the feeding and transportation of all crusaders, but 
Frederick's reading of the agreement was that this should apply 
solely to those capable of bearing arms or otherwise performing 
119 
essential duties. Whatever the case, the result was that as many 
as 200 to 250 of the one thousand promised knights failed to depart 
or returned immediately after their arrival in Syria. And although 
Frederick may have intended to make good this deficiency 
120, his 
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excommunication and the increasingly aggressive tone of the papacy 
combined to alter this policy, and severely restrict the size of the 
force which was to accompany him in 1228 by rendering it necessary to 
retain a major defensive force within the Sicilian kingdom121. The 
Patriarch Gerold did not appreciate this subtlety and, disregarding 
Frederick's earlier protests that the pope was conspiring with 
Italian rebels against him, found it perfectly reasonable to 
criticise the meagre troops arriving with the emperor in Syria in 
122 September 1228. 
Like the financial aspects of the crusade, the organisation of 
its manpower and shipping was characterised by a lack of detailed 
planning which indirectly resulted in forces less than those 
anticipated by the pope. The actual size of the army during the 
period of Frederick's personal leadership is difficult to estimate, 
but was probably small by the standards of earlier crusades122a. 
Even so the imperial forces were not insubstantial and despite the 
apparent Muslim superiority of numbers123 were sufficient to convince 
the Egyptian sultan they could not safely be ignored. But the 
willingness of the Muslims to negotiate and the satisfactory 
conclusion of the crusade (as far as the emperor was concerned) must 
not be permitted to obscure the fact that Frederick's attempts to 
ensure the financial and organisational viability of his expedition 
had on the whole been a dismal failure, or that in the process 
Frederick had destroyed all prospect of what could have been a most 
useful alliance with the king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne. In the 
end the military effectiveness of the crusade had been severely 
undermined long before the crusade set sail. 
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Chapter Five 
The Emperor Frederick and the nobility of the Latin East 
The Emperor Frederick arrived in Syria in September 1228 and 
departed eight months later at the beginning of May 1229. His 
relatively brief sojourn in Syria was dominated largely by a series 
of diplomatic exchanges with the Egyptian sultan, al-Kämil, 
culminating ultimately in the cession of the Holy City of Jerusalem 
to the Franks. But the negotiations pursued by Frederick with the 
Muslims by no means constituted the sole activity of the emperor in 
Palestine, nor was his presence co-incident with the whole period 
covered by the imperial crusade. 
For a whole year prior to Frederick's own arrival in Syria his 
army was active in rebuilding a number of ruined fortifications. 
Arriving in the early autumn of 1227 under the leadership of the duke 
of Limburgs, the crusaders initially assembled at Acre2. On 28 
October a great gathering was held outside the walls of the city, and 
in the presence of Gerold, Henry of Limburg (who was here confirmed 
in his role as leader of the army by the crusaders3) and the heads of 
the three main military orders, it was agreed that the army should 
reconstruct Jaffa and Caesarea as a preliminary to an attack on 
Jerusalem; the army would set out for Caesarea on 2 November4. 
Obviously the departure date was over-optimistic: before the plan 
could be put into operation news reached Acre of the death of 
al-Mucazzam, the prince of Damascus, which had occurred on 11 
November 1227/ 30 Dhü'l-Qacda 624 H. It was therefore decided to 
take advantage of the Muslim disarray and seize the city of Sidon 
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which had been under joint Muslim and Christian administration since 
the Franks' treaty with al Adil in 12045. The subsequent work of 
reconstruction lasted until the spring of 1228 and not only 
guaranteed the crusader possession of the city but also improved the 
security of the coastal road. At the same time as the English and 
French were working on the new fortifications at Sidon, another group 
of crusaders may have begun the refortification of Montfort6. On 
completion of the work at Sidon the army returned to Acre, briefly 
pasturing their horses at Haifa before moving on to Caesarea around 
7 the end of April or early May. Here the crusaders probably engaged 
themselves in the reconstruction of the citadel on the south quay of 
the port which al-Mu`azzam had destroyed. The work lasted about five 
months and was probably completed by the time of the emperor's 
arrival in late summer8. The former Chateau-du-Roi in the mountains 
of Acre was also rebuilt about this time9. 
The engagement of the crusader army in the restoration of the 
kingdom's embattled defences was probably a deliberate decision on 
the part of the crusade leaders. Although it was possible to claim 
that the death of al-Mu`azzam had invalidated the existing truce with 
the Muslims in Syriai0, negotiations had already been initiated 
between Frederick and the Egyptian sultan, al-Kämilii. Any display 
of aggression on the part of the crusaders might possibly have been 
misinterpreted by the Egyptians, negate completely what progress had 
been made, and consequently threaten the success of the whole 
campaign. Hence the severity with which Thomas of Acerra suppressed 
12 
an unauthorised chevauchee against the Muslims in early November. 
A strong programme of refortification would usefully channel 
enthusiasms until the arrival of the emperor, whilst simultaneously 
benefitting the security of the kingdom. It was obvious that such a 
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programme would not necessarily satisfy the majority of crusaders, 
who were anxious to get to grips with the enemy13, but by defining 
the planned reconstruction as a necessary preliminary to an advance 
on Jerusalem it was possible at least to gain their acquiescence and 
to prevent an eruption of uncontrollable fervour. 
Frederick's plans to depart for the Holy Land in May 1228 were 
interrupted by the death of the Empress Isabella on the sixth of that 
month14, and as a consequence the imperial fleet did not leave port 
until 28 June. It arrived at Limassol in Cyprus on 21 July. On 17 
August the emperor moved overland to Nicosia before rejoining the 
fleet at Famagusta on 2 September. The following day the fleet 
sailed for Syria, moving down the coast from Botron via Beirut, 
Sidon, and Tyre, before finally putting in at Acre on 7 September15, 
Frederick seems to have installed himself initially in the citadel, 
at the boundary of the old town and the new quarter of Montmusard, 
but very soon quit the city for the nearby village of Tell-Kurdana 
(Ricordane) which lay between Acre and Haifa 
16. It was here that 
Frederick learnt of the arrival at Acre of two Franciscan brothers 
sent by the pope with letters denouncing the emperor as an 
excommunicate and forbidding the military orders from rendering any 
assistance whatsoever17. 
In the meantime Frederick's negotiations with the sultan of 
Egypt continued unabated through the medium of Balian of Sidon and 
Thomas of Acerra; but al-Kämil's sudden departure from Nablus18 
threatened to cut short the intercourse. Frederick's response was to 
march to Jaffa, a reaction which has been portrayed as a military 
gesture designed to bring pressure to bear on the sultan19, who now 
appeared to be reneging on a previous offer to return a large wedge 
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of the Holy Land to Frankish rule20. But although the emperor does 
seem to have announced his intention to march on Jaffa with this in 
mind, we have seen that the plan to rebuild the port's ruined 
defences had already been agreed by the crusaders at Acre the 
previous autumn21. Jaffa may, therefore, have been Frederick's trump 
card which al-Kämil's withdrawal compelled him to play. In contrast 
Gerold of Lausanne cynically attributed the emperor's decision to a 
desire to be close to the Egyptian sultan in order to continue his 
parleys with the enemy and secure a truce22. Despite the malice 
displayed by the patriarch it is clear that this did nevertheless 
play a part in the emperor's thinking. 
The expedition arrived at Jaffa around 15 November 122823, and 
almost immediately ran into trouble: ships carrying supplies were 
delayed by storms at sea, and the army was compelled to consider a 
return to Acre24. This was forestalled by a propitious improvement 
in the weather, but in the intervening period the crusaders had 
ravaged the neighbouring Muslim villages for food, and only after the 
damage had been made good did a1-Kämil permit the recommencement of 
negotiations25. Even then he warned against the fortification of 
Jaffa26, but the work went ahead. Towards the end of December, 
whilst Frederick was still at Jaffa, an armed galleon arrived from 
Apulia carrying disconcerting news: hostilities had broken out in 
Italy. To forestall any initial advantage to the papal army 
Frederick's regent, Reginald of Spoleto, had invaded the March of 
Ancona and the Duchy of Spoleto in the autumn of 1228. The news 
prompted Frederick to order ship's biscuit to be prepared and his 
ships and baggage made ready. Only the unfavourable time of year 
appears to have prevented his departure27. 
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But Frederick's patience was rewarded. On 11 February 1229, 
whilst the crusaders were still at Jaffa, the emperor was able to 
disclose the draft clauses of an agreement by which Jerusalem was to 
be handed back to the Franks. The following Sunday, 18 February, the 
treaty was signed28. As a result the emperor may have hoped to 
celebrate Easter [15 April 1229] in the Holy City29, but intelligence 
which arrived at Jaffa on 7 March30 (probably concerning events in 
Italy31) could have served to alter such plans. Frederick swiftly 
sought al-Kämil's permission to visit the Holy City32, and on 17 
March, leaving the Cypriot knights behind at Jaffa33, the crusaders 
entered Jerusalem. The following day the emperor wore the crown in 
the Holy Sepulchre, and on 19 March the army returned to Jaffa34. 
After a brief stop-over, the crusaders made their way back to Acre, 
arriving around 25 March 122935. 
From now on the poor relations between Frederick, the Patriarch 
Gerold, and the Templars, which had grown steadily worse since 
February, deteriorated even further, to the point of open conflict. 
On Palm Sunday [8 April] 1229, Franciscan and Dominican friars were 
reportedly dragged from the pulpits in Acre, and around the same time 
Frederick is said to have laid siege to the houses of the Temple and 
patriarch for a period of five days36. Immediately prior to this 
episode Frederick may also have tried to seize the new Templar 
fortress at Chastel Pelerin ('Athlit). The tale is absent from the 
main text of the Estoire de Eracles but is related by the Chronique 
d'Ernoul. According to this version the attempt was made during the 
emperor's stay at Acre, soon after his arrival in the Holy Land. It 
was only after his failure to take the stronghold, and after his 
subsequent return to Acre, that Frederick set out for Jaffa37. 
Professor Prawer manages to reconcile the account by suggesting that 
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the absence of any other major Frankish fortress between Haifa and 
Caesarea may have provided Frederick with the excuse that imperial 
control of Chastel Pelerin was necessary in order to provide adequate 
security for the march to Jerusalem38. But if the assault on Chastel 
Pelerin is not to be dismissed as pure invention39, it seems more 
likely that it would have taken place in March 1229, en route from 
Jaffa to Acre. Despite his dislike for the Templars, and their 
Master in particular, Frederick is unlikely to have risked alienating 
a potential source of assistance so early in the crusade, whereas 
after his crown-wearing in Jerusalem it is clear from Gerold's 
letters to the pope that the emperor's relations with the order were 
at an extremely low ebb40. This episode must therefore be attributed 
to the period 20-25 March41, although by following, in isolation, the 
description of events put forward by William of Tyre's continuator, 
it is possible to argue that Frederick first returned to Acre from 
Jaffa, and only then set out for Chastel Pelerin, returning 
immediately afterwards to attack the house of the Temple42. This 
would limit the assault to early April 1229. 
On 1 May Frederick embarked at Acre43 and sailed to Tyre, where 
he issued a charter in the city to John de Bagnolo in 
44 
acknowledgement of services rendered the emperor in Jerusalem. 
From there the fleet crossed to Cyprus where the emperor married the 
young King Henry by proxy to Alice of Montferrat45, before continuing 
his journey to Brindisi, which was reached on 10 June 1229, one year 
after Frederick's departure for the East46. 
Apart from letters written by Frederick himself, Hermann von 
Salza and Gerold, and the partisan accounts of the baronial 
histories, the documentary evidence for the crusade as a whole is 
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scanty. Nevertheless the movements of the crusader army 1227-8 and 
of the emperor himself in Syria can be followed with relative ease, 
but the minutiae of the expedition must remain sketchy, and even the 
application of the Muslim chronology fails to permit the dating of 
certain episodes of the crusade with any greater certainty. One thing 
is, however, clear, namely that although Frederick was preoccupied 
with negotiating a peaceful settlement in Syria, his activities were 
not strictly limited to discussions with the Muslims: he used his 
presence to enforce his own authority in Cyprus and the kingdom of 
Jerusalem, issuing charters, granting privileges and appointing 
officers. But whereas Frederick, as German Emperor, was the 
recognised suzerain of Cyprus 
47 
, his status in the kingdom of 
Jerusalem was not so easily defined. 
When Frederick II married John of Brienne's daughter, the 
heiress to the kingdom of Jerusalem, in November 1225, his position 
was essentially one of king-consort to the young queen48, but he 
immediately took the title 'king of Jerusalem' and laid claim to all 
his queen's prerogatives in spite of protests from her father who 
claimed that his retention of the title for the remainder of his 
lifetime had been guaranteed by Hermann von Salza49. The distinction 
between king and king-consort would not have been obvious to the 
thirteenth century nobility, and Frederick's actions would not have 
been out of place or unexpected. Indeed the nobles who had 
accompanied Isabella to the West willingly paid homage to the 
emperor, and the imperial envoy, the bishop of Melfi, sent to Syria 
to receive the homage of the nobles of the kingdom, successfully 
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carried out his commission. The homage which Frederick received 
from his vassals in Jerusalem was, therefore, rendered to him as king 
and husband of Isabella51. But although Frederick's assumption of 
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the title king of Jerusalem may have been justified on legal grounds 
- after all, John of Brienne's sole claim was that of regent to his 
daughter in a kingdom which she had inherited from her mother52 - 
this did not guarantee his recognition as such. Both Honorius III 
and Gregory IX (until after the treaty of San Germano) refused to 
address Frederick as king of Jerusalem and continued to reserve the 
53 title for John of Brienne. 
Together with his wife, Frederick issued charters for the 
kingdom and appointed baillis to rule on his behalf. The term bailli 
was very broad and might be used, as in this case, to indicate a 
lieutenant established by a king or regent who was, or intended to 
be, absent temporarily from the kingdom, but equally might be applied 
to a regent chosen in a time of minority or when the heir to the 
throne had not yet come to be crowned54. Frederick designated as his 
lieutenants Odo of Montbeliard in 1225 and Thomas of Acerra in 
1226/755, but in practice although it was possible, through his 
wife56, to appoint such lieutenants, theoretically no regent could 
exercise authority in the kingdom until he came in person to receive 
it57. The designation of Odo of Montbeliard as bailli in 1225 was 
perhaps intended as an assurance of continuity. Odo, who was a 
kinsman of John of Brienne and whose -uncle had been in the entourage 
of John's brother, Walter, during the years 1202-458, had been left 
in charge of the kingdom by John when he departed for the West in 
1222. The confirmation of Odo's position by Frederick and Isabella 
must have reassured many of those who feared dramatic change as a 
result of the marriage. The appointment of Thomas of Acerra as Odo's 
successor in 1226/7 was far more radical. Acerra had created a name 
for himself as a captain of the imperial forces during Frederick's 
campaign to bring the Sicilian nobility to heel and re-establish 
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royal rights as they had been under the Norman kings. His promotion 
to the rank of Frederick's representative in the Holy Land is 
unlikely to have been co-incidental59, and the population of Syria 
was said to have been greatly troubled as to what the appointment 
presaged of Frederick's intentions60. Certainly it would seem not 
unreasonable to interpret the move as evidence that Frederick hoped 
to pursue in Palestine the same policy as he had in Sicily61. 
Thomas of Acerra's position in the kingdom of Jerusalem was 
officially one of representative of both Frederick and Isabella, but 
de facto as representative of imperial interests in the kingdom. 
When Isabella died in May 1228 leaving a ten-day-old son, Conrad 
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it might be inferred from our sources that Frederick's status, and 
consequently the count's role, were radically altered: Frederick was 
not now 'king', but merely regent for the infant Conrad63. As such, 
according to John of Jaffa64, he was powerless to appoint his own 
representatives in the kingdom until he came in person and presented 
himself before the High Court for acceptance as regent. Hence, 
Thomas of Acerra's position as Frederick's lieutenant also lapsed, 
and John of Jaffa wrote in his treatise on the bailliage that, after 
John of Beirut and John of Caesarea had declined to take up the 
office, the High Court chose Baliau of Sidon and Odo of Montbeliard 
as regents for Conrad until such time as the emperor might arrive in 
Syria65. This must have occurred in June or early July 1228. 
But despite Thomas of Acerra's apparent replacement and the 
appointment of Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbeliard sur le fait de 
la seignorie ['in charge of the affairs of the lordship' 
65a3, 
at the 
time of the emperor's arrival in Cyprus in July 1228 he is referred 
to by the Estoire de Eracles as bailli of the kingdom of Jerusalem66, 
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and witnessed two charters in the same capacity in April 122967. The 
Patriarch Gerold also tells us that Frederick intended Thomas should 
remain as ballivus in the kingdom after the emperor's own 
departure68. 
The implication would appear to be that, despite the death of 
Isabella in May 1228 which deprived him of any legal authority, 
Thomas of Acerra retained his position as imperial lieutenant in the 
kingdom from the time of his appointment to the office by Frederick 
and Isabella in 1226/7 right through to the time of the emperor's 
departure from the Holy Land in May 1229. Such an interpretation, 
however, fails to take account of a number of problems. For 
instance, how was it possible for Thomas to hold on to the title of 
bailli after the election of Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbeliard 
as regents for Conrad, and why should Frederick have found it 
necessary to persist with a bailli during his own presence in the 
kingdom? One solution might be that since the appointment of 
Frederick as regent for Conrad was likely to be a mere formality, 
Thomas of Acerra was able to remain as Frederick's representative in 
Syria complete with the title of bailli until formally reappointed; 
in the meantime, however, the law required that regents be chosen to 
exercise authority until Frederick himself came and was accepted as 
regent. On the emperor's arrival in Syria it would be feasible for 
him to replace both Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbeliard, and 
reinvest Thomas with the powers which accompanied his title. 
But this explanation is unsatisfactory: although the count of 
Acerra appears in charters of April 1229 as bailli of the kingdom, 
John of Jaffa makes no mention of a transfer of authority from Balian 
of Sidon and Odo of Montbeliard to Thomas of Acerra during the 
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emperor's stay in the Holy Land and, indeed, clearly identifies 
Frederick as holding the bailliage of the kingdom at this time. In 
addition Balian of Sidon is referred to as the emperor's bailli at a 
juncture soon after the completion of negotiations with the 
Muslims69. The obvious solution would appear be that not long after 
news of the empress's death reached the Holy Land in 1228 Thomas of 
Acerra was removed from his position as imperial lieutenant in the 
kingdom and, as Professor Riley-Smith asserts70, the description of 
Acerra as bailli at the time of the emperor's disembarkation at 
Limassol in July 1228 is an error of fact by William of Tyre's 
continuator. In April 1229, in anticipation of the emperor's 
departure, Acerra was reappointed to the office; hence his title on 
the various charters issued by Frederick in that month. During the 
intervening period Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbeliard initially 
held the title of baillis (in the sense of being regents), but the 
emperor's arrival in the kingdom rendered their continuation in 
office unnecessary. John of Jaffa's account in which he ascribes the 
bailliage of the kingdom to Frederick during his stay and yet also 
identifies Balian of Sidon as bailli can be reconciled. Although, as 
we have seen, the term bailli was often used in Old French sources to 
signify a regent who was related to the monarch by blood, or a vassal 
chosen as regent by the High Court, or indeed a lieutenant appointed 
by a regent (or monarch) to govern in his or her absence, it was also 
applied indiscriminately to minor officials operating in the royal 
domain and lordships71. John of Jaffa significantly refers to Balian 
in this instance not as bailli dou roiaume, but as baill de 
l'empereor. In other words the reference may not be taken as 
indicating that Balian continued uninterrupted as regent, then 
imperial lieutenant, in the kingdom right up until the reappointment 
of Thomas of Acerra, but that during Frederick's presence in the Holy 
- 110 - 
Land he was on at least one occasion acting as a direct 
representative of the emperor. As for Frederick holding the 
bailliage during this period, the assertion is not inconsistent since 
both Frederick's status and his recognition as regent for Conrad by 
the High Court demand that the term be interpreted not as 
'lieutenancy', but as 'regency'. 
There is, however, another twist to the final solution. 
According to the jurist, Philip of Novara, when an absentee monarch 
had come of age the law which then operated was substantially 
different from that which applied in the case of a minor72. In fact 
there existed no precedent for such an assertion73, but nevertheless 
John of Jaffa was to write that as soon as Conrad came of age 
Frederick's regency was automatically terminated and, as in 1228, the 
office of his lieutenant in the Holy Land, allegedly held by Odo of 
Montbeliard at this time, also lapsed74. The Livre au Roi, however, 
although it makes no allowance for such an eventuality as an absentee 
monarch, stipulates that where a king had come of age but had not yet 
been crowned, further acts of a parent-bailli were still valid 
provided they were countersealed by the young king75. In other 
words, even after 26 April 1243, the date of Conrad's majority, 
Frederick, and consequently his lieutenant, could continue 
legitimately to exercise authority, backed by the sanction of 
Conrad's seal, until the young king himself came East to be crowned. 
That this was the prevailing view - at least until the early 1240s - 
is evidenced by a petition of June 1241 in which the barons John of 
Ibelin (later count of Jaffa), Balian of Beirut, John of Arsur, 
Philip of Montfort and Geoffrey of Estrein requested the emperor that 
he appoint as his lieutenant in the kingdom the earl of Leicester, 
Simon de Montfort (who was then on crusade in the Holy Land), stating 
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explicitly that de Montfort would hold the lieutenancy first of all 
for Frederick, as regent, and then, once Conrad reached his majority, 
for the absentee king, without interruption76. If such a proposition 
was acceptable to the baronage in 1241, then it is inconceivable that 
in 1228 it would not have been possible for Thomas of Acerra to 
retain the lieutenancy of the kingdom until the arrival of the 
emperor despite the natural hiatus created by the death of 
Frederick's wife. The appointment of substitute baillis would, 
therefore, have been completely unnecessary, and the description of 
the count of Acerra by William of Tyre's continuator as bailli of the 
kingdom in July 1228 would not have been incongruous. In addition, 
this would tie in with the homage Frederick had received from the 
Syrian nobility in 1225» and which may arguably have given Thomas of 
Acerra the right to remain bailli even after the death of Isabella. 
Such an interpretation, however, directly contradicts John of 
Jaffa's treatise on the bailliage which clearly states that on 
Isabella's death the count of Acerra was replaced by Odo of 
Montbeliard and Balian of Sidon, and that when Conrad came of age Odo 
(theoretically imperial lieutenant since 1229) had formally to be 
re-elected before the regency was passed to Queen Alice78. What is 
interesting, however, is that this brief survey of the bailliage was 
written by the same John of Jaffa who in 1241 along with other nobles 
advocated the appointment of Simon de Montfort as lieutenant for both 
Frederick and, subsequently, Conrad. 
So why should John have considered in 1241 such a continuation 
in office feasible, but not when he came to write his treatise in 
c. 1265? The answer lies in the fact that John was not an historian, 
but rather sought to establish retrospectively a justification for 
- 112 - 
baronial actions primarily with regard to the termination of 
Frederick's bailliage in the kingdom in 124279. It is for this 
reason that John totally ignores the appointment of the imperial 
marshal Richard Filangieri as Frederick's lieutenant, although the 
nomination had been accepted without question by the High Court in 
123180. To have acknowledged Filangieri's tenure of the office would 
not only have seriously undermined the baronial claim that a 
lieutenant could not be appointed simply on the say-so of letters 
from an absentee monarch or regent81, but would also have severely 
damaged the carefully constructed argument that a change in ruler, be 
it due to the majority of a minor or the death of the rightful queen, 
brought with it major constitutional implications which had to be 
dealt with in person by the new absentee king or regent. The 
temporary re-election of Odo of Montbeliard, said to be the imperial 
lieutenant in Syria, and the supposed precedent for this action - the 
replacement in 1228 of Thomas of Acerra by Balian of Sidon and the 
ubiquitous Odo - formed a part of this argument. Only by tailoring 
the pattern of events with regard to Conrad's majority82, and by 
endowing the death of Isabella with greater constitutional 
significance than it ever possessed, could the barons, at the 
instigation of the Ibelins, create an umbrella of respectability for 
their challenge to Hohenstaufen rule. 
In 1241 the baronial leaders had sought to resolve their 
differences with the emperor by means of a compromise appointment to 
the lieutenancy; in c. 1265 when John of Jaffa came to write his 
account of the bailliage he was concerned to establish a credible 
explanation of what had been achieved in the intervening period by 
unconstitutional means. The baronial petition of 1241 and the Livre 
au Roi both show that it was accepted practice in the kingdom that 
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appointments made by a parent-bailli were valid even after an heir 
came of age, and consequently that Frederick's continued regency for 
his son would have been legitimate. It seems clear that to overcome 
this John manufactured evidence to support the transfer of the 
bailliage from Frederick to Alice, and that this evidence included 
the replacement of Thomas of Acerra in 1228. It is probable, 
therefore, that Thomas was not superseded as bailli of the kingdom by 
Balian of Sidon and Odo of Montbeliard, but continued in office until 
the emperor's arrival in Syria in September 1228. He was then 
re-appointed to the office in April 1229. 
But Frederick's decision to leave Thomas of Acerra as 
lieutenant in the kingdom with full powers was reversed by the time 
of the emperor's departure for Italy. Already on board ship 
Frederick named Balian of Sidon and Garnier 1'Aleman as his 
representatives, an appointment which was apparently confirmed by the 
fact that they joined Frederick at Tyre a day or two later83. The 
belief that Thomas of Acerra had already returned to Sicily, based 
presumably on his letter to the emperor of February or March 1229 
detailing the advances made in Italy by the papal army under the 
command of John of Brienne84 would adequately explain the switch in 
appointments, but the count of Acerra's presence in the kingdom of 
Jerusalem in April 1229 is attested by the two charters which he 
witnessed at Acre, and by Gerold's letter to all the Christian 
faithful which was probably written in May 122985. An alternative 
argument favours the view that although in general a regent's choice 
of lieutenant (providing the regent had himself already been received 
in the Holy Land) could not be challenged, pressure brought to bear 
by the vassals and High Court had some indirect influence resulting 
in Thomas of Acerra's replacement86. This may well have been the 
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case, but the worsening news from Italy might equally have prompted 
Frederick to reverse his earlier decision, thereby permitting the 
return home of Thomas of Acerra who had, after all, already proved 
himself on the battlefields of Apulia. 
In summation then, Thomas of Acerra held authority as imperial 
lieutenant in the kingdom of Jerusalem from the time of his arrival 
in the summer of 1227 until the appearance of the emperor at Acre in 
September 1228. Although Isabella's death radically altered 
Frederick's perceived status in the kingdom, we must discount John of 
Jaffa's claim that it necessitated the replacement of Thomas of 
Acerra as bailli by Odo of Montbeliard and Balian of Sidon. The count 
was then briefly re-appointed in April 1229. As for the emperor's 
legal position in the kingdom of Jerusalem, until the death of his 
wife Frederick was owed homage as king and husband to Isabella. 
After Isabella's death his status was transformed to become that of 
regent for Conrad, but in theory until he came in person to Syria 
this regency would not be recognised in law. Frederick himself 
continued to use the title king of Jerusalem - an accepted practice, 
since John of Brienne had done the same during his regency for 
87 Isabella. 
The question of Frederick's legal status in the East was an 
important one on which depended his attitude towards, and his 
relationship with, the baronage of both Syria and the island of 
Cyprus. As regards Cyprus, Frederick contended that the regency 
belonged to him by right: the Emperor Henry VI had granted the 
island in fief to Aimery of Lusignan in 1197, and whilst a developing 
European custom held that a king or lord should have wardship of a 
vassal's lands during a minority, since the death of King Hugh in 
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1218 the office of regent and guardian for the minor Henry I had been 
held by his mother, Alice of Champagne88. This was in perfect accord 
with practice in the Latin East, which said that a regency belonged 
first to a child's surviving parent; but since Cyprus was a 
vassal-state of the empire it was not unreasonable for Frederick to 
press that it should follow imperial custom. In a number of letters 
he reminded Alice that she held the regency solely at his pleasure89, 
and when Henry was crowned in 1225 without his permission (an action 
which may have been prompted by the prospect of baronial 
disenchantment with their de facto rule had the Ibelins delayed the 
coronation90) he complained bitterly, and with justification, that 
the crown should have been received from him alone91. Not only did 
such an action totally ignore Frederick's claims to the bailliage, 
blatantly flouting his rights as suzerain, but it also laid the 
foundations for the antagonism which was to follow. Frederick's 
relations with a section of the Cypriot nobility were therefore from 
the beginning likely to be little less than stormy. 
On the eve of his arrival in Cyprus Frederick appears to have 
had two main objectives; the first to re-establish what he believed 
to be his rights as suzerain of the kingdom, the second to finance 
his crusade from the revenues of the kingdom, which according to 
imperial tradition should have accrued to him92. In opposition to 
these aims Frederick faced John of Ibelin, the 'Old Lord' of Beirut, 
who together with his brother Philip, then Queen Alice's lieutenant 
in Cyprus, had pushed through Henry's coronation in defiance of 
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imperial rights. John was not unknown in the West94 and Frederick 
himself stated that he had long ago heard of his adversary's skill as 
an orator95. At a banquet in Limassol within days of his arrival in 
Cyprus96 the emperor demanded the surrender of Beirut, which he 
- 116 - 
claimed John of Ibelin did not hold by right, and the profits of the 
revenues of the bailliage and regalia of Cyprus for the ten years 
since the death of King Hugh, 'for this is my right according to the 
97 
usage of Germany'. 
Although none of the authorities state explicitly that John had 
been elected to the bailliage following Philip's death earlier in the 
year, it is unlikely that Frederick would have addressed his demands 
for the revenues of the kingdom to anyone other than the person he 
considered responsible for them98. There is also evidence to suggest 
that Frederick may have suspected the Ibelins of corrupt 
administration". But although John made a bold response claiming 
that Beirut had been granted him by Isabella and Aimery (i. e. 
pre-1205), and asserting that the Cypriot rents had been enjoyed by 
Alice alone 
100, it is clear that John did not necessarily carry the 
majority support of the Cypriot baronage101. Alice herself had had a 
major disagreement with Philip of Ibelin, and the activities of the 
Ibelins, during the later stages of the minority in particular, had 
antagonised a good many nobles, with the result that in anticipation 
of Frederick's arrival in the kingdom certain of their leaders had 
set out to meet him en route to lay out their complaints and explain 
the usefulness of Cyprus for the crusade102. The rumours of the 
Ibelins' corruption which appear to have circulated in Frederick's 
entourage, and doubts as to the legitimacy of John's possession of 
Beirut may have had their origins in the information communicated to 
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the emperor by these knights 
But in actual fact it may have been that Frederick had no right 
to demand that John of Ibelin surrender his fief of Beirut since he 
had not yet been received in Syria as regent and therefore in law 
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could be said to have held no powers in the kingdom. Whether or not 
this was true, it was certainly arguable that the matter of Beirut 
was one which could be dealt with only by the High Court of 
Jerusalem. It was therefore agreed that twenty of John's followers, 
including two of his sons, should join the emperor's party as a 
guarantee for John's appearance before the High Court, and that John 
himself would serve the emperor on the mainland103a. 
The dispute was an unnecessary complication to Frederick's 
position in Cyprus, and may indeed have weakened that position104. It 
certainly cannot have failed to heighten suspicions among the Ibelin 
partisans and on 26 or 27 July they withdrew to Nicosia in line with 
predictions by Frederick's collaborators who had warned that a 
careful watch should be kept on the movements of John and his 
followers105. But the emperor does not seem to have been at all 
worried by the course of events and remained at Limassol a full three 
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weeks after John's departure, Perhaps his sense of security was 
encouraged by his continued possession of the lord of Beirut's two 
sons, and indeed, despite wariness on John's part - as the emperor 
approached Nicosia he withdrew to the castle of Dieu d'Amour -a 
compromise solution appears to have been reached relatively 
quickly'07. Under the mediation of some of the more moderate Syrian 
leaders, the lord of Beirut and his followers promised fealty to 
Frederick as liege-lord of King Henry, and agreed to serve him in the 
Holy Land. They recognised him as suzerain of Cyprus, but refused 
him the bailliage which they claimed belonged by right to Alice. 
Frederick, however, was permitted the functions of the office and 
would receive the rents together with the custody of the king'08. The 
kingdom was to be received in person by Henry, but until his majority 
the castles would be guarded by Cypriot liegemen appointed by 
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Frederick. In addition Frederick was to free the hostages who had 
been delivered to him at Limassol109. In other words, Frederick 
received the bailliage of the kingdom as was his right as imperial 
suzerain, but the title of bailli was retained by Alice in accordance 
with the laws of Cyprus. The agreement, however, only postponed the 
quarrel as Frederick does not appear to have obtained satisfaction 
concerning the outstanding rents which should have accrued to him 
during the previous ten years110, and the question of Beirut had yet 
to be settled. 
Throughout Frederick's stay in Cyprus both parties appear to 
have maintained a sense of legality. Frederick may have used 
bullying tactics to impress on John of Ibelin the rights which he 
claimed as suzerain, but with the one exception of intimidating his 
banqueting guests"', he cannot be said to have behaved arbitrarily: 
he had not seized John's person, the hostages which he requested had 
been surrendered to him voluntarily112, and he had agreed to take the 
case of Beirut to the High Court of Jerusalem. In fact Frederick had 
acted in a very restrained manner. For John's part, he had rejected 
a suggestion made by John of Caesarea and Anceau of Brie that they 
assassinate the emperor, and had emphasised that as vassals his 
followers must not raise arms against Frederick's person113. But by 
withdrawing from the emperor's presence and commencing fortification 
of three strongholds in the north of the island114, the Ibelins had 
severely compromised themselves in the eyes of those who accused them 
of maladministration and corruption. Whilst they had acted in 
accordance with their own ideas of the laws of Cyprus, Frederick 
could have been forgiven had he chosen to impose his own 
interpretation of a suzerain's rights with even greater firmness. 
Instead he held back and, assisted by John of Ibelin's refusal 
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actively to oppose him, was able to conclude the highly favourable 
agreement of August 1228. 
It has been suggested that Frederick may have intended to 
employ against the Cypriot nobles the same methods used so 
successfully in southern Italy115, and that the agreement reached 
between John of Ibelin and the emperor was prompted by fears that 
delay in Cyprus would permit the pope to seize the initiative in 
Italy 116. But Frederick's impatience with the situation in Cyprus is 
not over-evident and the bias of the agreement would tend to indicate 
that Frederick (and his collaborators) held the advantage and were 
clearly recognised as doing so by the Ibelins. Hence the emperor had 
no need to make concessions, but all the same he may have found it 
expedient to drop demands for a refund of rents in Cyprus and an 
account of the bailliage. It was sufficient that he had effective 
control of the kingdom and had been able to secure use of the rents 
l there to help finance his crusade in Syria 
l7. When in April 1229 
Frederick sent Count Stephen and a force of Italians from Botron to 
Cyprus to impose his regency and take control of the fortresses and 
revenues, his action was entirely consistent with his views of his 
status in the kingdom, that of regent for the king, but contrary to 
the compromise of the previous autumn which had formally recognised 
Alice as bailli and which had entrusted the fortresses not to 
Frederick's own officers but to the liegemen of the king. By the same 
argument Frederick was perfectly within his rights to appoint his own 
baillis, which he now did, however unethical the farming of the 
bailliage might seem. It was his decision to disinherit the lord of 
Beirut and his followers [in Cyprus] and to prevent their return to 
the island, without having obtained the sanction of the High Court, 
however, which overstepped his authority and was to seriously affect 
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his relations with the feudatories on the mainland, leading 
ultimately to civil war118. Only then did the strained relations 
finally reach breaking point. 
Frederick had come to Cyprus claiming the bailliage as imperial 
practice demanded; this he had received in all but name, but with 
certain limitations of power in line with the laws of Cyprus. This 
was adequate for his immediate requirements, but once he had achieved 
his aims in the kingdom of Jerusalem he chose to renege on his 
agreement with the lord of Beirut and assert the imperial rights he 
had claimed all along. Consequently, after the emperor's stop-over 
in Cyprus in May 1229 he departed the kingdom as acknowledged 
suzerain and de facto regent, but left behind him a veritable powder 
keg. 
The policy pursued by Frederick in Cyprus, and the manner of 
its implementation were important since many feudatories held fiefs 
in both Cyprus and in the kingdom of Jerusalem. It was likely, 
therefore, that Frederick's actions in Cyprus and the attitude he 
assumed towards the nobility there would have a direct bearing on his 
relations with the baronage of Syria. This goes some way to explain 
his willingness to compromise and his refusal to countenance any rash 
moves against the Ibelins and their supporters during their presence 
at Nicosia and Dieu d'Amour. The subsequent agreement reached 
between the two parties in the late summer of 1228 improved the 
strained relations and ensured that John of Ibelin and the rest of 
the Cypriot nobles would render their co-operation to the emperor on 
the mainland. At the same time it probably also encouraged support 
from those Syrian barons who did not hold fiefs in Cyprus. Indeed 
there is evidence to suggest that during the period 
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September/November 1228 to February/March 1229, Frederick's relations 
with the Syrian nobility as a whole (including the Cypriot 
feudatories) were relatively amicable. Although Frederick had 
departed on crusade whilst still under sentence of excommunication, 
and despite the arrival of Franciscan friars carrying letters from 
the pope which forbade all contact with the emperor or obedience to 
his orders119, the vast majority of the nobility and crusaders120 
affirmed their willingness to follow the emperor to Jaffa. Only the 
Masters of the Temple and Hospital demurred, declaring that they 
considered themselves obedient to the pope alone, but even so 
announced that under the circumstances, for the 'need and benefit' of 
Christendom they would be prepared to accompany the emperorl21. No 
doubt it was this episode which led Frederick in a letter dated March 
1229, to comment favourably on the help and assistance he had 
received from the patriarch and military ordersl22. As for the nobles 
themselves, though John of Ibelin might not be considered as being 
representative of the Syrian baronage as a whole, then at least he 
can be put forward as an example that even those who were not 
entirely well-disposed towards the emperor appear to have sunk their 
123 differences and co-operated. 
Frederick's relationship with the Syrian nobility was therefore 
a working relationship. It was not without friction, but both 
parties realised the necessity of co-operation124. In law Frederick 
was regent for his son Conrad; in practice he claimed the title king 
of Jerusalem. But despite his crownwearing in the Holy Sepulchre he 
does not seem to have demanded that homage be paid to him as king125, 
Nor does he appear to have raised the question of Beirut at any time 
during his stay in the Holy Land126. Whilst in Cyprus he had received 
the homage of the Cypriot nobility as liege-lord of King Henry, and 
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had requested the fealty of Bohemond IV of Antioch-Tripoli and all 
his vassals. Bohemond refused to comply with the emperor's wishes, 
but nevertheless appears to have remained on reasonable terms with 
127 the emperor and is found in his presence at Acre in April 1229. 
Frederick took what was essentially a pragmatic attitude 
towards Cyprus and Syria. By agreeing to minimal compromises in 
Cyprus he was able to avoid a major confrontation with the Ibelins 
which might have hampered the progress of the crusade. The same 
priority dictated that the question of Beirut should be left 
unanswered until the objectives of the crusade had first been 
achieved. In the same way Frederick was unwilling to press his 
claims to suzerainty over the principality and county of 
Antioch-Tripoli. Although he was anxious to re-establish his rights 
in the East as he saw them, his claims to Bohemond IV's fealty are 
nevertheless dubious. It has been suggested that he may have based 
his demands on his position as regent-to-be of Jerusalem 
128, but 
without having been received in Syria Frederick may not have had 
authority to make such demands, and moreover it is arguable whether 
or not Antioch-Tripoli was a vassal of the neighbouring kingdom129. 
Although Bohemond refused to pay the emperor the homage which he 
demanded, Frederick declined to exact it by force. Relations between 
the empire and Antioch-Tripoli had on the whole been good, and 
Tripoli was already a centre for opposition to the Ibelins130. 
Frederick would not therefore have wished to forfeit Bohemond's 
131 
sympathy and aid at this stage. Indeed, the only evidence for a 
major schism between Frederick and Bohemond is given by the jurist, 
Philip of Novara, a celebrated Ibelin partisan, who describes how the 
prince feigned illness and slipped away from Cyprus under cover of 
132 darkness before his oath of fealty could be exacted. But reading 
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between the lines there is nothing strange in Bohemond's departure; 
he left Cyprus at the same time as Frederick, as did John of Ibelin, 
but whereas the emperor sailed to Botron and moved down the coast via 
Beirut, Sidon and Tyre to Acre, John of Ibelin crossed to Beirut, and 
Bohemond, as might be expected, sailed to Nefin, the nearest port in 
the county of Tripoli and only slightly up the coast from Botron133. 
Although there is no evidence to show that Bohemond was ever with the 
emperor in the kingdom of Jerusalem before his appearance at Acre in 
April 1229, this should not be taken as proof that the two were on 
bad terms: not only do William of Tyre's continuators omit reference 
to the rupture, but in recent years much doubt has been cast on the 
reliability of Philip of Novara's portrayal of events134. With one 
flourish of the pen Novara is able to accuse the emperor of 
ill-treating John of Ibelin's sons when he held them hostage in 
Cyprus, and with another he finds it not inconsistent to recount how 
Balian of Ibelin was subsequently taken into the imperial household 
(and served the emperor well), whilst his brother, John, was offered 
the city of Foggia135. And there are other contradictions of fact, 
such as the two different dates for Bohemond IV's arrival in 
Cyprus136 and the uncertainty as to which of John of Ibelin's sons 
were given as hostages 
137, 
over and above Novara's very obvious bias 
towards the Ibelin household. Professor Riley-Smith points out that 
Philip of Novara may well have embellished his reports of speeches 
made by John of Ibelini38, and it seems certain that Novara was by no 
means averse to exaggerating his own role in the Ibelin s' struggle 
with the emperor139. In other words the jurist's description of 
Bohemond's flight from Cyprus is in all probability a highly 
distorted account of events, and whilst there may have been some 
disagreement between the prince and emperor relating to Bohemond's 
refusal to recognise Frederick's suzerainty it was not of sufficient 
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magnitude to permanently upset their relations140 _ hence Bohemond's 
presence at Acre in April 1229. The view that Frederick deliberately 
excluded Antioch-Tripoli from the scope of his treaty with al-Kämil 
in retaliation for Bohemond's rejection of the emperor's pretensions 
must be dismissed since, as will be been pointed out elsewhere, it 
was not uncommon for the county of Tripoli and principality of 
Antioch to be outside any agreements made between the kingdom of 
Jerusalem and its Muslim neighbours141. The fact, however, that the 
truce agreed between al-Kämil and Frederick prohibited the kingdom of 
Jerusalem from giving its neighbour direct military assistance, 
clearly angered Bohemond142, and he seems to have considered meeting 
John of Ibelin's request for military aid against Frederick's baillis 
in Cyprus. After the defeat of the baronial forces at Casal Imbert 
in May 1232, however, and friendly overtures from the emperor, 
Bohemond reverted to a policy of non-interference which, if not 
entirely favourable to Frederick, rendered the imperial forces 
passive support through his neutrality143. Frederick had attempted to 
impose some form of suzerainty over Antioch-Tripoli, but this had no 
firm basis in law. Bohemond was therefore able to reject Frederick's 
pretensions and maintain his independence of action. 
***** 
Frederick's stay in Palestine can be divided neatly into two 
distinct periods: the time of the crusade proper, culminating in the 
acquisition of the Holy City by treaty in February 1229, and the 
following few months during which the emperor set about reorganising 
the kingdom of Jerusalem. 
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As we shall see, during the initial period Frederick was 
concerned chiefly with the negotiations conducted between himself and 
the Egyptian sultan, al-Kämil; problems of administration and the 
establishment of the emperor's rights in the kingdom were left until 
the primary objectives of the crusade had been achieved. This is 
reflected in the number of charters which survive from the period of 
Frederick's presence in the Holy Land. Of the fifteen which are 
extant twelve date from April 1229 and only two from the previous 
October. One was issued in May 1229. Of the feudatories of 
Jerusalem Balian of Sidon and Garnier l'Aleman witnessed every 
charter and Odo of Montbeliard and John of Ibelin fourteen of the 
fifteen; but beyond attesting to John's fulfilment of his pledge to 
serve the emperor in Syria, there seems to be little significance in 
this144. The grouping of the charters is, however, indicative of 
Frederick's pre-occupations: having secured financial aid in Cyprus 
and the co-operation of the Cypriot nobility he was concerned to 
maximise their use in the prosecution of his crusade, and hence any 
decisions or assertion of royal rights which might antagonise the 
nobility had to be delayed until the objectives of the crusade had 
been realised. Even so, a number of charters issued in April 1229 
relate primarily to problems raised by the treaty agreed between 
Frederick and al-Kämil, but in the same month Frederick also accorded 
privileges (perhaps tax remissions) to the burgesses of Acre and lent 
his support to the Syrian Christians against the Latin clergy 
145 
actions which had they occurred the previous October would 
undoubtedly have strained the loyalties of the nobility and military 
orders. Hence it would seem as if Frederick purposely postponed all 
actions likely to provoke serious opposition until after the 
completion of the truce with al-Kämil. An apparent anomaly would seem 
to be the attempts made by imperial officers in 1226-8 to restore 
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what were believed to be royal rights over the chaine at Acre 
146. 
But since such actions affected the Italian merchants rather than the 
Syrian nobility, even though they took place before the emperor's 
arrival in the East, they should not therefore be viewed as being 
inconsistent with Frederick's policies during the early part of the 
crusade. 
Of the problems which were raised by the treaty of Jaffa and 
which Frederick sought to resolve by his charters of April 1229, one 
of the most serious concerned the inheritance of the fief of Toron 
and Chastel Neuf. In general nobles continued to maintain their 
titles to fiefs even when they had been lost to Muslim rule, and it 
was the practice that such fiefs when recovered should be returned to 
the person closest in degrees of relationship to the last actually in 
seisin (plus dreit heir aparant)147. The lordship of Toron had 
fallen to Saläh al-Din in 1187; under the terms of the agreement 
concluded between the Emperor Frederick and al-Kämil in 1229 it was 
returned to Christian administration and consequently was due to 
revert to its rightful owner. But establishing just who was the 
rightful possessor of the fief proved to be a much more difficult 
task than Frederick can originally have anticipated. 
When Humphrey IV of Toron had been betrothed to King Baldwin 
IV's sister, Isabella of Jerusalem, he had surrendered (before 
November 1181) Toron, Chastel Neuf, and his rights over Banyas to the 
king148. In 1186 Guy of Lusignan granted the lordship of Toron and 
Chastel Neuf to Joscelin of Courtenay149, who in turn transmitted the 
fief to William of Valence, brother of Guy, on the marriage of 
William to Joscelin's elder daughter, Beatrice. Following William's 
disappearance and presumed death around 1187, in total disregard of 
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King Aimery's right to arrange such marriages, Beatrice married Count 
Otto of Henneberg (who had probably arrived in Syria with the German 
Crusade of 1197-8), and returned with him to Saxony. In the meantime 
Joscelin of Courtenay had died and his lands had been divided 
betweeen his two daughters, Beatrice and Agnes, but despite 
Beatrice's violation of her service de mariage, which it might have 
been expected would affect her rights to dispose of her inheritance, 
Beatrice and Otto proceeded to grant their half of the 'lordship of 
Count Joscelin' piecemeal to the Teutonic Knights. Admittedly this 
disposal of their lands took place after Aimery's death, but 
nevertheless it was not opposed even then. It was by virtue of these 
donations that after Toron's return to the Christians by the treaty 
of Jaffa in February 1229, Frederick considered it within his rights 
to restore Toron to the Teutonic Knights, on the grounds that after 
the disappearance of William of Valence Toron had returned to 
Joscelin, becoming part of the inheritance which was subsequently 
150 
acquired by the Teutonic Order. If James of La Mandel6e, to whom 
the rights of Beatrice's younger sister had passed, had any claims to 
Toron, he does not seem to have asserted them. 
But there was an alternative solution to the problem of the 
inheritance of Toron and Chastel Neuf. The marriage of Humphrey IV 
of Toron and Isabella of Jerusalem had been dissolved in 1190 and 
Isabella married to Conrad of Montferrat. According to-the Eracles, 
one of Isabella's first actions after her marriage to Conrad was to 
restore to her ex-husband the lordship of Toron, to which Humphrey 
151 
had reasserted his claims as early as 1186. Humphrey died without 
direct heirs, and Toron passed through his sister, Isabella, widow of 
Rupen III of Armenia, to their daughter, Alice. It was on these 
grounds that Alice challenged the grant of Toron and Chastel Neuf to 
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the Teutonic Knights. 
But although Frederick's charter of April 1229 is clear 
evidence that he had first granted Toron to the Teutonic Knights 
before the grant was disputed by Alice of Armenia, a Muslim 
chronicler, Ibn al-CAmid, wrote that Toron did not form any part of 
Frederick's original treaty with al-Kämil, and that its cession was 
arranged only after the lady of Toron had come before the emperor and 
requested it152. On the other hand the Christian sources would seem 
to indicate that Toron was included in Frederick's agreement from the 
outset153. Perhaps it is the case that Toron did not form part of the 
draft treaty which the emperor revealed to selected barons on 11 
February 1229154, yet was written into the final form made public the 
following Sunday. This would explain the Muslim intimation that 
Toron was restored to the Franks as a personal favour to Frederick 
only after the outline of the treaty had-been agreed, and at the same 
time would satisfy the Frankish belief that it formed part of the 
treaty of Jaffa ab initio155. Ibn al-'AmTd's claim, however, that 
the emperor was prompted in his request by Alice of Armenia must be 
incorrect, since, as has been noted, the charter of April 1229 
compensating the Teutonic Knights for the return of Toron to Alice is 
clear proof that the lordship had already been assigned to the order 
when Alice claimed it. It seems nevertheless improbable that Hermann 
would have neglected to assert the claims of the Teutonic Order to 
Toron and Chastel Neuf before February 1229, and consequently that 
Frederick would have excluded the territories from his negotiations 
with the Muslims prior to that date. Indeed Frederick's charter 
relating to Toron states explicitly that Hermann had secured the 
grant of the lordship in advance of the crusade, whilst Frederick was 
still in Italy and whilst Isabella was still alive156. Probably, 
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therefore, Frederick had already requested Toron during the course 
of his negotiations with al-Kämil, but only in February did the 
Egyptian sultan have a change of heart and agree to its cession. In 
stark contrast to this discussion, another Muslim chronicler does not 
appear to have recognised the existence of such a clause whatsoever 
and asserts that Toron and Chastel Neuf remained in the hands of the 
Muslims until after the death of al-Ashraf [28 August 1237/4 Muhurram 
635 H. ], when they passed to al-Malik al-Sälih `Imäd al-Din IsmN'Tl, 
who included them amongst other fortresses which he gave to the 
Franks157. This account by Ibn al-Furät should not, however, be 
dismissed as incorrect, as a continuator of William of Tyre notes 
that certain of al-Kämil's officers refused to surrender three 
northern fortresses in the territory of Tyre and Sidon which, 
although apparently included in the treaty, as a result were never 
158 delivered to Frankish control. Toron may have been one of these 
three, which would explain the assertion that it remained in Muslim 
hands until well after the death of al-Ashraf. 
As we have seen Frederick appears to have considered the 
Teutonic Knights as the rightful heirs of the inheritance of Joscelin 
of Courtenay and consequently to the lordship of Toron and Chastel 
Neuf. But this was disputed by Alice of Armenia who, in accordance 
with the requirements of the law, appeared before the High Court and 
was able to prove that she had an hereditary right through her 
mother, Isabella of Toron. The jurist John of Jaffa relates how the 
High Court ruled in Alice's favour, but Balian of Sidon, acting as 
Frederick's bailli, produced imperial letters specifically forbidding 
her to be put in seisin. John goes on to say that the Syrian barons 
responded by withdrawing their service from the emperor, stating that 
they would serve him again only when he agreed to abide by the ruling 
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of the court159. Professor Riley-Smith applies his interpretation of 
the Assise sur la Ligece to the episode, believing that Alice of 
Armenia, having proved the justice of her claim, was excluded from 
her inheritance on Frederick's sole authority and without esgart of 
court, and that by withdrawing their service the barons were acting 
in line with a precedent set in 1198 when Ralph of Tiberias, accused 
of instigating an attempt on the life of King Aimery, was 
disinherited and banished from the kingdom also without esgart160 
But whereas John of Jaffa's legal treatise asserts that the emperor 
was working unconstitutionally, Frederick's charter of April 1229 
referring to these events makes the transfer of Toron to Alice and 
the compensation of the Teutonic Knights appear a purely normal 
procedure with no hint of animosity161. And indeed a second 
contemporary jurist and Ibelin partisan, Philip of Novara, fails to 
mention Toron or any problem with its inheritance - from which it 
might be possible to infer that the dispute was speedily and amicably 
resolved. 
Recent studies have cast some doubt on John of Jaffa's 
reliability 
162, 
particularly with regard to the supposedly comparable 
situation of 1198163. Although John was in Acre during the events of 
March/April 1229 and had close connection with those directly 
involved, he was too young to be in the High Court and his account of 
the dispute dates from a period after the defeat of the 
pro-Hohenstaufen element in Syria, and is in itself the product of 
the victorious anti-imperialist party. Moreover, by studying John's 
legal writings we can see that in the same way that the relatively 
simple Livre au Roi tried to present the image of a (non-existent) 
strong monarchy comparable with that of the early twelfth century as 
a means to re-establish its authority, so the Livre de Jean d'Ibelin 
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was a sophisticated analysis of the laws of Jerusalem which was keen 
to stress baronial rights and their precedents in law164. This is 
not to say that John of Jaffa's lawbook is totally unreliable as an 
historical source, but it must be used with extreme caution since 
John's aim was not to record history but to create a legal treatise 
from the point of view of baronial interests. 
But the details of John of Jaffa's account concerning Toron to 
some extent parallel Frederick's own version of events in which, 
following Alice's initial approach to the emperor, a date was set for 
her to prove her case in court164a. Frederick's charter indicates 
that he had made a genuine mistake as to the ownership of Toron and 
Chastel Neuf; Alice was able satisfactorily to prove her hereditary 
right, and Frederick restored the lands 'according to the esgart of 
our court'165. John of Jaffa is the only source to affirm that the 
vassals withdrew their service in support of Alice; nevertheless, in 
comparison to his version of similar events in 1198 which, it has 
recently been argued, should be interpreted as a purely rhetorical 
view of not what did happen, but what should have happened166, it 
seems likely that the withdrawal of service in 1229 did take place. 
The withdrawal, however, was ineffectual, and John's 'Livre', in 
characteristically vague terms, implies that the vassals had returned 
their service to the emperor before the restoration of Toron to Alice 
was agreed. [When certain Syrian barons were disinherited in Acre 
probably soon after, an alternative solution was adopted and they 
were restored to their fiefs by force167. ] According to John, the 
baronial action was a direct result of the imperial command which 
forbade Balian of Sidon to execute the judgement of the High Court 
and put Alice in seisin. But is this a true representation of 
Frederick's intentions? I would suggest not. True, the withdrawal of 
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service was an expression of displeasure at Frederick's refusal to 
implement the esgart of the court, but the delivery by Balian of 
Sidon of imperial letters to the baronage would in this case have 
taken the form of an injunction effective until Alice had met the 
conditions of Frederick's ruling and, whilst in the narrowest sense 
it might have forbidden Alice's entry into the fief of Toron, would 
not have denied the justice of her claim1"' 
Although Frederick was probably unaware of Alice's claims to 
Toron when he first granted the lordship to the Teutonic Knights, his 
decision to go ahead and comply with their request that the territory 
be assigned to them as a former possession of the late Joscelin of 
Courtenay, much of whose domains they had acquired, must have been 
guided to some extent by the staunch support which they had shown him 
during his crusade. When it was realised that Alice had a stronger 
claim to the fief the Teutonic Order was compensated with Maron, plus 
a rent of 7000 besants on the revenues of Acre, by virtue of Humphrey 
IV's cession of Toron to Baldwin, by the terms of which these 
properties, ceded to Humphrey, were to revert to Count Joscelin if 
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Toron were returned to Humphrey. 
But Frederick had begun to shower benefits on the Teutonic 
Order even before his arrival in Syria: he completed the donation of 
Otto of Henneberg by obtaining for the order the cession of the 
mountainous region of Trefile, seven miles northeast of Acre, in 
which the old fortress of Montfort was situated, together with a 
number of other fiefs, but large sums had to be paid to James of La 
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Mandelee, Joscelin of Courtenay's other heir, to persuade him to 
renounce his claims to this domain. These payments were facilitated 
by Frederick's concession to the Teutonic Knights in April 1229 of 
6400 crusader besants annually from the tolls in the harbour of 
Acre169. In 1226 the knights had been exempted from taxation, in 
particular from the market tolls known as the plateaticum, and in 
April 1229 they were granted le Manoir le Roi in Jerusalem, in the 
street of the Armenians near the church of St. Thomas, which was said 
to have once belonged to King Baldwin, together with the former house 
170 of the Germans in Jerusalem, plus a garden and six acres of land. 
As has been suggested, the favour which Frederick rendered the 
Teutonic Order stemmed probably from the unwavering support which the 
order had shown him throughout his crusade; but their Master, 
Hermann von Salza, had also played an invaluable role not only during 
the preparations for the expedition, but also in the arrangement of 
the emperor's marriage to Isabella of Brienne on which Frederick 
based his claim to the crown of Jerusalem. All of this may have been 
a factor in Frederick's donations, but Professor Jean Richard has put 
forward a broader theory which suggests that Frederick aimed to 
transform the order into 'the chief instrument of the defence of the 
Holy Land', and perhaps even create a German Kingdom of Jerusalem171. 
It is certainly true that Frederick favoured the Teutonic Knights 
above the other military orders, and sought to promote the German 
nobility - Garnier l'Aleman was appointed Frederick's lieutenant 
(jointly with Balian of Sidon) on his departure from the Holy Land, 
and in 1229 Conrad of Hohenlohe was granted an annual payment of 6000 
besants on the customs of Acre in return for the feudal service of 
Conrad and nine knights172. Yet it seems likely that the chief aim 
of Frederick's policy was to ensure his support in the kingdom, and 
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by making grants to the Teutonic Order and those nobles of German 
extraction he was merely pursuing a policy that any other leader 
would have adopted in similar circumstances. 
But by openly promoting the Teutonic Knights Frederick was 
likely to further alienate the other military orders, in particular 
the Templars. Frederick had shown the Temple and Hospital some 
favour in the early years of his reign, but between November 1226 
(when he had concluded an agreement with the Hospital as part of the 
preparations for his crusade) and March 1228 he began to confiscate 
Hospitaller and Templar possessions in Sicily173. On his return from 
Syria to Sicily he again seized Templar property apparently in 
retaliation for his treatment in Syria, but one of the conditions of 
his reconciliation with the pope in 1230 was that these possessions 
be returned. In August 1230 Frederick ordered this to be done, but 
later in the same year lands belonging to both the Temple and 
174 Hospital were again confiscated. 
The emperor's actions may have been prompted by a desire to 
curtail the powers and independence of the two main military orders 
within his kingdom of Sicily and ultimately in Jerusalem, but there 
also seems to have existed an element of personal emnity between 
himself and the master of the Temple. Frederick's failure to take an 
active role in the Fifth Crusade and the siege of Damietta had caused 
resentment amongst many of those who had taken part, and when John of 
Brienne departed for the West in 1222 together with the patriarch of 
Jerusalem and the master of the Hospital, Garin de Montaigu, the 
master of the Temple, Peter de Montaigu, refused to accompany them 
and was instead represented at Rome by one William Cade1175. It was 
the same Peter de Montaigu who in 1228 infuriated Frederick by a 
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speech which openly opposed the leadership of the crusader army by an 
excommunicate176, and after the signing of the treaty of Jaffa was 
noticeable by his absence from the Holy City despite the presence of 
his counterpart, the master of the Hospital, in the emperor's 
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entourage. For his part, after returning to Acre in March/April 
1229, Frederick publicly harangued the Temple and Peter de Montaigu 
in particular, and it was rumoured that he planned to kidnap Peter, 
take him to Apulia, and perhaps even kill him178. Whatever the truth 
of the matter Frederick and the master of the Temple were certainly 
not on the best of terms. 
Both the Temple and the Hospital strongly objected to the 
treaty which had been concluded between the Emperor Frederick and the 
Egyptian sultan. The Templars were enraged by the fact that the 
Temple at Jerusalem remained in Muslim hands depriving them of their 
traditional headquarters179, whilst the most important estates of the 
Temple and Hospital - Krak des Chevaliers, Margat, Tortosa, and 
Baghras - were outside the kingdom of Jerusalem and therefore 
excluded from the scope of the treaty. This in itself would not 
ordinarily have angered the military orders who were at the time 
following an aggressive policy towards the Syrian Muslims and would 
not have welcomed an interruption in their activities, but 
Frederick's treaty specifically stipulated that no military 
assistance whatsoever should be given to Antioch-Tripoli by the 
kingdom of Jerusalem, a clause which thereby effectively isolated the 
possessions of the military orders in the north and deprived them of 
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all military reinforcements and aid. The Templars' response 
therefore was to refuse to ratify the treaty, and with the connivance 
of the Patriarch Gerold they began to raise troops to break the 
agreement. Frederick reacted by besieging the houses of the Temple 
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and patriarch at Acre, in an attempt to enforce the observation of 
the treaty, and a truce was hastily cobbled together181. 
Nevertheless, despite the assurances which the Templars must have 
given to Frederick, the Temple continued to give direct military 
support to their houses in Antioch-Tripoli and in February 1231, 
under pressure from the emperor, Gregory IX wrote to the master of 
the order commanding them to desist from their violations of the 
182 treaty. 
The reaction of the Templars to the treaty was not unexpected. 
Although both the Templars and the Hospitallers had accompanied 
Frederick to Jerusalem, they did not take part in the ceremony at the 
Holy Sepulchre, and the master of the Temple, Peter de Montaigu, had 
refused even to come to the Holy City. The military orders did attend 
a council to decide on Jerusalem's defence, but after a heated 
exchange the meeting produced no results183. Perhaps anticipating a 
military expression of their dislike of the treaty, on his return to 
Acre184 Frederick sought to seize control of the Templar stronghold 
of Chastel Pelerin as a means of impressing upon the order his 
determination to ensure the faithful observance of the agreement, but 
was foiled by its garrison, and Frederick was therefore compelled to 
make his point more forcibly by means of direct action against the 
houses of the Temple and patriarch at Acre. 
Although the military orders had followed Frederick to Jaffa 
and had promised their assistance in the refortification of Jerusalem 
if it were required185, relations with the Templars were on the whole 
far from cordial. Frederick's seizure of the order's property in 
Sicily and the clash of personalities between the emperor and the 
master of the Temple from the beginning did not portend successful 
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co-operation, and in addition Frederick had neglected to consult the 
military orders in his negotiations with al-Kämil186. The result was 
an agreement which was both openly opposed and deeply resented by the 
Templars. Indeed Matthew Paris relates with great relish the rumour 
of a Templar-led plot, presumably prompted by their dislike of the 
treaty, which sought to betray the emperor into Muslim hands during a 
secret pilgrimage to the Holy Places on the Jordan187. Had these 
rumours of treachery and dislike of Peter de Montaigu been the sole 
reasons for Frederick's assault on the houses of the Temple and 
patriarch then it might have been possible to argue that the 
emperor's actions were unjustified'88, but in the light of the 
evidence to do so is to misconstrue the purpose of the siege. The 
emperor was not motivated by a desire for revenge but by the need to 
ensure the acquiesence of the military orders in his treaty with the 
Muslims. This he obtained (with arguably minimal use of force), and 
although the Templars did not strictly abide by the contents of the 
treaty they did not immediately break it as had been originally 
planned. 
The other main military order, the Hospital, appears to have 
remained essentially neutral during the few days of civil strife in 
Acre, and indeed seems to have taken a less extreme view of the 
agreement with the Muslims. Although they opposed the treaty in 
principle, the Master of the order accompanied Frederick to 
Jerusalem, and may even have given the emperor refuge in Acre after 
Frederick had raised his siege of the Templars and patriarch in April 
12291ß8a. By the mid-1230s the Hospitallers had assumed a stand in 
support of the emperor and of the Egyptian alliance, possibly in the 
hope that they would recover their possessions which the emperor had 
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confiscated in Sicily. 
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Consequently although Frederick could count on the backing of 
the Teutonic Knights, he drew only limited support from the Temple 
and the Hospital, and sometimes not even that. To broaden his 
support, therefore, just as he had patronised the nobility of German 
extraction, Frederick sought to regrant privileges to Pisan merchants 
in the kingdom of Jerusalem which had been withdrawn in 1228190. 
Relations between Pisa and the Hohenstaufen in Italy were on the 
whole good, and had been since at least the time of Frederick 
Barbarossa who, in 1162, had made generous promises of estates, 
quarters in cities, and complete tax exemptions in the Norman kingdom 
of Sicily, should the Pisans assist him in conquering the kingdom 
which had been established in imperial lands against imperial 
interests. These promises were renewed by Henry VI in 1191, and in 
general the Pisans retained strong Hohenstaufen sympathies191. But 
attempts in 1226-8 by Frederick II's officers apparently to restore 
what were believed to be royal rights over the chaine at Acre, and to 
impose a tax on all horses brought into Acre by the Pisans before 
1229, had elicited strong opposition from the Pisan merchants. As a 
result Thomas of Acerra had deprived them of all their judicial 
rights in Syria - despite the pro-imperialist policy they followed in 
the West192. It was these rights and privileges which were restored 
by Frederick in April 1229. 
Thomas of Acerra's activities may have stemmed from Frederick's 
policy towards trade in his kingdom of Sicily, in which the main 
motivation appears to have been control as a direct means to provide 
for the fiscal needs of the kingdom: as we have seen, Frederick 
apparently intended to employ the rents due to him in Cyprus as a 
means of financing his crusade and may have harboured similar 
intentions for the revenues on the chaine at Acre. Certainly such 
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moves were unlikely to have been a preliminary to the replacement of 
the Pisans in Syria by Sicilian merchants. Although Frederick was 
not unaware of the advantages of commercial exchange for his empire, 
his overall policy on trade cannot be described as encouraging 
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and there appears to have been no attempt by the monarchy to improve 
trade between the kingdom of Sicily and the East. In Sicily the 
native merchants were compelled to trade on an often inferior footing 
to the north Italian powers, and as a result were chiefly limited to 
Italian coastal trade194. Consequently they lacked the capital for 
the lengthy voyages to Syria and Egypt, which anyway could not be 
reached by their light coastal shipping195. Hence there was little 
incentive for Frederick to grant privileges to his Sicilian 
merchants, and the long-haul routes were likely to stay in the hands 
of the established merchant powers such as Pisa196. The Pisans must 
have realised that their maritime trade with the kingdom was not 
being threatened, and although the actions of the emperor's 
lieutenant squeezed their profits and cut Frederick's support, these 
would have been fully recouped by the restoration of privileges in 
April 1229. 
But it might also be argued that the actions of the emperor's 
bailli in Syria were indicative of the policy which the emperor 
intended to pursue in Palestine -a kind of quo warranto approach to 
rights and privileges as had been followed in Sicily, by which all 
privileges granted by Frederick's immediate predecessors had to be 
submitted for inspection and verification as a means of recovering 
royal rights and property197. Indeed such a policy may have been 
behind Frederick's demand that John of Ibelin surrender his fief of 
Beirut which, according to Philip of Novara, he considered to have 
been illegally alienated from the royal domain. But this does not 198 
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seem to have been the case. Although the Pisan privileges in the 
kingdom were suspended by Thomas of Acerra and later regranted, as 
has been suggested, the more likely reason for the count of Acerra's 
activities on the chaine at Acre was probably the need to secure 
funds for Frederick's impending crusade. In the same way the demand 
that John of Ibelin return his fief of Beirut derived probably not 
from the fact that he possessed no right to it, but rather that by 
converting it into a port without permission he had infringed upon 
royal prerogative199. Frederick was obviously keen to ensure royal 
rights in the kingdom of Jerusalem - after all, not only had John of 
Brienne's rule lacked strength, but since 1222 he had been absent in 
the West and the rights of the monarchy cannot have failed to be 
eroded as a result200; but to have consciously pursued a programme 
of examining all privileges and rights held in the kingdom would have 
taken more time than the emperor was prepared to give. The actions 
which Frederick took against the Italians, the Templars and John of 
Ibelin were not therefore quo warranto proceedings, nor did they form 
part of a broader policy based on that which had been implemented in 
Sicily201. Instead Frederick sought to preserve the established 
prerogatives of the crown, as he saw them, by demanding the return of 
Beirut and by favouring the Teutonic Order in preference to the 
Temple and Hospital whose independence of action undermined royal 
authority. Donations to the German nobility and the regranting of 
privileges to Pisan merchants within the kingdom were similarly 
designed to bolster support for Frederick and thereby counterbalance 
the forces which threatened further to erode the position of the 
monarchy. In this limited sense Frederick's policies can be said to 
have been a conscious imitation of those he pursued in Sicily in that 
they were intended to strengthen the authority of the crown based on 
royal rights as they had existed at an earlier time, but they did not 
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encompass the same techniques nor were they carried to the same 
extremes. 
The position of the monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 
had been visibly weakened since the end of the twelfth century, but 
it was evident to Frederick that a thorough scrutiny of privileges 
and grants such as had been followed in Sicily was not only 
inappropriate, but would severely hamper the progress of the crusade, 
and his attempts to secure his recognition as king. But at the same 
time he was tempered in his actions by the need to come to an 
agreement with al-Kämil, a need which in turn inhibited all acts 
which might antagonise the Syrian nobility. Although the emperor's 
restrained attitude did promote co-operation in Syria and facilitate 
the eventual assertion of his rights in Cyprus, such an attitude was 
unlikely to make him more congenial to those nobles whose power and 
rank had been greatly enhanced by the minority in Cyprus and by the 
absentee monarchy in Syria. They saw in his marriage to Isabella and 
his claims to the throne of Jerusalem a major threat to their own 
position and, despite their willingness to support Frederick in the 
prosecution of his crusade, did not wish to encourage his personal 
advancement in the kingdom. 
The view of the jurists John of Jaffa and Philip of Novara that 
friction between Frederick and the majority of the nobles in the 
Latin Kingdom was brought about by the inflexibility of the emperor 
is in stark contrast to the apparent evidence of maladministration by 
the Ibelins in Cyprus and John of Ibelin's infringement of royal 
rights concerning Beirut - both of which could be cited as 
alternative reasons for the tension between the two parties. Indeed 
Frederick's policies and actions were much less extreme than the 
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works of these two jurists have suggested, and their intimations that 
the vast majority of nobles in Syria and Cyprus were opposed to 
imperial rule are patently incorrect. Frederick's relations with the 
Ibelins were poor mainly because they had most to lose by the 
assertion of his rights in the two kingdoms, whereas his relations 
with a not insignificant section of the nobility, who had been 
angered by the promotion of the Ibelin family and their partisans, 
were on the whole good. These nobles came from some of the most 
illustrious families in the East and included such men as Balian of 
202 Sidon, Bertrand Porcelet, Amaury de Bethsan and Hugh of Gibelet. 
Nevertheless, despite differences, Frederick was able to ensure 
support from all sections during the period of his crusade proper by 
compromise and a refusal to assert his rights until the primary aim 
of agreement with the Muslims had been achieved. Once this was 
secured he set about asserting his position by issuing charters and 
dispensing justice. Donations and grants of privilege to Pisan 
merchants and German nobles in the kingdom added to the support he 
already attracted from a variety of nobles. Only when the Patriarch 
Gerold in alliance with the Templars threatened to overturn the 
treaty which he had negotiated did Frederick resort to military 
action. Relations with the Templars had been strained, but until then 
Frederick had been content to counterbalance the order's independence 
by patronising the Teutonic Knights. Some of Frederick's later 
actions, such as the sale of the bailiiage of Cyprus and the 
appointment of his own officers to control the island's fortresses 
(although this was his right as bailli) together with the 
disinheritance of John of Ibelin, might be interpreted as 
provocative, but Frederick cannot be accused of being wholly 
- 143 - 
responsible for the situations which ensued. His attitude towards 
Cyprus and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was essentially pragmatic, 
and therefore flexible. Under pressure he was willing to alter his 
appointment of Thomas of Acerra as bailli for the kingdom after his 
departure, to that of Balian of Sidon and Garnier l'Aleman. He was 
also able to recognise the error of his judgement in assigning Toron 
to the Teutonic Knights and arrange for its transfer to Alice of 
Armenia. In the circumstances Frederick's actions were reasonable and 
restrained; they may not have been popular with everyone, but they 
certainly lacked the anti-baronial hue with which the jurists insist 
they were coloured. The arrival of the emperor in the East polarised 
opinion, but this was a polarisation which had already begun; 
Frederick's presence merely exacerbated existing tensions. 
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Chapter Six 
The Treaty of Jaffa: a reassessment 
The treaty concluded between Frederick II and al-Malik al-Kämil 
remains a shadowy piece of diplomacy of uncertain substance. Its 
terms must be pieced together from the testimony and letters of the 
Patriarch Gerold, Pope Gregory IX, the Emperor Frederick and Hermann 
von Salza, supplemented and bolstered by the evidence provided by 
Muslim and Christian observers and anthologists. No comprehensive 
text of the treaty has survived and this presents the largest single 
obstacle to an adequate assessment of the true nature and extent of 
the agreement. Such a document does, however, seem to have existed: 
Gerold remarked to the pope that he had demanded and received from 
Hermann a full transcript of the conditions of the agreement. He 
related also how. Frederick had refrained from making known the 
articles contained in the document, each of which he intimated were 
poorly defined for fear that the sultan might not agree to them1. 
But the patriarch, when he wrote to the pope, preferred not to send a 
full copy of the terms agreed by the two leaders, merely the most 
surprising elements of which he considered it necessary to inform 
Gregory2. These were written in Old French - the predominant 
language amongst the Franks in the kingdom - with Gerold's appended 
comments in Latin. The version as printed by Raynaldus and presented 
by Huillard-Br'eholles is a translation into Latin of the original Old 
French extract; hence, although translated with close reference to 
the patriarch's accompanying letter, it must be handled with some 
care as it differs marginally yet significantly from the clauses 
quoted by Gerold3. Raynaldus himself was under the impression that 
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the original text of the treaty was written in Arabic and then 
translated into the vulgar French tongue4. 
The discrepancies between the Muslim and Christian accounts of 
the treaty and its stipulations are more blatant, a circumstance made 
certain not by the paucity of the Muslim sources but by their 
brevity. Most are totally preoccupied with the cession of Jerusalem 
to the Franks and fail to give any greater substance to the treaty 
than this; of those that do, however, the majority (of which 
MaqrTzT's Kitäb al-sulük fi ma'rifat duwal al-mulük is a good 
example) are derived from Ibn Wäsil's Mufarrij al-Kurlib. This 
provides the fullest Muslim version of the agreement. Ibn Abi '1-Dam 
must be the only writer to comment in some detail on the stipulations 
of the agreement, albeit with reference to Jerusalem alone, and yet 
remain independent of Ibn Wäsil5. Other chronicles, such as the cIgd 
al-Jumän fi ta'rtkh ahl al-zamän (Collar of Pearls) by Badr al-Din 
al-`Aini, are compilations from older authorities6. Thus, although 
the Muslim accounts would superficially appear to be many and quite 
extensive, they provide a very limited description of the treaty, 
whilst their apparent scope is further restricted by their close 
interdependence. 
The treaty which was agreed between Frederick II and al-Kämil 
was sworn on 18 February 1229. Under the terms of the agreement 
Jerusalem was to be surrendered to the Christians, with the proviso 
that the Temple area and its precincts - the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat 
al-Sakhra, or Templum Domini) and the al-Agsä mosque (Masjid al-Aq$ä, 
or Temple of Solomon), collectively known to the Muslims as the Haram 
al-Sharif (sacred enclosure) 
7- 
were to remain in Muslim possession. 
Muslim worship and practices were to continue there. The Franks for 
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their part were strictly forbidden to enter the area except as 
visitors. Thus the Sibt Ibn al-JauzT was able to report that during 
Frederick's visit to the Holy City in March 1229 in the company of 
the gädi of Nablus, Shams al-DTn, the muezzins continued their 
customary call to prayer, and that before leaving the city the 
emperor distributed money amongst the custodians and muezzins and 
pious men of the sanctuary. It was even reported that actually 
within the confines of Solomon's Temple Frederick rebuked a cleric 
for abusing the right of pilgrimage so graciously accorded the Franks 
8 by the sultan. 
The arrangement is not lacking in confirmation: al-`Aini 
quotes the Chronicle of Baybars to the effect that the rights of 
Islam were to be observed in the sacred enclosure9. Magrizi repeats 
the claim, as does the contemporary Ibn Abi '1-Dam, adding that no 
Muslims should be excluded from repeatedly visiting the Islamic 
shrines of the city, nor should any dues be exacted from them for the 
'° 
privilege of that admission. 
All these stipulations are confirmed by the Patriarch Gerold in 
his letter to the pope, even to the point of passing on Frederick's 
specification that the Templum Domini was to be manned by Saracens so 
that those Saracens who wished to come there on pilgrimage could 
enter freely and without paying dues. As a means of ensuring this 
the keys to the gates of the Haram al-Sharif were to be in the sole 
charge of its Muslim administrators, and the al-Agsä mosque and 
Templum Domini which it comprised were to be places of Muslim worship 
and prayer free from hindrance or oppression 
". A semi-fictional 
account of the events by the fourteenth century writer Qirtäy 
represents Frederick as saying that he had obtained agreement that 
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there should no longer be a Muslim force in the city12. The Eracles, 
however, whilst agreeing that the Muslims retained possession of the 
Templum Domini and its appurtenances, suggests that in order to 
guarantee the situation and ensure their right of pilgrimage they 
were permitted to guard the area with a force of three men. Since 
the Temple area had four entrances and twenty-two gates, the 
concession cannot be said to have amounted to much13. . 
Neither Frederick nor Hermann von Salza denied that they had 
not obtained full rights for Christians within the Holy City - 
indeed, as Gerold was quick to point out, it would have been 
impossible to hide such a fact14 - but they attempted to cushion the 
blow by emphasising that the Templum Domini, although remaining under 
Muslim control ('because they have long been in the habit of praying 
there') was still freely accessible to those Christians who wished to 
worship within its walls15. Moreover, as the emperor wrote in a 
letter to King Henry III of England, only as many Saracens as the 
Franks might choose to allow would be permitted to visit the Haram 
al-Sharif, and without arms. Nor were they to be permitted to dwell 
in the city, but outside its walls, and as soon as they had paid 
their devotions they were to depart16. In the opinion of the Master 
of the Teutonic Order, such an arrangement represented no threat 
since the Saracens held the Temple only in so far as a few of their- 
functionaries who were old and unarmed were guarding it, whilst the 
emperor's men guarded and fortified the outer gates with the result 
that there was no way in nor out for these Saracens, or any others, 
except with the approval of the emperor's men17. Nevertheless 
Hermann was anxious to make it known that the Muslims possessed a 
long established right to worship in Jerusalem, just as Christians 
had once been permitted to worship in Muslim cities. Indeed whilst 
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the Muslims retained the al-Agsä mosque and the Rock, in which the 
Prophet's footprint had been miraculously preserved, the Christians 
for their part had been restored the right to come and go freely to 
the Holy Sepulchre18. Under the circumstances it appeared that the 
treaty was a just compromise since, as the emir Fakhr al-Din 
recognised, the Saracens held the Templum Domini in as great a 
reverence as the Christians did the Sepulchre of Jesus Christ19. 
However, it seems probable that Hermann was more mindful of plausible 
excuses to justify the existence of this anomalous Muslim enclave 
than any concern for equitable settlement. Certainly Gerold remained 
unconvinced, and in his commentary on the treaty he complained 
bitterly that a Frank might worship neither in the Templum Domini nor 
in the Temple of Solomon if he did not believe as the Saracens did20. 
But such a stipulation is not specified by Ibn Wäsil nor does MagrTzi 
include this as a condition in his presentation of the material. It 
seems unlikely that had this been the case the Muslim custodians 
would have permitted the offerings made at the Rock to go to the 
Christians as Hermann maintains that they did21. 
The sole other right attributed by the sources to Muslim 
pilgrims within the city, subsequent to al-Kämil's expulsion of the 
resident Muslim population, was that of independent administration of 
justice, although only when the injury or mischief committed involved 
Saracens alone. Gerold condemned this out of hand as allowing the 
Muslims the same jurisdiction in the city as the Christians22. 
Despite the obvious importance of this provision for the Islamic 
population, the Muslim chroniclers apparently neglect to list it 
amongst the concessions which they held in the Holy City, although 
they may have felt that such an itemisation was unnecessary, 
considering It a self-evident responsibility of the new Muslim 
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governor who was now to be resident at the town of al-Bira, actually 
23 
within the province of Jerusalem. 
In essence Frankish and Muslim sources are not at variance as 
regards the division of authority within Jerusalem: the Muslims were 
to retain the Templum Domini and the Temple of Solomon, to which the 
Franks had access but purely for worship. The problem of legal 
jurisdiction and the number of custodians permitted to guard the 
Templum Domini is less clear, since Frankish claims lack the 
confirmation of their Muslim counterparts. But it is over the 
question of the reconstruction of Jerusalem's ruined defences that 
the greatest divergence occurs. 
From the point of view of the Latin chroniclers Frederick had 
obtained from al-Kämil complete freedom to refortify the Holy City. 
But it is a claim which those Muslim authors who refer to the problem 
utterly refute. Nor has the predicament entirely escaped the notice 
of historians, although few have attempted to explain the 
incongruity: the much-cited Hans Gottschalk alludes to the 
difficulty, but disappointingly skirts round it asserting that since 
Jerusalem remained an open city until 1239 the Muslim tradition must 
be the correct one24. Joshua Prawer in his Histoire du Royaume Latin 
de Jerusalem lends only a footnote to the discussion, whilst Jean 
Richard is content to label it 'an unsolved problem'25. 
The walls of Jerusalem had been destroyed in 1219, during the 
time of the Fifth Crusade, by al-Mu Cazzam of Damascus, within whose 
domain the city lay26. Matthew Paris was convinced that the action 
was one of revenge for the siege of Damietta27. It could also have 
been in anticipation of negotiations whereby al-Kämil might offer the 
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crusaders Palestine in return for an end to the siege of the Egyptian 
port. But more likely is the suggestion that, denuded of troops by 
the duel in Egypt, Jerusalem would be wide open to attack from any 
new Frankish expedition arriving at Acre. Should it be taken, it 
would provide a ready-made stronghold for consolidation and further 
expansion28. The remaining defences were razed a second time in 
122029, and approaches made by a1-Kami1 towards Frederick II in 1227 
persuaded al-Mucazzam of a renewed threat to the city. Before his 
death on 11 November 1227/ 30 Dhi'1-Qa'da 624 H., he ordered the 
destruction of those fortifications which survived30. 
Both Hermann von Salza and Frederick stressed the concession 
which they claimed to have obtained from al-Kämil. In a letter to 
Henry III, Frederick wrote that he was permitted to rebuild the city 
of Jerusalem in as good a state as it ever had been, in addition to 
the castles of Jaffa, Caesarea, and Sidon and the new castle at 
Montfort. As for the sultan he was forbidden, until the end of the 
truce, to repair or rebuild any of his fortresses or castles. 
Hermann was in complete agreement, informing the pope that both the 
walls and towers of Jerusalem might be rebuilt just as the Christians 
wished; the Muslims, however, could construct no new fortresses or 
buildings, nor undertake any reconstruction until the truce had 
31 
terminated. 
The Old French extract from the treaty also states clearly that 
Jerusalem was to be given to the emperor, or his baillis, that he 
might do with it whatever he wished, whether fortify it or anything 
else. Gerold emphasised these concessions in his accompanying letter 
to the pope, although he made no reference to al-Kämil's oath not to 
undertake the refortification of Muslim possessions until after the 
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expiry of the truce32. It is also plain from the patriarch's letter 
that he considered defences might be constructed at Bethlehem, whilst 
Toron, however, was to remain in its present state. A number of 
other places are listed in the same vein, but Gerold's Latin is 
confusing and it is unclear which others could or could not be 
rebuilt33. In contrast the Annales S. Medardi Suessionensis identify 
only two cities which might be refortified: Jerusalem and Jaffa. 
The new castle at Montfort could also be strengthened, but Bethlehem 
34 
was not to be rebuilt, nor was Nazareth. 
But the Frankish sources seem to have been too ready to accept 
what for the Muslims was an enormous concession to make. Jerusalem 
had not been in Christian hands since the defeat of their forces by 
Saläh al-Din in 1187; by permitting its refortification al-Kämil 
would in effect be returning the long-contested city to Christendom 
in perpetuity - clearly a situation which would not be tolerated in 
the Islamic world. Not surprisingly the Muslim writers were 
unanimous in their belief that the Franks had been granted no 
authorisation whatsoever to begin reconstruction of Jerusalem's 
defences. Ibn Abi '1-Dam states quite expressly that the city was 
made over to Frederick II on the condition that the Franks should 
35 
rebuild nothing whatsoever within its confines. Likewise Ibn Wäsil 
asserts that the truce stipulated explicitly that Frederick was in no 
way to attempt to rebuild the city defences. It is an opinion 
disputed by none of the later anthologies compiled by MaqrTzT, 
al-`Aini and Abu '1-Fida36. 
Gerold implied that the right of refortification was granted to 
the emperor as a personal concession by al-Kämil which he 
communicated neither to his brother nor to his subjects37. Instead 
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the sultan was content in public to claim that he had conceded only 
churches and ruins, since the sacred precincts, the venerated Rock 
and all other sanctuaries to which the Muslims made their pilgrimages 
remained in Muslim control. He justified his action in a letter to 
the Muslim princes by pointing to the military helplessness of the 
city: Jerusalem's flattened walls and defences could afford little 
opportunity for resistance should the Franks seek to take the city by 
a sudden coup, yet by its surrender the Frankish forces would be 
stretched to their limit and thereby considerably weakened, thus 
facilitating its recovery at a later date when the situation was more 
favourable38. According to Gottschalk, it was a sufficiently good 
explanation to be accepted by all the Muslim sources - even the 
Damascene propaganda hostile to al-Kämil39. But criticism was 
severe, and a recent work (by J. M. Powell) has suggested that 
contemporary Muslim accounts which present Frederick in a very 
favourable light may in fact have been part of a concerted effort by 
the sultan to make the treaty much more palatable to its 
detractors39a. Likewise Fakhr al-Din's declaration that the emperor 
had no real ambition to hold Jerusalem nor anything else, but simply 
wished to safeguard his reputation amongst the Christians40, may also 
have been designed to provide additional comfort, by implying that 
Frankish possession of the city would pose no threat, and that 
Frederick might have no intention of undertaking a restoration of its 
defences. 
But the contradiction remains: the Christian sources maintain 
the treaty permitted refortification, the Muslim sources flatly deny 
it. Until now discussion has been limited to the treatment of the 
terms by representatives of the two opposing opinions. It might be 
profitable at this stage, therefore, to investigate the reaction of 
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the new masters of Jerusalem to the constraints which the agreement 
imposed upon them. 
As a result of the spectacular claims enunciated by both 
Frederick II and Hermann von Salza many people advised the emperor to 
hasten to Jerusalem and to carefully set about the rebuilding of the 
city41. Frederick himself declared boastfully to Henry III that 
before leaving the Holy City he intended to restore its magnificence 
by rebuilding its walls and towers and to arrange matters so that the 
work would be continued in his absence with no less care and 
diligence than if he had been there in person42. Thus, following 
Frederick's wearing of the crown in the Holy Sepulchre on 18 March 
1229, Hermann delivered a long speech first in German and then in 
Latin to the people and nobles gathered there, at the end of which he 
invited the nobles to give their assistance in the work of fortifying 
the city43. According to the Eracles, having given out that he 
wanted to fortify the city, the emperor set about uncovering and 
ascertaining the position of the foundations, presumably in 
preparation for the imminent work of reconstruction 
44. 
But in spite of the fact that the gathered nobility had agreed 
to give an answer the following day concerning the emperor's request 
for assistance, and although he had on many previous occasions 
promised to fortify Jerusalem, Frederick departed the city, in great 
secrecy at dawn on the Monday. He had told no one of his intention, 
with the exception of the constable of the kingdom, Odo of 
Montbeliard, whom he commanded to remain and guard the city45. 
According to Gerold, the brothers of both the Temple and the Hospital 
had agreed to aid him with all their forces and their advice, if he 
still wanted to undertake a programme of refortification, and he was 
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informed of their decision by a delegation which set off after him. 
His reply, however, was noncommittal46. 
But that the emperor was concerned with the problem of 
restoration does not answer the question of whether or not 
reconstruction work was actually begun. In his description of the 
events in Jerusalem during the emperor's stay, Gerold admits that 
some attempt was apparently made by Frederick to organise a renewal 
47 
of the city's defences. Hermann says that before leaving for Jaffa 
Frederick had on the same day made careful arrangements for the 
rebuilding of the city, whilst 'Ernoul' claims that Frederick went as 
far as to order his baillis to refortify the city48. 
Certainly there are a number of sources which assert with great 
confidence that the process of rebuilding was indeed begun. The 
annals of Margam describe how the emperor and other great men entered 
the city of Jerusalem in the forty-second year after it had been 
seized, and afterwards 'they manfully began to restore the walls of 
the city, and to build churches'. The annals of Dore, which closely 
follow the Margam annals in the details of Frederick's crusade, 
likewise maintain that the demolished walls were once more built up 
from the rubble49. Roger of Wendover, for his part, wrote that after 
divine services had been performed in the suburban churches, the 
prelates and all the religious men set to work in conjunction with 
the rest of the pilgrims, at great expense and trouble, to rebuild 
the city, to surround the walls with ditches, and to repair the 
ramparts of the towers50. German chroniclers note that Frederick 
also restored buildings in the city and rebuilt Jaffa, Capharnaum, 
and Nazareth, along with a great many other places5l. 
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The view that construction work did take place is shared by the 
Willelmi Chronica Andrensis, although here Frederick is credited with 
a somewhat less ambitious programme: the writer describes how, 
having conducted negotiations with the sultan of Babylon, Frederick 
regained Jerusalem, and applied himself to the restoration of its 
demolished walls. 'He rebuilt the Tower of David and built up St. 
Stephen's Gate', with the assistance and guidance of Peter des 
Roches, bishop of Winchester. But whereas St. Stephen's Gate as the 
principal entrance to the city for pilgrims and travellers coming 
from Acre was a likely contender for repair, the credibility of the 
information is undermined by the mis-identification of the Egyptian 
sultan as Saläh al-Din rather than al-Kämil52. 
Whatever may be the truth in these reports, it seems unlikely 
that construction work would have been begun whilst Frederick was 
actually in the city - for one thing there was not sufficient time: 
Christian sources agree with the Sibt that the Emperor spent only two 
nights in Jerusalem53. T. C. Van Cleve asserts, however, that a body 
of knights, probably of the Teutonic Order, was left behind in the 
city with the purpose of aiding the process of rebuilding. This 
seems to be pure speculation; the letter which he cites is evidence 
only that Frederick left some knights in the kingdom and those not 
necessarily at Jerusalem54. The Annales S. Medardi Suessionensis, 
however, state that Frederick stationed a garrison in the Tower of 
David, and at other cities elsewhere, just as he saw fit; but our 
information is scanty and it cannot be said with any certainty that 
the imperial troops noted by the Annales Sancti Rudberti 
Salisburgenses as protecting the Holy City in 1239 were the selfsame 
relic of Frederick's crusade, or that they had played the role of 
55 
masons or civil engineers. 
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In spite of the continued presence of at least some imperial 
forces, Gregory IX, in his encyclical to St. Louis and all the 
bishops of France, found sufficient grounds to complain that the 
emperor had left the Holy Land destitute of troops and men, of arms 
and other protections, thus exposing it to occupation by enemies of 
the faith56. The 'Rothelin' continuation of William of Tyre agrees, 
declaring that Frederick left the Christians in the Holy Land of 
Jerusalem in great peril, 'as it all remained unenclosed and without 
fortification'. Indeed, if we are to believe its author, none of the 
churches was rebuilt, the Holy City was not refortified, and neither 
Frederick nor his bailli gave any advice by which Jerusalem was to be 
refortified in the future57. This, of course, is in direct conflict 
with 'Ernoul "s version of events, and it seems likely that 'Ernoul' 
must have assumed, solely on the basis of the survey of the city's 
foundations, that Frederick's instructions to his representatives 
must have included a command to commence the work of rebuilding. The 
emperor's hurried departure from the city and return to Acre, despite 
being acquainted with the amenability of the military orders to the 
work of reconstruction, lends weight to this interpretation. 
Certainly there survives no record of Frederick accepting their offer 
of assistance. 
But this does not prove conclusively that no rebuilding was 
undertaken in Jerusalem during the period of the truce: indeed 
demolition of various parts of the city had been effected on three 
separate occasions during the previous ten years, and the scale of 
destruction must have been extensive. The Eracles attributes to 
al-Mu`azzam the dismantling of all the walls of the city of Jerusalem 
in addition to the two castles of Toron and Safed58. However, both 
the 'Rothelin' continuation and Magrizi's account of events assert 
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that the Tower of David was not destroyed59. 
The vandalism wrought by the prince of Damascus was described 
by the scholasticus Oliver of Paderborn in his Historia Damiatina, in 
which he told how in 1219 Jerusalem, although impregnably fortified, 
was destroyed within and without by al-Mucazzam. Its walls and towers 
were reduced to heaps of stone but, we are told, the Templum Domini, 
the Tower of David and the Holy Sepulchre all survived60. Thus 
Oliver's account indicates that the demolition included not merely 
the city's outer defences but also other buildings within the city 
walls. The 'Rothelin' continuation, in a later passage describing the 
condition of Jerusalem, also assesses the extent to which the city 
was affected, suggesting that during the period of Muslim occupation 
everything was razed with the exception of the Church of the 
61 Sepulchre and certain other buildings which are not identified. 
But between March 1219 and repossession of the city by the 
Franks in 1229, Jerusalem was subject a further twice to destructive 
onslaughts by its Muslim ruler. The Historia Damiatina indicates 
that in the late summer-autumn of 1220 the city was more completely 
destroyed; and the destruction of Jerusalem is again recorded in 
122762. Thus, even if the Templum Domini, the Church of the 
Sepulchre and the Tower of David survived 1219, or for that matter 
1220, it cannot be confidently asserted from the evidence available 
that in 1229 they remained unscathed. Certainly the Willelmi 
Chronica Andrensis would tend to indicate that the Tower of David had 
not escaped al-MuCazzam's wrath63. The Eracles hints at the same 
thing when it informs us that a little after the departure of the 
emperor from the Holy Land an attack was made on Jerusalem by, 
according to the report, more than fifteen thousand Muslim peasants 
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from the surrounding countryside. The attack was beaten off and five 
hundred of the raiders killed; but during the incursion the 
inhabitants took refuge in the Tower of David, 'in a fortification 
which had been made there out of the strongest houses which were 
close by'fi4. The Annales Wormatienses agree that the Muslims 
attacked the city, but add that the Tower of David was destroyed 
65 
This is not confirmed elsewhere. 
Whether the Frankish stronghold had been destroyed or not in 
1229 or before, it appears to have presented a major problem to 
al-Näsir Dä'üd when he arrived at Jerusalem on 15 December 1239, 
where, according to Ibn al-Furät, 'the Franks had built up and 
fortified a tower... known as the Tower of David'. It was 
sufficiently well defended to hold out until 5 January 1240. After 
66 its surrender it was reduced to a pile of rubble, 
'Rothelin' gives us a fuller impression of the work which had 
been accomplished in the intervening years since the return of 
Jerusalem to the Christians. We are told that on the appearance of 
Theobald's crusade in the Holy Land there were no fortifications in 
Jerusalem apart from the Tower of David, although the Christians had 
made good use of alms to begin to fortify the city near St. Stephen's 
gate, and had constructed '. I. you del mur et ne sai quantes 
tornelles'67. The extent of this refortification seems to be 
confirmed by the Chronique rimee of Philippe Mouskes which, with 
reference to Dä'üd's attack in 1239, affirms that the Tower of David 
was thrown down along with the gate of St. Stephen68. 
Thus it would appear that at some time between Frederick's 
departure from the Latin Kingdom and Dä'üd's assault on the city of 
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Jerusalem at the very end of 1239, work of refortification had been 
undertaken in the Holy City. The problem is at what stage this was 
begun, its full extent, and whether or not it contravened the terms 
of the agreement. 
Perhaps, surprisingly, the most conclusive proof of a violation 
by the Franks of the conditions of Jerusalem's cession would seem to 
come from a Muslim source. An historical study written by Ibn Shaddäd 
(1217/613H. -1285/684H. ) claims that reconstruction was indeed 
embarked upon and completed during the agreed period of the truce. 
We are told that after the treaty expired, around the time of 
Theobald's expedition, Jerusalem was evacuated of its inhabitants and 
a celebrated knight remained in command. 
'He had rebuilt the citadel of Jerusalem during the time of the 
truce and had fortified it and had filled it with 
equipment.... and he had joined it to the tower, which is known 
as the Tower of David.. '69 
But it is difficult not to be sceptical of this claim. Although it 
seems unreasonable to dispute the form which the fortification took - 
Ibn Wäsil writes that the Franks had constructed on the western side 
of Jerusalem a fortress which comprised the Tower of David as part of 
its walls - the date of construction remains open to dispute. Ibn 
Wäsil clearly fixes the rebuilding as occurring sometime after 
al-Kämil's death (9 March 1238/ 21 Rajab 635 H. ), adding that when 
al-Näsir Dä'üd learned that the Franks had constructed a citadel at 
Jerusalem, he marched against the city70. Thus the implication of 
Ibn Wäsil's account is that, had there been any major work on the 
city's defences prior to 1238-1239, it would have provoked a similar 
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reaction. How then is it possible to explain the apparent 
reconstruction which took place during the ten years following the 
loss of Jerusalem to the Franks? 
In the first place it seems clear that the Tower of David 
escaped destruction on all three occasions when the wrath of 
al-Mu`azzam was unleashed on the Holy City: both Magrizi and Ibn 
Wäsil, writing about the events of 1239-1240, reaffirm that 
al-Mu'azzam had left the Tower of David intact, and 'Rothelin "s 
description of the city circa 1239 differentiates between the Tower 
of David and fortifications which had been begun only recently7l. 
The reason for its survival is given in a letter of al-Näsir to the 
Caliph: it seems that it was revered by the Muslims as an edifice 
personally constructed by the Prophet for use as a mosque. Dä'üd, 
although like al-MuCazzam a very religious man, was able to overcome 
his father's qualms, writing that he planned 
, to overturn it... and make it into a mosque for worship instead 
of a refuge for mobs and a musterground'. 
72 
In other words the Tower of David did not suffer destruction at the 
hands of the Muslims until 1240, and consequently it was not in need 
of reconstruction work during the period of the truce. 
However, between 1229 and December 1239 there were two 
occasions when building work was carried out in Jerusalem. The first 
was probably in the May or June of 1229 (although possibly as late as 
October of that year) when some sort of temporary refuge was hastily 
constructed from a number of sturdy dwellings within the former 
citadel area and neighbouring on the Tower of David73. The picture 
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conjured up by the Eracles is one of a few houses knocked together as 
an emergency measure in the face of increasing Muslim hostility in 
the locality, which had been excited by the harangues delivered from 
the mosques, probably at the instigation of al-Näsir Dä'üd who 
represented the loss of Jerusalem as a betrayal of Islam. Thus it 
was a minor defence measure, and as such provided no threat to 
Jerusalem's status of a 'free-city'. It is quite conceivable that it 
even passed unnoticed by Muslim observers. Indeed it is unlikely 
that any more extensive defences would have been necessary at this 
stage: the Christian community living in Jerusalem was small; few of 
the pilgrims had wanted to stay behind when Frederick had left74, and 
all the indications are that immigration did not really begin again 
until 1243. Even when the city was sacked by the Khwarizmians in 
1244, the population seems to have been only about seven thousand75. 
Nor was there any real incentive to contravene the treaty and 
refortify - the seat of government, the court and patriarch all 
remained at Acre. Even the Teutonic Order to whom Frederick had 
given possessions in Jerusalem (including le Manoir le Roi) preferred 
the comforts of the thirteenth century capital76. 
The second and by far the more important occasion was in the 
period March 1238 to December 1239. According to Ibn al-'Amid the 
duration of the truce was set at ten years, five months and forty 
days, and would, therefore, expire some time in mid-to-late 1239; 
but with the death of al-Malik al-KImil on 9 March 1238 / 21 Rajab 
635 H. the treaty lapsed before its allotted time and the binding 
obligations on the two parties were lifted77. This sort of unwritten 
contingency clause seems to have been commonly recognised by the 
Franks, and it is found in connection with the death of al-MuCazzam 
in 1227 and of the ruler of Aleppo nine years later. Thus in March 
78 
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1238 the Franks considered themselves at liberty to begin work on 
refortification of Jerusalem's crippled defences. This resulted in 
the fortifications noted by the 'Rothelin' continuation and by Philip 
Mouskes as having been begun near St. Stephen's gate, and the 
building up of the citadel to incorporate the Tower of David which 
the Muslim writers report. Ibn Shaddäd's assertion that this 
construction work took place during the time of the truce reflects 
the unwillingness of the Muslims to recognise this particular 
agreement as having expired with the sultan's death, an 
understandable attitude which was directly attributable to the 
inevitable upheaval within the Ayyübid house on al-Kämil's demise. 
Indeed it was this unrest which prevented the Ayyübid princes from 
taking punitive measures against the Christians. Only with his 
cousin Ayyüb safely incarcerated in Kerak, and the demoralising 
defeat of a Frankish force near Gaza in November 1239 by Egyptian 
troops, did Dä'id find it opportune and advantageous to move against 
Jerusalem and to espouse the cause of the Jihad as he had done in 
79 1229. 
It is obvious that the construction work undertaken in the Holy 
City belongs in essence to the period intervening between al-Kämil's 
death and al-Näsir's assault79a, a period which the Franks considered 
to be outside the jurisdiction of the truce. Roger of Wendover's 
claim that the refortification was begun almost immediately after the 
emperor's visit to Jerusalem appears to be poetic licence based on 
the boastful intentions portrayed by Frederick in his letter to Henry 
III80. The suggestion by the Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensium 
Chronicon that the buildings within the city walls were restored81 
may again have been an action which was contemplated, but one which 
was never carried out. As for the affirmation by the annals of 
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Margam that the walls were repaired and churches built, this must 
surely be pure supposition - or at least wishful thinking. The whole 
episode of the emperor's visit to Jerusalem as described by the 
Margam chronicler is one of misinformation: mass is said to have 
been celebrated despite the city having been under interdict since 
1187 and the emperor being an excommunicate, the patriarch is 
mistakenly included amongst Frederick's entourage, and the event is 
misdated as Palm Sunday [8 April] 122982. In the face of such 
neglect it is difficult to class talk of refortification as anything 
other than just one more error. 
Indeed we have only the word of Frederick and Hermann that 
there ever existed any intention to refortify the city. Certainly 
the emperor did not personally undertake the rebuilding of the Tower 
of David and St. Stephen's gate as the Willelmi Chronica Andrensis 
asserts; Gerold accuses Frederick of arriving in the Holy Land with 
'scarcely forty knights and without money'83, and his departure from 
Jerusalem was far too hasty for him to have initiated the actual 
process of rebuilding. Frederick himself complained of the poverty 
which beset him, in spite of having borrowed thirty thousand besants 
from Guy of Gibelet before his departure for Syria84. As it was 
there was little enough money for day to day expenses, to say nothing 
of refortification, and he found it necessary to confiscate the 
offerings made at the Holy Sepulchre, and to deprive the canons at 
Acre of certain of their customs dues in order to meet the short-term 
needs of his expedition85. Even if we were to suppose that the Tower 
of David had not survived the destruction caused by al-Mu'azzam, and 
that the refortification specified by the Willelmi Chronica Andrensis 
did take place in Jerusalem in 1229, we would have to accept the 
dubious assertion that it was supervised by Peter des Roches, bishop 
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of Winchester. He may indeed have remained behind for a short time 
in the kingdom of Jerusalem after Frederick's departure86, but a 
review of the bishop's life by the xenophobic Matthew Paris, whilst 
hailing the Englishman as the principal architect of the crusade's 
successes, attributes to him little more than the strengthening of 
Jaffa in 1228 and the transformation of the church of St. Thomas the 
Martyr in Acre from a secular to a military establishment87. It is 
more than doubtful that, had Peter des Roches masterminded a 
refortification of Jerusalem, it would have escaped Paris's able pen. 
If Frederick II set out with the intention of refortifying 
Jerusalem it was an intention which the pressing' circumstances of the 
final months of his stay in the Holy Land compelled him to abandon. 
Under the pressure of events he was forced to accept al-Kämil's 
terms. Although he went through the motions of preparing for a 
programme of reconstruction - he had the foundations of the city 
walls surveyed, and requested assistance from the Syrian baronage and 
military orders - it seems probable that this was an attempt to dupe 
the opposition and to make a pretence of goodwill. His sudden 
departure from Jerusalem and evasive reply to the Templars' offer of 
help frustrated the anticipated rebuilding. Thus it would appear 
that the Muslim sources were correct in their assertion that there 
was to be no refortification of the city. Certainly it seems 
unlikely that, whilst permitting the Franks to rebuild, al-Kämil 
would have accepted a clause which barred him from renewing those 
fortresses in his own possession. Indeed the terms on which the 
sultan was prepared to declare a truce remained secret until 11 
February 1229 and even then we cannot be certain that all the points 
were relayed in full, or remained without embellishment by the 
emperor. Frederick claimed that he possessed the right to rebuild 
88 
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Jerusalem's city walls and defences89, but his actions would tend to 
suggest otherwise. It is a right which the Muslims would not have 
conceded lightly, and a concession which al-Kämil's own justification 
for the conclusion of the truce precludes. But Frederick's prestige 
and position as the temporal head of Christendom had been seriously 
undermined by his excommunication, and the very fact that the 
imperial crusade had been based not on success in battle, but on 
negotiation, had only added to his critics90. By claiming that the 
Egyptian sultan had conceeded the right to refortify Jerusalem, 
Frederick may have hoped to silence these critics and in particular 
to persuade the Patriarch Gerold and the Templars to withdraw their 
opposition to the treaty. This did not mean that he planned to 
commence refortification; events at home demanded his attention and 
ruled out prolonged personal involvement in Syria. He therefore 
never intended to break the truce, nor had he any intention of 
permitting the inhabitants of the kingdom to break it. But 
Frederick's claims failed to placate Gerold, and when the patriarch 
attempted to raise troops on the pretext of protecting the kingdom 
from attack by the prince of Damascus, and in apparent contravention 
of the terms of the treaty, Frederick reacted violently, besieging 
the patriarch in his palace, setting soldiers at strategic points 
about the city of Acre, and removing engines of war useful for both 
defence and attack91. In February 1231, after his reconciliation 
with the emperor, Gregory passed on a 'serious complaint' from 
Frederick to the Master of the Templars which accused the order of 
seeking to violate the truce contrary to the terms of peace and in 
face of prohibition by his bailli, 
, by frequently drawing off knights from the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem for the purposes of campaign.... '92 
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Frederick used his concern that the Muslims were not properly keeping 
the truce as an excuse to send out his marshal, Richard Filangieri, 
in the autumn of 1231, not only to police the kingdom and protect it 
from Muslim unrest, but also to keep the Syrian baronage in line and 
at the same time prevent any premeditated attempts to break the 
truce93. That Frederick was not anxious to violate the treaty is 
reflected in the continued friendly relations with al-Kämil, and the 
Ayyübid dynasty in particular, which Ibn Wäsil attests were 
maintained right up to the emperor's death in 1250. 
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But in his quest for a swift and universally acceptable 
conclusion to the imperial crusade, it seems unlikely that Frederick 
would have limited himself to exaggerating the concessions which he 
had obtained in the Holy City; and indeed the problem of reconciling 
the Muslim and Christian accounts of the treaty in general as regards 
the territory returned outside the city is equal in its complexity to 
that of refortification. Again this is due largely to the brevity of 
the Muslim accounts. Ibn Abi '1-Dam was convinced that the cession 
was limited to Jerusalem alone95, but most of the contemporary Muslim 
sources concede that more than just the Holy City was returned to 
Frankish control, although they are reluctant to enlarge upon this 
further. 
The most expansive Muslim text is again supplied by Ibn Wäsil, 
who wrote that outside the city all the villages within the province 
of Jerusalem were to remain in Muslim hands and were to be 
administered by a Muslim governor resident at al-Bira. Excepted from 
this agreement were ten hamlets on the road from Acre to Jerusalem, 
which were to belong to the Franks96. Ibn al-Athir attributed to the 
treaty the cession of Jerusalem and the cities appertaining to its 
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district, whilst Abu Shäma, a contemporary writing in Damascus, 
complained of the scandalous agreement which had abandoned the city 
of Jerusalem to the Franks, along with 'several villages'97. 
In contrast the gains which Frederick claimed to have obtained 
were far more extensive. They included Bethlehem and all the country 
between Jerusalem and that city; the city of Nazareth and all the 
country between Acre and that city; the whole of the district of 
Toron, and the city of Sidon with the whole of its plain and 
appurtenances 
98. Hermann, the emperor's trusty aide, agreed with the 
emperor's itemisation, although he considered it necessary in his 
letter to the pope to spell out that the agreement included the 
tenements and dependent villages of each city. In addition he listed 
'the town known as St. George' and the villages lying on either side 
of the road as far as Jerusalem99. 
Gerold was scathing of the emperor's claims and whilst he does 
not appear to have disputed the return of Bethlehem, Nazareth, Toron, 
and Sidon, along with a handful of villages, he complained that 
outside Jerusalem not a single square foot of land was being restored 
to the Latin Church in Syria, nor to the Hospital; only the Templars 
received back any of their property, and even then, as he remarked 
with great bitterness, the villages which this entailed were few in 
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number and of little worth. 
Christian sources generally agree that the Franks received 
possession of Bethlehem, Nazareth and Sidon, but with the exception 
of Bethlehem, which is mentioned by Kamäl al-DTn101, none of these is 
confirmed by the available Muslim sources. The reason for 
Bethlehem's absence from most Muslim versions of the treaty could be 
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explained by the suggestion that the Muslim writers probably 
understood the city as being included in with Jerusalem, presumably 
owing to its proximity and close religious ties, hence its usual 
omission102. Of the three places thus far mentioned, the Annales de 
Terre Sainte confirm only Nazareth but do add Lydda to the inventory, 
as do the Gestes des Chiprois103. This, remarkably enough, is 
verified by the Coptic Christian, Ibn al-`Amid, writing around 1273, 
who lists the cessions as Jerusalem, the city of Ludd [Lydda], and 
the localities situated on the road104. MaqrTzT also mentions Lydda, 
but does not specify it as reverting to Christian tenure, preferring 
to reserve this fate for the villages which lay between Jaffa and 
Lydda, and Lydda and Jerusalem, rather than the city itself. He also 
reaffirms that those villages dependent on Jerusalem were to continue 
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under Muslim control. Since Lydda lay on the direct route between 
Jerusalem and Jaffa, it seems unlikely that under the provisions of 
the truce the Franks would not be permitted to hold it. Hermann von 
Salza had already specified in his report to the pope that the city 
of St. George was returned, and in general this referred to both 
Lydda and the neighbouring township of Ramla, a situation which had 
existed since the time of the First Crusade when Robert of Rouen had 
been appointed to the bishopric of Lydda, at that time comprising 
both Lydda and Ramla and the surrounding territory. Together they 
formed the important Lydda-Ramla cult centre of St. George, a 
strategic point on the Jerusalem-Jaffa roads106. The inseparability 
of the two townships is emphasised by the History of the Patriarchs, 
which lists 'Ludd al-Ramla' amongst the Christian gains'07. Ramla 
was also included, along with part of its plain, in a description of 
the truce provided by the letter of an English crusader, and was 
specifically mentioned by the Annales S. Medardi Suessionensis as 
being amongst the five cities handed over to Frederick II108. 
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Another impressive gain specified by Hermann was that of the 
castle of Toron, a strong point on the road from Tyre to Banyas and 
then Damascus. It was an important foothold (when fortified) for 
possible future reconquest of Galilee to the south. Ibn al-CAmTd 
informs us that the fortress did not originally feature amongst the 
terms of the treaty, but was granted at Frederick's own personal 
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request. 
But what appeared to be sweeping gains seem in large measure to 
have been simply an exercise in self-aggrandisement on the part of 
the emperor since much of what had been gained constituted merely a 
recognition of established facts. Even Frederick's assertion that 
the Christians had permission to refortify Jaffa, Caesarea, Sidon and 
Montfort neglected to point out that work had already begun or been 
completed at all these places before or immediately following the 
emperor's arrival110. Both Frederick and Hermann claimed that Sidon 
had been wrested from the Muslims by the terms of the agreement, and 
yet in reality the joint Frankish-Muslim condominium had reverted to 
solely Frankish control when a detachment of troops drawn from Acre, 
Tyre and Beirut had occupied it during the winter of 1227-8/625 H., 
following the death of al-Mu'azzam111. Lydda and Ramla had also been 
shared between the Muslims and Franks since 1192-3, but a truce 
agreed by al-cAdil in September 1204 had altered previous agreements 
to give up the Muslim share of the revenues of both, and perhaps even 
of Sidon as well. The Franks also received full control of Nazareth 
112 
and Jaffa. 
Thus in 1229 the Franks appear already to have been in 
effective control of Sidon, Nazareth, Lydda and Ramla, and the treaty 
of Jaffa must have served merely to confirm the Franks in these 
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possessions. Even so, the fourteenth century anthologist Ibn 
al-Furät maintains that the Muslim-Christian condominium over Lydda 
and Ramla survived through the reigns of al-CAziz, al-Afdal, al-'Ädil 
and al-Kämil, until al-Kämil's son, al-Malik al-'Ädil, came to the 
throne. Then, presumably at the time of Theobald's crusade, the 
Franks broke the agreement to share the towns and seized control of 
them both113. As for Toron, he claims it remained in Muslim hands 
until the death of al-Ashraf (28 August 1237/4 Muharram 635 H. ), 
after which time it passed to al-Malik al-Sälih Ismä'Tl, who included 
it with some other fortresses which he gave to the Franks114. The 
conflict of opinion seems irreconcilable, but Ibn al-'Amid appears to 
be proof that Toron was added to the treaty only after a provisional 
draft had been drawn up115, and Muslim opposition to its inclusion 
may well have prevented its actual transfer to Frankish control at 
that time116. In addition the surrender of rights to revenues in a 
township, as is proved by the example of Sidon117, did not 
necessarily recognise the suspension of Muslim rights to a say in the 
administration of that township. Hence the treaty of Jaffa may have 
confirmed the transfer of the Muslim share of the revenues of Sidon, 
Nazareth, Lydda, and Ramla, as had originally been agreed in 1204, 
without actually recognising their return to the Franks which, in the 
up 
case of Sidon at least, was an established fact. Nazareth, Sidon and 
St. George do not feature in the Muslim accounts of the treaty, and 
indeed for June 1229/Sha'bän 626 H., MaqrTzT notes that an agreement 
reached between the warring Ayyübid princes resulted in the Egyptian 
sultan now possessing Shawbak, Hebron, Tiberias, Gaza, Ascalon, 
Ramla, Lydda, and all the Muslim possessions in the Sihil 
118, in 
spite of the terms apparently agreed with Frederick. In other words, 
from the point of view of the Muslims, the form of the treaty was 
nowhere near as substantial as the emperor claimed it to be. It is 
- 187 - 
perhaps significant that the only commentators in Arabic to affirm 
the return of Lydda to the Franks, Ibn al-'Amid and the anonymous 
author of the History of the Patriarchs, were themselves Christians. 
Much of the territory which al-Kämil was supposed to have 
signed away by his treaty with Frederick II was at the time of the 
truce within the domain of al-Näsir DW'üd of Damascus, al-MuCazzam's 
son. He was an inexperienced, impetuous youth, not quite twenty 
119 
and had inherited his father's stubbornness and strength of purpose; 
his refusal to cede the Transjordanian fortress of Shawbak to 
al-Kämil convinced the Egyptian sultan of the prospect of yet another 
unruly neighbour in the north. On the pretext of protecting Syria 
from the imminent Frankish invasion, al-Kämil moved into Palestine in 
early August 1228, and took al-Näsir's possessions there. Jerusalem, 
Nablus, and Hebron were all seized. Some time before February 1229, 
al-Kämil reached agreement with al-Ashraf to deprive their nephew of 
all his territories and compensate him with less significant lands in 
Diyär Mudar. Despite using the surrender of Jerusalem to identify 
his cause with that of Islam, Dä'üd was forced to concede Damascus to 
al-Kämil and al-Ashraf on 25 June 1229/ 2 Sha'bän 626 H., and the 
ensuing territorial exchanges gave the Egyptian sultan a position of 
120 
supremacy within the Ayyiibid confederation, 
Thus, only with the fall of Damascus nearly two months after 
Frederick's departure from the Holy Land, did much of the land ceded 
according to Frederick and Hermann officially become al-Kämil's by 
right to cede. The fact that al-Kämil had not been in a position to 
surrender much of what Frederick suggested he had done was not 
mentioned by the emperor; it was 
left to Gerold to point this out 
and that the prince of Damascus was unwilling to swear to the truce 
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or to any concessions 
121. Indeed, 'Ernoul' reports that under the 
terms of the truce al-Kämil was to return all the land of Jerusalem 
that had been conquered by the Muslims in 1187, except for Kerak and 
three castles in the territory of Tyre and Sidon, which their 
occupants refused to surrender, suggesting that al-Kämil's control 
over the northern territories around Toron remained extremely 
122 limited. 
The treaty represented a considerable reduction in what might 
have been obtained. Some time in 1226-7/624H., al-Kämil, fearing an 
alliance between al-Mu`azzam and the Khwarizmshah Jaläl al-Din, had 
sent the emir Fakhr al-Din to Frederick to request his assistance 
against the ruler of Damascus. In return the emperor would receive 
all of those conquests made by Saläh al-Drn, including Jerusalem, 
which had been offered to the Franks at the time of the Damietta 
campaign123. Gottschalk argues convincingly that al-Kämil did not 
seek an alliance, merely a deterrent which would also forestall 
another calamity like Damietta124. This seems to be borne out by the 
Chronicle of Baybars, as quoted by al-`Aini, which claims that the 
step had the object of persuading al-Mucazzam to abandon his 
opposition to al-Kamil and to make common cause with him as a subject 
prince125. But when Frederick eventually arrived at Acre in 
September 1228, the situation had changed considerably: al-Mucazzam 
was dead, and Jaläl al-Din found himself too fully occupied with the 
Georgians to be concerned with affairs in Syria. Nevertheless, 
despite the drastic reduction in bargaining power, Frederick still 
felt it within the interest of al-Kämil to surrender all that which 
had been previously agreed. In his opinion the sultan could offer 
him nothing less than had been promised to the Fifth Crusade; this 
126 
included all the Sähil plus rights in Alexandria. 
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But if Frederick thought that al-Kämil would respect his 
previous offer in the modified circumstances he was being 
unrealistic. Pressed hard by increasingly grave news from home that 
papal armies had invaded his Sicilian kingdom, Frederick was anxious 
to leave but could not because of the time of year127. His 
discomfiture led him to set a tight schedule for the completion of 
negotiations and he arranged for Henry of Malta to bring the 
necessary transports for a return to Italy at Easter128. Meanwhile 
al-Kämil hedged and negotiations dragged on129. According to Richard 
of San Germano, the sultan knew of the animosity between the Church 
and the emperor, and it was this which persuaded him of the advantage 
he possesssed130. Gerold would have preferred the explanation that 
Frederick's representations rendered him despicable in the eyes of 
the sultan and his subjects, 'especially after they had discovered 
, 131 that he was not at the head of a numerous army.... 
al-Kämil's situation was also increasingly difficult; he had 
committed himself to the surrender of Jerusalem, and to refuse could 
mean war132. Whilst Frederick's army was nowhere near as large as it 
might have been133, the turmoil of such an event would rob him of the 
unusual opportunity with which he had been provided to assert his 
authority throughout the Ayyübid empire. Nor was a defeat for the 
crusaders likely to ensure a very long peace in Palestine. What he 
needed, therefore, was a peace involving no strategic liabilities, 
marginally acceptable to his subjects, and which would remove the 
crusading army from Syria as quickly as possible, leaving him free to 
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strike at Damascus. 
Thus as the Muslim year progressed both leaders found it more 
and more expedient to compromise, and what two years earlier might 
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for Frederick have been the cession of the whole of the former 
kingdom was stripped to its barest minimum. The reality of the 
agreement was in stark contrast to the belief of a number of 
Christian sources that if not the whole of Palestine, then at least 
the bulk of it, had been regained for Christendom135. Of Saläh 
al-Din's conquests there remained in Muslim possession by far the 
greater part of the Holy Land - Hebron, Nablus, the Jordan Valley, 
not to mention the fortresses of Transjordan136. For al-Kämil the 
agreement with Frederick and the subsequent juggling of territories 
amongst the Ayyübid princes presented him with Tiberias, Hebron, Gaza 
and Ascalon. Dä'üd received the lordship of the Jordan valley, Kerak 
and Shawbak, whilst al-Ashraf, wooed by its beauty, was only too 
happy to become the new ruler of Damascus137. A strange 
intermingling of possessions, but it would provide al-Kämil with a 
more far-reaching and more imposing power-base allowing him to ensure 
the allegiance of his brother and nephew and exert greater influence 
in the affairs of Damascus and Kerak. 
The settlement must ultimately have been profoundly satisfying 
for the Egyptian sultan, for whom the possibility of an alliance 
between the Franks and al-Näsir Dä'üd, master of the Transjordanian 
fortresses, may well have raised serious fears138. But although 
Frederick cannot have been unaware of the tensions within the Ayyübid 
house - Gerold had reported them as early as 1227139 _ it was 
essential for him to achieve a swift settlement. Backing al-Ns. ir - 
had not al-Mu`azzam's response to Frederick's approaches in 1227 and 
Dä'üd's reaction to the loss of Jerusalem in 1229 rendered such an 
alliance unthinkable140 - would probably have meant prolonged 
involvement. Besides which, when the situation was considered 
objectively, it was al-Kämil who was in effective control of 
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Jerusalem and the surrounding areas, and not Dä'id141. Consequently 
despite the obvious weakness of his claim to the lands which he 
occupied, it was the Egyptian sultan, rather than his nephew, with 
whom the emperor had to conduct his dealings. Frederick, however, did 
not ignore Dä'üd, and when the treaty had been sworn he sent Balian 
of Sidon to the prince of Damascus to receive similarly an oath from 
him. The annals of Margam claim that the bishop of Exeter, William 
Brewer, was sent to Damascus, presumably with the same aim, but the 
context would suggest merely that he was a party to the discussions 
142 between Frederick and al-Kämil_ 
Continually aware of the approach of the spring passage 
Frederick had launched into the negotiations with renewed anxiety143. 
In his haste he had been inattentive to the security requirements of 
those cities already under effective Frankish control which he 
nevertheless claimed to have obtained by means of the agreement; and 
although in theory the Frankish domains had been vastly enlarged, and 
fortifications were officially permitted in a region which had 
hitherto remained open, Nazareth, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and also for 
that matter Toron, all remained isolated from the main body of the 
kingdom. After the collapse of Damascus, Jerusalem's isolation was 
made even more effective by the agreement handing Beit-JibrTn to 
al-N'9sir Dä'IId thereby dissecting the link road from Ramla to the 
Holy City144. 
In retrospect the gains which al-Kämil made as a result of the 
treaty seem far more extensive than those which Frederick made. The 
impressive territorial concessions when studied in a little depth 
become far less substantial. The promise of Jerusalem and Bethlehem 
when initially made emanated from al-Kämil and not from al-Näsir, to 
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whom they belonged; and when by right of Dä'üd's surrender in June 
1229 they finally accrued to the Egyptian sultan, the right to 
Jerusalem and its surrounding district was immediately returned to 
al-Näsir, with whom the Franks had no agreement. Although officially 
content to respect the treaty it did not prevent him from agitating 
against the loss of what was rightfully his. As for Toron and 
Nazareth, the latter was already more or less a Frankish possession, 
whilst al-Kämil's influence barely stretched as far as Upper Galilee, 
and could not necessarily guarantee the truce there. 
Nazareth, Bethlehem and Jerusalem were connected to the kingdom 
by roads running through hostile Muslim territory145. The realm 
possessed neither the capability of guarding the roads nor the 
strength to build a new network of fortifications - even if this had 
been permitted by the agreement. Thus the application of the treaty 
would depend heavily on the goodwill of the Muslims. 
The sparkling achievements of the treaty of Jaffa in reality 
lacked all but the faintest lustre, and Frederick knew it. It could 
be suggested that his grasp of the situation was far less 
well-informed than many historians would have us believe, or that he 
just misunderstood the magnitude of the concessions, preferring to 
believe that he had obtained various rights and confirmations of 
rights where none had been offered. But Frederick was an intelligent 
man: he was fluent in six languages, including Arabic, and was well 
versed in the sciences, medicine, philosophy and natural history146. 
MagrTz even tells us how he sent many very difficult problems of 
geometry, number theory and mathematics to the Sultan al-Kämil147. 
He was also very shrewd; having been approached by al-Kämil in 
1226-7, he sent to Damascus to find out what al-Mu'azzam had to 
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offer148, and in his reconciliation with the pope in 1230, his 
submissive approach appeared to cast all blame for the dispute on to 
149 the shoulders of Gregory IX. Such a man could hardly fail to be 
aware of the subtle intricacies of the predicament in which he found 
himself. al-Kämil, however, was no longer under any compulsion to 
grant him anything. As a result Frederick's gamble was unlikely to 
bring him the windfall on which he had pinned his hopes. Jerusalem 
might have satiated his adversaries in Europe and in the Latin 
Kingdom had it been granted outright, but it continued to be shared 
with the Muslims. Frederick therefore found it necessary to 
exaggerate his achievement. Only in this way could he hope to save 
his face and pacify his opponents. 
In addition to the major points of the treaty already outlined, 
there remained a number of clauses attributed to it by Gerold, and by 
Pope Gregory, who based his objections on Gerold's information. 
According to the patriarch the emperor swore not to induce any 
Frank to contravene the treaty, and to restrain all those who might 
contemplate to do so. He would also deny aid to anyone attacking the 
sultan, and was even bound to defend the sultan and take up arms 
against an aggressor150. These are clauses which remain unconfirmed 
by both Frederick's and Hermann von Salza's versions of the 
agreement, although they could quite conceivably have formed a 
necessary part of the treaty which, for obvious reasons, the emperor 
was unwilling to divulge publicly. 
The treaty had particular significance for the northern 
Frankish principalities, since Tripoli, Crac des Chevaliers, Chastel 
Blanc, Tortosa, Margat, Antioch, and their territories were to remain 
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as they were, and the emperor was to forbid his troops and men, 
regardless of whether or not they were native Franks, from assisting 
the lords of these places. This, claimed Gerold, had never occurred 
before, since always when there had been a truce in the kingdom of 
Jerusalem, the knights of the kingdom and other Christians had 
assisted and defended these regions in their predicament. Gerold was 
not complaining at the exclusion of Tripoli and Antioch from the 
treaty, as this was quite a usual occurrence; rather that they were 
to be given no military assistance151. This did not, however, 
prevent both the Templars and Hospitallers from taking part in 
conflicts on the borders of Tripoli before a separate peace was 
152 
signed in June 1231. 
One very commendable point of the treaty in the eyes of the 
Franks must have been the clause permitting the exchange of 
prisoners. As Frederick assured Henry III, the sultan was to return 
all those captives not released after the loss of Damietta and all 
those who had been taken since that time. This, explained Hermann, 
was to apply to both sides153. Needless to say, it was not confirmed 
by the Muslim sources, nor is there any evidence that the restitution 
ever took place. Certainly when Louis IX entered Damietta in June 
1249, Franks were discovered in its dungeons who had been there since 
154 
at least 1227. 
Christian sources generally agree that the treaty was to last 
for a period of ten years. Ibn al-`Amid, however, specifies ten 
years, five months and forty days. It has been proposed that the 
difference is due to the discrepancy between the length of the Muslim 
and Christian years; but such an explanation is inadequate and still 
leaves several months unaccounted for155. Another exception is the 
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annals of Margam which claim that the peace was agreed for a period 
of 'ten years and the same number of days"156. However, since the 
peace was automatically terminated by al-Kämil's death in March 1238, 
computations as to the exact date of its expiry become irrelevant 
since its effective duration was limited to only nine years. 
As regards the commencement of the truce, since the emperor was 
in Jerusalem in mid-March, it must have come into effect some time 
before this. Magrizi dates the commencement of the treaty as 28 
RabT' 1 626 H. /24 February 1229157. The annals of Margam date the 
proposed transfer of the city to the Franks as the day of St. Peter 
in cathedra, or 22 February 1229 - the same date as is given for the 
158 
handover by the annals of Southwark. Either way, the few days 
following the signing would have been necessary to evacuate the city 
of its Muslim inhabitants. Certainly by the first day of Rabi' 11/27 
February, Abü Shima in Damascus had heard of the abandonment of 
Jerusalem to the Franks. Since Damascus was three days distant from 
the Holy City, it is a date which accords well with that proposed by 
MagrizT159. But perhaps the coincidence of dates is a little too 
convenient: Ibn al-`Amid, from whom Magrizi appears to have taken 
his information in this instance, apparently believed the truce to 
have come into immediate effect on 22 Rabi' I 626 H. /18 February 
1229, a date he specifically identifies as being a Sunday. Magrizi's 
date, when converted, is found to be a Saturday. Thus it would seem 
that Magrizi misread Ibn al-CAmid's chronicle, and that there was no 
distinction between the conclusion of the agreement and the 
160 
commencement of the truce. Abu Shima was probably right about 
when the news of Jerusalem's betrayal actually reached Damascus, but 
it was the expulsion of the Muslim population which the rumours 
referred to and not the date the treaty had come into operation. It 
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must be assumed that the annals of Margam (and of Southwark) are once 
again in error, as is Ibn al-Furät who claims that the Holy City was 
handed over to the Franks on 11 Rabi' I 626 H. /7 February 1229161. 
al-Nuwayri must be referring to Frederick's visit to Jerusalem when 
he writes that the emperor took possession of the city in the month 
162 
of Rabi' II [27 February - 27 March]. 
The treaty is further credited with certain provisions which 
are mentioned by-neither Frederick and Hermann, nor by Gerold, the 
principal of these being that free access was gained for Christian 
pilgrims to the Holy Places on the Jordan. A letter incorporated in 
the annals of Waverley claims that the way lay open for all pilgrims 
to come and go as far as the river Jordan, along the ancient pilgrim 
route, just as had been proclaimed by King Richard and the sultan 
Saläh al-DTn163. But it seems unlikely that the Latins would have 
been able to provide adequate protection for pilgrims should this 
have been the case. 
A letter from Henry, Duke of Lorraine, to Henry III, repeats a 
report that the emperor had gained permission for the Roman Church to 
send legates and preachers in complete safety throughout the sultan's 
territory, with the specific aim of converting the Muslims. As a 
concession which would only have provoked widespread violent 
opposition in the Islamic world this claim can only have been based 
on hearsay; the duke himself writes that the news was heard from the 
messenger of the King of Bohemia, mistakenly described as the 
emperor's son164. The currency of such wild rumours is testimony, 
however, to the obscure nature of Frederick's peace, and to the 
aspirations of many Christians in the West. 
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It is also possible that the treaty may have included a number 
of commercial clauses. Roger II of Sicily had been keen to improve 
trading links with Egypt almost a century before, and Frederick was 
not unaware of the advantages of commercial exchange. According to 
MaqrTzT he had been concerned to reacquire rights in the port of 
Alexandria, and during his stay in Acre in April 1229 various 
privileges and rights were restored and renewed for the Pisans in the 
165 kingdom's capital. 
Such then may well have been the final few points of the 
agreement, an agreement which, taken piecemeal, possessed some 
promising elements but as a whole portended disappointment and 
discord. 
The treaty agreed between Frederick II and al-Kämil met with a 
mixed reception. Hermann von Salza was scarcely able to describe the 
joy in Jaffa at the restitution of the Holy City, whilst Alberic of 
Trois-Fontaines was more reserved, writing that the few Christians 
and pilgrims permitted by the peace to go freely to the Sepulchre 
welcomed the truce joyfully and greatly esteemed the emperor. His 
account is qualified, however, by the information that Gerold, the 
Templars and the Hospitallers all objected to the agreement166. 
Indeed the patriarch was so angered by the treaty that he refused the 
crusaders licence to enter the Holy City and renewed the papal 
interdiction which had been proclaimed in 1187. He even went as far 
as to despatch the archbishop of Caesarea to Jerusalem in an apparent 
attempt to prevent Frederick's triumphal wearing of the crown. 
According to Hermann the reason for Gerold's anger was that the 
Templum Domini and the Temple of Solomon remained under Muslim 
control, and that the Muslims continued to practice their religion 
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there. Gerold himself ascribed his actions to the fact that the 
treaty was totally opposed to the interests of the Church, and that 
if after the emperor's departure Jerusalem should be retaken by the 
167 Muslims it would be the Church that was blamed. 
But a principal point of contention was that Frederick had 
formulated the truce with little or no reference to the patriarch or 
to the military orders. Van Cleve suggests that this, and the 
constraints imposed upon the orders by the treaty, may have been a 
form of revenge for the 'long opposition' they had presented to 
Frederick168. A more likely explanation would be that Frederick 
sought to restrict their independence as part of an attempt to 
restore the authority of the crown and its representatives, which had 
been gradually eroded since before the beginning of the thirteenth 
century. For this reason only limited consultation was made of the 
Templars, whilst Frederick preferred to rely on the support of 
Hermann von Salza and the Teutonic Knights169. But to the Templars 
Frederick appeared to have ignored their rights completely, and to 
have deprived them of all manoeuvrability. What enraged them even 
more was the fact that the Temple had not been recovered -a 
deliberate oversight we are told by 'Ernoul', so that the order might 
have no headquarters in the city170. 
At the same time the agreement had imposed on the kingdom a new 
burden of defence which went against the ideas and policies of many 
of those permanently resident in Syrial7l. The Latins preferred a 
geographically restricted kingdom which they would still be able to 
protect once the crusaders had departed. Extended frontiers would 
stretch resources to the limit thus vastly reducing defence 
capabilities 
172. An additional complaint was that Jerusalem belonged 
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by right to Damascus, with whom the Franks until recently had been 
bound by treaty, and it was the good will of the Damascenes which 
permitted the passage of trade to Acre, Tyre and Beirut173. Thus the 
treaty threatened the commercial interests of the kingdom, and 
consequently the revenues of its lords. At the same time, by denying 
the military orders the right to render assistance to their houses in 
Antioch-Tripoli, it removed all obstacles on al-Kämil's road to 
Damascus, and cleared the way for an encirclement of the Latin states 
by a 'unified' Muslim power, an event which the military orders had 
sought to avoid. Now with their hands tied by Frederick's truce 
they were powerless to prevent it. One solution, therefore, was to 
sabotage the treaty. Claiming that the kingdom was under threat from 
the young ruler of Damascus with whom there existed no agreement 
(although at the time Damascus was already under siege by troops 
despatched by al-Kämil and al-Ashraf174), and using money bequeathed 
the Holy Land by Philip Augustus, Gerold and the Templars began to 
assemble troops175. Van Cleve alleges that Gerold, with the support 
of the Templars, was determined to claim Frederick's achievements for 
the papal faction and, after the emperor's departure, take Jerusalem 
in the name of the pope. Considering Gerold's reasoning behind his 
lack of support for the emperor this seems unlikely176. Nevertheless 
the activities of, the patriarch and his supporters did threaten to 
wreck the peace treaty and consequently would have seriously 
jeopardised the emperor's schedule for departure. Frederick's 
response, therefore, was to besiege the patriarch and his allies in 
their houses at Acre in order to compel their acquiescence 
l ». 
In the Muslim world discontent at the surrender of Jerusalem to 
the Franks was so great that the Egyptian sultan found it necessary 
to issue a circular letter in an attempt to calm scandalized opinion. 
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Nowhere was the loss more vehemently condemned than in Damascus, 
where al-Näsir Dä'Dd commanded the Sibt Ibn al-Jauzi" to preach 
against al-Kämil's treachery178. But none of the Muslim princes was 
in a position actively to oppose the cession; al-Kämil was well 
established in southern Syria, and a rebellion by his brother and 
ally, al-Ashraf, would deprive the ageing prince of Diyär Mudar of 
the promised prize of Damascus. To the minor princes the mood of 
events was obvious and consequently al-Näsir remained in isolation. 
The treaty of Jaffa was a miraculous achievement of diplomacy, 
but one which does not stand up to scrutiny. Both al-Kämil and 
Frederick were anxious to reach a swift agreement: al-Kämil to take 
advantage of the weakness of Damascus, caused by the death of 
al-Mu`azzam, Frederick to extricate himself from what threatened to 
be prolonged personal involvement in Syria. Had negotiations failed, 
no longer able to invoke the spectre of al-Mu`azzam (or for that 
matter Jaläl al-Din), the emperor's sole recourse would have been 
direct military action - an alternative which he could ill afford. 
Frederick claimed to have obtained remarkable gains for the kingdom 
of Jerusalem, but for the Egyptian sultan to have made massive 
concessions to the Franks would have been counterproductive and would 
have gravely jeopardised the success of his own plans. 
The result was a truncated treaty, the provisions of which 
Frederick felt it necessary to exaggerate in order to vindicate his 
preference for negotiations over all-out war. Instead of the whole 
of the former kingdom with which he had been tantalised by Fakhr 
al-DTn179, Frederick had to be content to accept Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, a few villages on the road from Jerusalem to Jaffa, and 
later, Toron (although the Franks were apparently never able to make 
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good their claim to the lordship). In exchange he had to agree not 
to undertake any work of reconstruction, nor to give any military 
assistance to Antioch-Tripoli. The Muslims grudgingly permitted the 
Franks to hold Lydda and Ramla, but failed to recognise Frankish 
sovereignty of these townships, or of Nazareth and Sidon. 
Thus the brief Muslim versions of the treaty were far nearer 
its true form than the exaggerated claims put forward by Frederick 
and repeated by Hermann. Yet even though some of these claims, such 
as the right to refortify Jerusalem, were accepted, the critics were 
not stifled. Frederick had earned the emnity of many Syrian nobles 
whilst still in Cyprus, and his refusal to engage the Muslims, or 
permit others to do so, only added to their dissatisfaction. It must 
have appeared to them that in his negotiations Frederick had paid 
little attention to the restoration of the possessions of the Holy 
Sepulchre, or those of the military orders. In concluding a truce 
without due reference to the full Syrian baronage and without the 
authority of the patriarch he had violated their prerogatives. As a 
regent he had offended the nobility by wearing the crown, and as an 
excommunicate he had insulted the Church by effecting his 
crown-wearing in the Holy Sepulchre. Worst of all the Holy City 
remained shared with the votaries of a false religion, and the 
muezzins there continued to call the faithful to prayer. 
The treaty of Jaffa cannot be said to have been in the best 
interests of the kingdom of Jerusalem: it ran counter to established 
commercial relations, and it overstretched the kingdom's military 
commitments. In addition it effectively permitted the Egyptian 
sultan a free hand in Muslim Syria, but was not subscribed to by the 
prince of Damascus, the legal ruler of the territories ceded to 
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Frederick. And when al-Kämil gained control of Damascus, he 
immediately recognised al-Näsir's authority in the adjoining areas 
that had been ceded, thereby relinquishing his responsibility for the 
observance of the treaty. 
Despite popular opposition, al-Kämil emerged from the agreement 
strengthened. For Frederick it seemed the complete opposite: his 
treaty lacked substance, and what stability it offered the kingdom 
was negated by the climate of resentment and rebellion it provoked. 
In letters addressed to Gregory IX Hermannn von Salza gave expression 
to Frederick's misgivings, commenting 
'I am not writing to you about this [the terms of the 
agreement] to the effect that the emperor is satisfied or that 
he would not gladly have arranged it otherwise had he been 
able. But, God knows, he was not able to bring about a peace 
and truce in any other fashion'180, 
and opined 
'It seems likely that if the lord emperor had crossed in the 
grace and harmony of the Roman Church the business of the Holy 
181 
Land would have fared far more effectively and profitably'. 
Hermann was, of course, irredeemably biased, but one cannot help 
feeling that had not Frederick's excommunication, the domestic 
turmoil of Germany and Sicily, and the death of al-Mu`azzam all 0. 
combined to obstruct Frederick's crusade, the resulting treaty would 
have been something quite spectacular. 
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Chapter Seven 
The English contribution to the imperial crusade 
Frederick II's crusade was by no means a specifically German 
crusade, nor was it 'Sicilian'; but in the same way that the crusade 
movement as a whole from its inception in the late eleventh century 
drew widespread active support throughout Europe, so too the imperial 
crusade of 1227-1229 attracted its share of combatants whose origins 
lay outside the bounds of the German Empire. 
Richard the Lionheart is probably the most famous English 
knight to have taken the cross, but 'English' involvement in the 
crusades began with Pope Urban's summons to the East in 1095; then 
William the Conqueror's son Robert Curthose mortgaged the entire 
Duchy of Normandy in order to finance his participation in the First 
Crusade, a venture in which he was joined by Ralf de Gael, the exiled 
earl of Norfolk. Englishmen, including Ranulf of Chester and Saer de 
Quincy, fought at Damietta in 1218-1221, and William Longuespee, earl 
of Salisbury, accompanied St. Louis to Egypt in 1249. It was Henry 
III's brother Richard of Cornwall who negotiated the return of 
Ascalon to the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1240/1, and Henry's son Edward 
I was one of the very last western princes to visit the kingdom 
before its final collapse in 1291. Even Henry II, who never once set 
foot in the Holy Land, heaped up an enormous treasure at Jerusalem 
which was to prove invaluable to the city's defence in 11871. It is 
therefore perhaps inevitable that Englishmen should be found with the 
emperor's crusade in Syria in 1227-1229. 
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At the head of the English contingent which departed Apulia 
with the vanguard of the imperial army in September 1227 were two of 
King Henry III's foremost bishops, Peter des Roches of Winchester and 
William Brewer of Exeter2. Peter des Roches was a powerful man, a 
Poitevin who had served as chamberlain in Richard's household, and 
who in 1205, through the influence of King John, had been rewarded 
with the prestigious see of Winchester3. Throughout the turbulent 
years of John's reign Peter remained loyal to the king and 
progressively advanced his position. When John died in 1216, it was 
Peter, not the archbishop of Canterbury, who crowned the young King 
Henry and who emerged as guardian of the royal person4. It was as 
such, and in conjunction with his immense ecclesiastical stature, 
that the bishop of Winchester achieved international repute and 
respect -a major figure in the government of England. Yet for the 
English nobility he remained an outsider at the fore of a foreign 
faction which had usurped their traditional rights and privileges5. 
The latent antagonism which this situation provoked finally led Henry 
III in February 1227, apparently at the instigation of the then 
justiciar, Hubert de Burgh, to declare himself of age, renounce the 
bishop's guardianship, and dismiss the bishop's followers from the 
court6. But the timeliness of the royal coup would suggest it to 
have been a calculated decision designed to make easy capital out of 
Peter's own plans: it was already clear that the bishop was 
contemplating his imminent departure on crusade and, by relieving 
Peter of his position, Henry could check court rivalries whilst 
simultaneously freeing the bishop of Winchester from any commitments 
which might hamper his pilgrimage to the East. Indeed Peter himself 
may already have realised that his position at court was rapidly 
becoming untenable and hoped by his absence to defuse the situation7. 
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Peter's desire to depart on crusade was well-known. A warrior 
bishop, he had played a decisive role at the 'Fair' of Lincoln in 
1217, and in later life was to command the troops of Gregory IX 
against the rebellious citizens of the Patrimony. His ability as a 
soldier was recognised even amongst his fiercest critics8; but 
during the Fifth Crusade Peter had deferred his assumption of the 
cross, and contented himself with the custody of the lands and men of 
William de Ferrers, earl of Derby, who had left for Palestine in 
mid-12189. It was only the news of his election as the first 
archbishop of Damietta which apparently prompted him in September 
1221 to take up the cross 
10, by which time the fate of the Christian 
enterprise in Egypt had already been decided. With the benefit of 
hindsight, Ralph de Coggeshall was to comment cynically that the 
shortlived appointment had been 'for nothing"'. Peter himself was 
unaware of Damietta's fall, and in early November 1221 was still 
12 
agitating for recruits to accompany him on his proposed expedition. 
It was only when he and the Norman adventurer Falkes de Breaute were 
actually in the midst of their preparations for crusade that news of 
the catastrophe reached them. As a result the two men agreed to 
postpone the fulfilment of their vow until such a time as the pope 
might command13. 
In the event Pope Honorius did not waste time in his attempts 
to organise a new crusade. In December 1221 he wrote to all the 
prelates of Europe exhorting them to rouse the people in its 
support14, and at the conference of crusade leaders at Ferentino in 
March 1223 it was agreed that the Emperor Frederick II should 
undertake his long-awaited expedition to the East in June 122515. As 
we have seen, however, continued unrest in Sicily compelled the 
German emperor to urge a postponement, and a second conference 
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convened at San Germano in July 1225 announced that the crusade would 
now depart on 15 August 122716. Peter des Roches resumed his 
preparations, and in November 1226 Henry III despatched a letter to 
Frederick recommending to him the bishop of Winchester's envoys so 
that they might arrange for Peter's passage through the Italian 
dominions of the empire17. Two months later a papal encyclical 
reminded the bishop himself not to neglect to preach the forthcoming 
crusadei8, and soon after, in February 1227, a letter from Honorius 
confirmed papal protection of the bishop of Winchester's person and 
goods. This same letter granted the bishop licence to receive and 
pledge rents belonging to his episcopal income for the whole of the 
period covered by the general indulgence. Concurrent with this was 
an order to the bishops of Salisbury and Coventry to ensure that this 
protection be observed, on condition that Peter appoint a fit 
representative to serve the see in his absence. A similar letter 
dated 5 April 1227 granted papal protection to a second English 
bishop, William Brewer of Exeter19. 
William Brewer was a lesser known figure than his compatriot, 
having succeeded to the diocese of Devon and Cornwall as recently as 
April 1224, on the death of Simon of Apulia. Prior to his elevation 
he had been precentor at the cathedral in Exeter. His uncle, of the 
same name, was the benefactor of Torre Abbey and other religious 
foundations, -a great magnate influential in both ecclesiastical and 
secular government affairs20. It was to do penance for his own sins 
and for those of his uncle that William assumed the cross in late 
1226 and prepared to depart for the East in the company of the bishop 
of Winchester. As a means of financing the trip, and to provide 
funds for his nephew's use in the Holy Land, the elder Brewer had 
deposited the remarkable sum of four thousand marks of silver with 
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the Temple at Acre. But the aged baron did not live to see the 
21 
outcome of the crusade and died before his nephew set sail. 
From the evidence of the annals of Tewkesbury it would appear 
that the two bishops set out on their journey some time after Easter 
[11 April] 122722, but an entry in the Liberate Rolls dated 8 June 
23 1227, gives no indication that they had as yet left. The annals of 
Southwark prefer a departure date of around the feast of St. John the 
Baptist (24 June]24, and indeed a note in the Close Rolls dated 18 
June describes Peter des Roches as being absent on pilgrimage25. 
Thus it would seem likely that the bishops of Winchester and Exeter 
and the crusaders who accompanied them probably departed in early 
June with the intention of taking the August passage to Syria, the 
crossing by which, as Honorius had already informed Peter, the 
emperor himself would be travelling26. 
The actual size of the English contingent remains uncertain. 
Roger of Wendover claimed that upwards of forty thousand had taken 
the cross in England in 1227, but such a figure is out of all 
proportion, and in the event probably only a few thousand at most 
made the journey to the continent27. Even so this was by no means an 
insignificant force and sufficient to be singled out by the Annales 
Placentini Guelfi amongst the multinational host converging on the 
28 
ports in Apulia. Here the intemperate weather and poor food 
supplies took their toll. Even the emperor succumbed, and retiring 
to Pozzuoli to recuperate, nominated in his place Henry, duke of 
Limburg, until such time as he himself might be fit to cross29. The 
crusade thus departed for Syria without its principal general, but 
taking with it the the two English bishops, together with the new 
patriarch of Jerusalem, Gerold of Lausanne30. 
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Regardless of the enormous losses which the imperial army 
suffered whilst inactive at the Italian ports, the Chronigue 
d'Ernoul31 nevertheless remarked on the impressive numbers of 
Englishmen amongst the crusaders arriving in Syria. One Italian 
chronicler described the bishop of Winchester as a man endowed with 
an abundance of warriors32, and it is obvious that the vast majority 
of the English contingent must have remained steadfast in their 
resolve to fulfil their vow of crusade rather than re-embark as a 
good many other crusaders were to do in the light of the emperor's 
decision to remain in Italy33. Amongst the English soldiers a small 
section probably came from the area around Farnham in Surrey, or were 
at least closely associated with the abbey at Waverley, the annals of 
which incorporate the letter of an English crusader dated at Acre in 
April 1229 34. One or two actual names of crusaders can be gleaned 
from the Curia Regis Rolls and from the Papal Registers35, and from 
Matthew Paris who identifies a certain Master Walter, a member of the 
Dominican Order charged by the pope with the duty of attending to the 
religious needs of the army, as being of English origin36. But other 
than these few hints there are no indications as to the composition 
of the army, nor of its intended strength. Several of those who made 
the journey to the Holy Land in all probability stayed on in the 
Latin Kingdom after the departure of the English bishops and the 
emperor, as during a Muslim attack on the city of Jerusalem in 
mid-to-late 1229, although casualties were light, the Franks suffered 
a single fatality which, we are told (as if it were of little 
consequence), was that of an Englishman37. 
Both Peter des Roches and William Brewer appear to have been 
on the whole worthy ambassadors of the English crown: 'Ernoul' 
affirms that their presence was extremely beneficial38, a comment 
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echoed, as might be expected of an English source, by the annals of 
Winchcombe39. The annals compiled at the abbey of Margam claim that 
William Brewer was sent with certain others to the sultan in Damascus 
to arrange a peace between the Christians and Saracens. But the 
Margam annalist is largely an impassioned and untrustworthy source 
for the crusade, and the context of his claim would indicate merely 
that the bishop was party to the negotiations conducted between the 
Emperor Frederick and the sultan of Egypt, who was never once during 
40 this period resident in Damascus. An article by Kate M. Clarke 
goes as far as to suggest that William even went to Baghdad where he 
obtained costly embroideries decorated with birds, elephants and 
other animals, which on his return to Exeter he presented to the 
cathedral. Since the inventories of the cathedral do not specify the 
source of the cloths, Ms. Clarke's claim appears to be without 
foundation. It is, nevertheless, interesting to speculate, and the 
various relics which William bequeathed to his cathedral might well 
41 have been the profits of his visit to Syria. 
Whatever else the bishop of Exeter may have undertaken in the 
Holy Land is not known - the annalists tend to neglect him and, of 
the handful of documents which do exist relating to his episcopate, 
none sheds any light on his pilgrimage. In contrast Peter des Roches 
was of great interest to his contemporaries, and he appears to have 
been extremely active during his stay, travelling with the army to 
Sidon, Caesarea, Jaffa and Jerusalem. The bishop played a major role 
in the rebuilding of Jaffa, using his vast wealth to promote the 
refortification work both here, and at Sidon42. The annals of 
Dunstable also claim that it was through his outstanding help that 
43 
the city of Ascalon was restored. This latter event is extremely 
unlikely. The fortifications of the city had lain in ruins since 
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1192 and remained in the same condition at the time of Theobald of 
Champagne's crusade in 1239. Nowhere is there any mention that 
during, or as a result of, Frederick's crusade Ascalon reverted to 
Frankish control, and the agreement concluded between the Egyptian 
sultan, al-Kämil, and his nephew al-Näsir Dä'id in June 1229 
specifically mentions Ascalon as being transferred from the authority 
of Dä'üd to that of al-Kämi144. It is possible, therefore, that the 
Dunstable annalist mistakenly inserted Ascalon, where in actual fact 
Caesarea was meant. Confusions such as this were not uncommon: one 
chronicler attributed the rebuilding of the Tower of David and St. 
Stephen's gate in Jerusalem to the Emperor Frederick, in which work, 
so the writer asserts, he was nobly aided and supported by Bishop 
Peter45. But whereas Peter did prove a useful counsellor and ally - 
indeed Matthew Paris writes of him in his obituary that all honours 
and benefits gained for the Church in the Holy Land during 
Frederick's crusade were brought about solely by the bishop's wise 
counsels and assistance46 - one thing he did not do was to mastermind 
the refortification of the Holy City. Such a programme of 
reconstruction was strictly forbidden under the terms of the truce 
agreed by the emperor and sultan, and Frederick was not sufficiently 
reckless as to risk an act which would separate him from his Italian 
dominions, already subject to active papal interference, for any 
longer than was absolutely necessary47. Instead the bishop of 
Winchester's single greatest achievement of the crusade lay elsewhere 
in the kingdom - at Acre, where he transformed the Hospital of St. 
Thomas the Martyr, reputed to have been founded by Richard I, into a 
military establishment subject to the rule of the Teutonic Order. 
The transformation was probably undertaken in consultation with the 
patriarch and magnates of the kingdom, who would have been keen to 
stress the vulnerability of the Holy Land, but the reform was equally 
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consistent with the military background and outlook of the bishop 
himself. The situation of the house at Acre was also changed, from a 
site near the German hospital on the eastern side of the city, to a 
more suitable location in the northern quarter of Montmusard. And so 
that the fortunes of the foundation might be restored the bishop 
donated to the Order some of his own wealth, augmented on his death 
in 1238 by a further bequest of some five hundred marks. 
Confirmation of these reforms was not issued by the papacy until 
1236, but they were effected certainly before the autumn of 1228, 
probably in late 1227 or early the next year48. 
But in spite of the beneficial works which the two English 
bishops performed, they were unable to remain aloof from the troubles 
which engulfed the imperial expedition. Frederick had departed for 
the East without papal sanction and whilst still under sentence of 
excommunication. This in itself was guaranteed to provoke hostility, 
but his treatment of the Syrian nobles and his apparent disregard for 
what they saw as their inalienable rights and privileges, not simply 
in his conclusion of a truce with the sultan of Egypt, generated an 
atmosphere of permanent resentment and rebellion49. In order to 
ensure the acceptance of the negotiated agreement both William Brewer 
and Peter des Roches urged the emperor to consult with the patriarch, 
who was after all the highest representative of the ecclesiastical 
establishment in Syria. But Gerold refused out of hand to swear to 
the treaty, and in frequent letters to the pope he complained 
bitterly that once the emperor had departed not only might al-KImil 
be able to repossess Jerusalem, but the Latin Kingdom itself would be 
under serious threat from the prince of Damascus, with whom there 
existed no agreement50. For this reason (so he claimed), and in 
complete contravention of the truce, he began to assemble troops with 
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which to protect the kingdom. In response, fearing that such action 
would disrupt the peace and with it his plans for departure, 
Frederick, secure in the support of the Teutonic Order, laid siege to 
the houses of both the patriarch and Temple at Acre51. Roger of 
Wendover claims that the bishops of Winchester and Exeter were also 
besieged in their quarters, but none of the letters of Pope Gregory 
nor of Gerold, from which he indicates he obtained this information, 
confirm this belief52. Indeed the two bishops had been amongst the 
emperor's retinue at Jerusalem in March 1229 in breach of the 
interdict covering the city which Gerold had refused to lift53. 
Moreover the annals of Winchcombe assert that both William and Peter 
were subsequently suspended from their duties by the pope -a course 
of action which would have been totally incomprehensible had they 
shared the lot of Gerold and the Templars54. Richard of San Germano 
notes that on Frederick's return to Europe in 1229 he specifically 
called upon Peter des Roches, amongst others, to witness before 
Gregory IX as to his good behaviour in the Holy Land 55. Peter 
responded favourably, and was instrument; 
pope and emperor at Ceprano on 28 August 
could hardly be expected of some one who 
Frederick's hands. 
Before arriving back in Winchester 
des Roches undertook a second diplomatic 
11 in the reconciliation of 
123056. Such co-operation 
had suffered violence at 
on 1 August 123157, Peter 
sortie, collaborating with 
Earl Ranulf of Chester to successfully arrange a three year truce 
between England and France58. William Brewer, meanwhile, had already 
returned home. The annals of Tewkesbury record his joyful arrival in 
59 
Exeter at Easter 1229. Unfortunately, we know from Gerold that 
both William and Peter were still in Jerusalem only four weeks 
beforehand60, and to have reached England in such a short space of 
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time would have been a virtual impossibility. On this occasion the 
Tewkesbury annalist must have been mistaken. The bishop of Exeter's 
presence in England in 1229 is, however, confirmed by the annals of 
Winchcombe, and by the Patent Rolls which limit his return to some 
time before October of that year61. The Liberate Rolls are 
conclusive proof that in January 1230, whilst the bishop of 
Winchester continued to be absent, William Brewer was being dealt 
with in person in his business with the king 
62. Thus it would seem 
reasonable to assume that William, probably in the company of his 
fellow bishop, departed the Holy Land around the same time as 
Frederick in May 1229, having spent approximately two years on 
crusade. The erroneous belief that the bishops of Winchester and 
Exeter were together absent in the Holy Land for almost five years, 
and which has in the past misled a number of historians, must be 
attributed to an unfortunate generalisation by Matthew Paris63. In 
actual fact, although Peter des Roches was absent for just over four 
years, much of which time was spent in Europe reconciling the pope 
and emperor, it seems unlikely that either of the two bishops ever 
intended being away for any more than three years, as this was the 
period of validity (dating from the early autumn 1227) of the royal 
letter of protection issued by Henry III to the bishop of 
Winchester64. But for William Brewer even his relatively short 
absence of two years was two years too long: on his return to Exeter 
he discovered the goods of his diocese had been disgracefully 
squandered, and as late as 1238 the papacy was still appealing to 
creditors to be patient lest the church of Exeter 'be swallowed up in 
the abyss of usury'65. Winchester fared much better, and on his 
death in 1238 Peter des Roches left his successor a richly stocked 
bishopric with 'no diminution of its plough cattle'66. 
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As for the lesser Englishmen who had accompanied William 
Brewer and Peter des Roches to Syria, neither those who returned, nor 
those who failed to do so, find any mention in the various English 
annals. Hugh Watkin, however, proposes a strange and unsubstantiated 
theory that the widows of those who died on crusade were granted a 
special dispensation to mark their own last resting places with a 
large and floriated cross, perhaps as a gesture of thanks to the dead 
crusaders67. 
Frederick II may have lacked papal approval for his actions in 
Palestine, but the two English bishops who accompanied him to 
Jerusalem embodied all the ecclesiastical sanction he required. 
Regardless of deteriorating relations with the papacy, he could 
invariably rely on their support, and in spite of the bitter 
confrontation between the emperor and the patriarch in April 1229 the 
loyalty of his English allies remained steadfast. For Peter des 
Roches defiance of papal authority was nothing new: he had stood by 
King John in the bitter dispute with Innocent III; in his 
association with Frederick he defied Pope Gregory. The apparent 
suspension of the bishops of Winchester and Exeter from their 
episcopal duties was perhaps a predictable response, but Peter at 
least was not one to be underestimated: just as in 1205 he had been 
able by personal representation to prevail upon Innocent III in his 
disputed election to the see of Winchester, so at San Germano in 1230 
he was able to win over Gregory IX. It was a shrewd emperor who 
appealed to Peter to help mediate his disagreement with the Apostolic 
See, and a talented and calculating man who accepted. It was not the 
first time that Englishmen had played a major role in the leadership 
and politics of a crusade, and it would not be the last. 
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Chapter Eight 
The aftermath of the crusade; diplomatic relations 
between Frederick II and the Ayyübids 
The sense of dismay which the treaty of Jaffa provoked amongst 
sections of the Christian community also found expression amongst the 
ordinary Muslims of Palestine. Dissatisfaction with the agreement 
was immediately expressed in frequent attacks on Christian pilgrims 
making their way to the holy city and the repeated cutting of the 
road from Jaffa to Jerusalems. Much more serious was an event not 
long after the emperor's departure from the kingdom: probably in late 
May or June, but possibly as late as October 12292, the Muslim 
population of the areas around Hebron, Nablus and Jerusalem, excited 
by the Damascene condemnation of the cession of Jerusalem by al-Kämil 
and urged on by the harangues of the religious classes, rose against 
the tiny Christian presence in the Holy City3. According to the 
Eracles, more than 15,000 Muslim peasants took part in the attack, 
declaring that they would not tolerate the possession of Jerusalem by 
the Christians, nor the practice of Christian worship in the Templum 
Domini, and that al-Kämil had not even sanctioned the city's return 
to the Franks4. In anticipation of the Muslim incursion, the 
Christians withdrew with their families and possessions to the Tower 
of David and to a number of small houses nearby which had been 
hastily converted into a makeshift stronghold5. Renaud of Haifa, the 
castellan of Jerusalem, despatched an urgent appeal to Acre for 
assistance, and two days after the Muslims had entered Jerusalem, a 
Christian squadron under Baldwin of Picquigny arrived at Bethlehem. 
In the meantime the Muslim raiders had been in total control of the 
- 234 - 
holy city, plundering and looting, and killing the few who had not 
found refuge. But when the Franks trapped in the Tower of David 
caught sight of the approaching Christian troops, they took new 
heart, emerged from their confinement, and expelled the Muslims, 
killing 500 or more of them in the process6. 
Technically the Muslim attack on Jerusalem was a direct breach 
of the truce negotiated between al-Kämil and Frederick; but in fact 
the Egyptian sultan took no part in the attempted repossession of the 
city, nor did he condone the raid which, from the account of events 
given by the Eracles, appears to have been an unorchestrated 
ebullition of popular feeling. Consequently al-Kämil could not be 
accused of instigating the incident, despite his comments on the 
future of Jerusalem to his fellow Muslims at the time of signing the 
treaty7. It is conceivable, however, that veiled encouragement of 
the attack may have been given either by al-Näsir Dä'üd or by 
al-Ashraf, both of whom at different times would have benefited from 
such an uprising. From the evidence available we cannot be certain 
of the exact date of the assault, only that it took place some time 
after Frederick had left the Holy Land and probably before the end of 
October when news of the event must have been sent to the pope8; but 
in late May and June 1229 al-Näsir may consciously have sought by his 
very vocal condemnation of the concession of the holy city to the 
Franks to incite popular emotions which would divert the attentions 
of al-Kämil and al-Ashraf and thereby relieve the pressure on 
Damascus, then under siege from their troops9. Equally, after 
al-Näsir's surrender on 1 Sha'bän 626 H. /25 June 122910 and his 
replacement by al-Ashraf as ruler in Damascus, al-Ashraf would have 
been concerned not only to defuse discontent at the loss of Jerusalem 
but also to still opposition to his new regime, objectives which 
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might conceivably have been achieved by cautious promotion of an 
attack on Jerusalem. This is, of course, pure speculation, and 
indeed whether or not passive encouragement was forthcoming from 
either Ayyübid ruler is here irrelevant; what does matter is the 
fact that no Muslim prince actively supported the raid, and that the 
treaty of Jaffa remained intact. 
But the treaty was not challenged by the Muslim populace alone. 
It has already been noted how discontent of the patriarch and 
Templars with the way in which Frederick terminated his crusade led 
to civil strife in Acre11, and in the immediate aftermath of the 
crusade non-observance of the treaty, particularly by the Templars, 
reflected this discontent. In frequent skirmishes on the borders of 
Tripoli during 1229-1231 the military orders provided active support 
and reinforcement from the kingdom of Jerusalem for their houses in 
Antioch-Tripoli. Although these operations took place in areas which 
were named specifically as being outside the scope of the treaty, 
they were a clear violation of its terms which also strictly forbade 
any such direct aid12. There appears, however, to have been no 
direct military response by the Muslims to these infringements of the 
truce. One reason for this may have been that al-Kämil considered it 
to his advantage to respect the traditional absence of the northern 
principalities from the treaties concluded between the kingdom of 
Jerusalem and Egypt13 on the premise that, by implicitly allowing 
limited hostilities to continue, this might serve periodically to 
preoccupy those elements in northern Syria whose loyalty was open to 
question14. Since the same purpose would be served by tolerating the 
minor violations of the treaty by the military orders, he may have 
been unwilling to compel their observance of its stipulations. The 
validity of such a policy would have been emphasised by the 
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reluctance of the citizens of Hamäh in July 1229 to surrender their 
city to al-Kämil's representatives15. But another reason for 
al-Kamil's inactivity may have been that he was not in a position to 
enforce the treaty; Ja1äl al-Din had reappeared in Greater Armenia 
in August 122916, and rather than militarily oppose the activities of 
the Temple and Hospital, which might be construed as a contravention 
of the peace and, indeed, tie up a portion of the military resources 
of both Egypt and Damascus, al-Kämil may have presumed upon his 
friendship with the emperor to request Frederick's intercession. 
Although it should be noted that there exists no record of an 
Egyptian embassy to Apulia about this time, in 1231, under pressure 
from Frederick, Gregory IX wrote to the master of the Temple at Acre 
commanding that all violations of the treaty by the military orders 
should ceasel7. Even so, despite the intervention of the pope, these 
transgressions can hardly be said to have been of sufficient 
magnitude to threaten the survival of the treaty, which remained in 
18 force until the death of al-Mmil. 
The violations of the treaty on the borders of the northern 
territories during the period 1229-1231 clearly did not constitute a 
major campaign against the Muslims, and the very cordial relations 
between Frederick II and al-Malik al-Kämil were undamaged by the 
activities of the military orders. Indeed, the amicable relationship 
which had been built up between the two dynasties before, and during, 
the imperial crusade, was to be maintained up to and beyond the 
deaths of its two inaugurators19. These contacts, it has been 
suggested, were initiated between Frederick II and the Ayyübids 
possibly as early as 1215/17, and at Frederick's instigation20. In 
consideration of the state of Germany at the time, however, this 
seems doubtful, but embassies were certainly exchanged as early as 
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1226/7 when the emir Fakhr al-Din was sent to Frederick in Sicily21. 
Frederick's friendship with Fakhr al-Din in particular was 
exceptionally close and, according to Joinville, he appears at some 
stage to have conferred the honour of knighthood upon the emir22; 
later, in 1230, imperial letters were sent jointly to Fakhr al-Din 
and to al-Kämil detailing Frederick's progress against the papal 
armies which had attacked his Italian dominions during his absence in 
the Holy Land23. In 1232 emissaries from both the sultan of Egypt 
and the prince of Damascus were to be found in Apulia, those of 
al-Kämil bringing with them the gift of a skilfully constructed 
planetarium valued in excess of 20,000 marks24. The Damascene embassy 
was reciprocated in 631 H. /1233-4, when an imperial messenger is 
recorded as having visited al-Ashraf, the then ruler in Damascus25; 
but it was relations with Egypt which took precedence, and in 1238 
these were apparently so cordial that the imperial troops besieging 
Brescia were reported to have included a detachment sent by the 
sultan26. al-Kämil's death in the same year threatened to interrupt 
the relationship which had been built up with the Ayyübid dynasty in 
Cairo, and the news of the sultan's demise was said to have deeply 
27 distressed the emperor. But despite this blow the friendship 
survived: in October 1239 an embassy from al `Adil II, al-Kämi1's 
successor in Egypt, was expected in Sicily28, and in late 1241 and 
early 1243 imperial ambassadors were despatched on missions to the 
Egyptian court. The Annales Siculi indicate that both these 
embassies were headed by the captain of Sicily, Roger de Amicis29, 
but the annals are at odds with a letter addressed by Frederick to 
Roger in October 1241 which places Roger firmly in Italy at the very 
time he was supposed to be in Egypt30 (although this would not 
however preclude Roger's participation in the 1243 embassy). 
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Frederick's diplomatic contacts with the Muslims were condemned 
by Innocent IV at the Council of Lyons in 1245, but were nevertheless 
maintained right up to the end of the decade31. Around 1248, 
reportedly as a result of his failure to dissuade Louis IX from 
departing on crusade, Frederick was said to have sent messengers to 
al-Sälih Ayyüb (who had replaced al-cAdil II) warning him (according 
to Muslim sources) of the French king's plans to invade Egypt32. 
After Louis's defeat and capture in April 1250, imperial envoys were 
despatched to intercede with Ayyüb's successor, Tiirän Shäh, for the 
French king's release. There were those, however, who suggested the 
real aim of the embassy was to ensure the king's continued 
33 imprisonment. 
But there is no firm evidence that either embassy was hostile 
to Louis or to his expedition34: in the first place Frederick may 
not have known the ultimate destination of the crusade35, and 
secondly, although relations between the king and emperor could not 
be said to be close, Louis's desire to promote peace between the pope 
and emperor and Frederick's offers of assistance for the crusade36 
might tend to suggest that the embassy of 1250 was prompted by a 
genuine concern for Louis's well-being and that the 1248 mission may 
even have been an attempt to pressure the sultan into granting 
territorial concessions. If Frederick did try to dissuade Louis from 
his plans (and we cannot be certain of this37), it may simply have 
been an attempt to influence the destination of the crusade38. 
Consequently, although Frederick was in touch with the Ayyübids 
during 1248-50, the intercourse should not necessarily be regarded 
either as being suspicious or as being detrimental to Louis's 
crusade. 
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By the time of Frederick's death in December 1250 the idea of 
diplomatic relations between Sicily and Egypt was well established, 
and the tradition which Frederick had begun was continued 
uninterrupted by his son Manfred39. 
*** 
The benefits of the accord which the Egyptian sultan envisaged 
when he first approached the emperor in 1226/7 with proposals for 
military intervention in Syria, were not lost on Frederick. Here was 
a golden opportunity not only to fulfil his longstanding vow of 
crusade, but one which appeared to guarantee success in the form of 
huge territorial concessions. At the same time it would allow him 
personally to re-establish imperial rights in Cyprus (which until now 
he had attempted to achieve by a series of letters addressed to Alice 
of Champagne40) and to supervise the restoration of royal rights in 
the kingdom of Jerusalem, rights which had been slowly eroded since 
at least the end of the twelfth century. Even more importantly, 
al-Kämil's overtures offered maximum return for minimal involvement 
in Syria at a time when, although Welf opposition had been subdued, 
the German princes continued to indulge in petty local squabbles in 
defiance of the regent's authority and, more dangerously, relations 
between the German principalities and the ambitious kingdom of 
Denmark threatened to degenerate into open warfare. The stubborn 
refusal of the communes of northern and central Italy to accept 
restrictions on their independence, or to fall in line with 
Frederick's conception of empire, was a further concern. In 
addition personal experience of the kingdom of Sicily had shown that 
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prolonged absence could lead to a virtual collapse of royal power and 
a resurgence of the nobility. In the interests of the empire, 
therefore, it was imperative that the emperor's personal involvement 
in the crusade should be limited to as short a period as was 
practical, the more so after the replacement of Honorius III by the 
hard-line Gregory IX whose attitude subsequent to the emperor's 
failure to depart on crusade in the summer of 1227 acquired a more 
aggressive quality, not just towards Frederick, but to the empire in 
general. 
Since in these respects Frederick's aims were essentially 
short-term, it seems strange that the relationship initiated between 
the sultan and emperor at the time of the crusade should persist long 
after the initial objectives of the arrangement had been achieved - 
particularly since the friendship which was struck up by the two 
leaders was regarded with such contempt by the papacy and with such 
suspicion elsewhere in Europe41. But although Frederick probably 
viewed their friendship primarily as a means of guaranteeing 
continued Christian control of Jerusalem, and ten years of peace in 
the Holy Land, during which time he might pursue his effective 
recognition as de facto ruler in the Latin Kingdom, and possibly even 
as a vehicle for the rejuvenation of trade between Italy and Egypt 
42 
in al-Kämil he appears to have found a genuine friend and kindred 
spirit. Frederick's patronage of the arts and sciences was mirrored 
in Egypt43, and together with the strong Arabic cultural influences 
in Sicily and on Frederick's Sicilian court, may have been a factor 
in encouraging their association. Whatever the reason, the links 
between the Sicilian and Egyptian courts far outlasted the crusade 
itself. 
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Some Conclusions 
In the sense that Frederick achieved his goal of limiting his 
own personal involvement in the crusade, and that Jerusalem was at 
long last returned to Christendom, albeit with certain restrictions, 
the imperial crusade of 1227-1229 can be said to have been a 
resounding success. In the same vein, in engineering before his 
departure on crusade, his own coronation as emperor and, against the 
wishes of the pope, the election of his son Henry as King of 
Germany', Frederick had been remarkably ingenious. But the 
successful conclusion of the crusade was achieved not through 
military skill, but by diplomacy and through Muslim disunity; and, 
by taking a broader view, it can be seen that not only did Frederick 
fail to realise a number of his fundamental objectives, but that the 
concessions which he claimed to have wrung from the Muslims were 
largely an exaggeration of the truth. 
True, Jerusalem had been wrested from Muslim control, but 
outside the holy city gains were insubstantial, or merely a 
recognition of established facts. In Cyprus Frederick had sought to 
re-establish lapsed imperial rights; he was recognised as suzerain, 
but was not accorded the title bailli. In the kingdom of Jerusalem he 
was acknowledged as regent for his son, Conrad, but not as king, 
although in 1231 (as a corollary to the crusade) his aspirations to 
de facto rulership appeared to take a step closer to realisation when 
the High Court accepted the appointment of the imperial marshal, 
Richard Filangieri, as Frederick's lieutenant2. 
Frederick visualised himself as the temporal leader of 
Christendom, and sought from the first to restore the Holy Roman 
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Empire as a unified Imperium consisting of Sicily, northern and 
central Italy and Germany3. Superimposed on this appears to have been 
a concept of world empire, in which the Holy Roman Empire, as the 
direct descendant of its Roman ancestor, held universal sovereignty: 
Christendom would be administered jointly by pope and emperor, the 
emperor being divinely ordained head, but subject to the spiritual 
guidance of the papacy4. His vow of crusade, therefore, was a 
logical extension to the concept of universalism, and essential to 
the imperial dignity. 
But the dignity and prestige which accompanied the assumption 
of the cross were severely undermined by Frederick's failure to 
participate in the Fifth Crusade, and the repeated postponement of 
his crusading plans 1223-1227, culminating in his excommunication by 
Gregory IX, further sapped his authority. Admittedly the delays were 
genuine enough - civil war and the breakdown of law and order in 
Germany; the restoration of royal authority and the suppression of 
the Saracen revolt in Sicily; conflict with the Italian communes; 
apathy among the German nobility for a new crusade, and Frederick's 
own debilitating illness, but the respect which he had acquired by 
the oath of crusade had been gravely damaged, and even the return of 
Jerusalem seems to have been insufficient to recoup what had been 
lost5. The contradictions of the crusade confounded many: here was 
a military campaign which should have been roundly welcomed by the 
Church, but was not, which was headed by the temporal leader of 
Western Christendom, but who was an excommunicate, which had not 
engaged the enemy and yet had won back the Holy City, which 
guaranteed the Christian right of worship in Jerusalem, but which 
also permitted the Muslims to worship there. According to Ibn Wäsil, 
Frederick had told Fakhr al-Din that he had insisted on the return of 
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Jerusalem solely to safeguard his reputation amongst the Franks6, but 
it did little to enhance his already tarnished reputation in the eyes 
of the Church or to increase his stature amongst the princes of 
Europe; the treaty infuriated as many people as it placated, and the 
papacy remained hostile and unappeased. 
As a military venture, if it could ever rightly be construed as 
such, the crusade was a failure. Frederick was not a great military 
leader, and his military record did not bode well for the forthcoming 
crusade: the war which he had conducted against Otto IV in Germany 
was a catalogue of ineptitude, neglect of supply lines and inadequate 
provisions, and what successes were gained in six years of war, were 
largely achieved through luck. Only with Otto's death (by natural 
causes) was Frederick ultimately freed of his Welf protagonist. 
Likewise the 1226 campaign against the Lombard League collapsed into 
impotence when the League, simply by blocking the Alpine passes, 
7 
prevented Henry VII from bringing German troops to Frederick's aid. 
In order to ensure that the lack of preparation and forethought 
which had characterised the war in Germany was not repeated, efforts 
were made during the years 1222-1227 to create a financial and 
logistical superstructure for the imperial crusade. The papacy, 
however, failed to provide any direct financial assistance, and an 
English subsidy levied in aid of the Holy Land was not made available 
to Frederick. At the same time other commitments throughout the 
empire proved a drain on imperial resources. Almost inevitably this 
resulted in a series of belated and ad hoc financial measures which 
included near-piratical demands on John of Brienne and on the clergy 
of the Latin Kingdom. Frederick also had his share of ill-luck: 
ships which had been under construction since 1224 were delayed by 
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bad weather and illness so that a proportion remained unfinished at 
the time of the fleet's departure, and crusaders massing at the 
Apulian ports in 1227 were decimated by the wildfire spread of 
disease - in all probability an epidemic to which Frederick directly 
contributed by failing to make adequate provision of sustenance and 
shelter. In addition 400 knights promised by the Lombard League 
failed to materialise. Consequently despite early efforts to plan 
and structure the crusade, its military effectiveness was seriously 
undermined long before it set sail. 
In the final analysis, however, military might was not a factor 
which had to be called upon, and Frederick was able to take advantage 
of the Egyptian diplomatic approaches to reach a negotiated 
settlement. But even then the anticipated territorial gains in the 
Holy Land were reduced to a minimum, and in agreeing a treaty which 
effectively encouraged the encirclement of the Latin states by a 
unified Muslim power (contrary to Christian policy), and which 
promoted commercial and political relations with Egypt despite 
practical considerations which dictated such relations be with 
Damascus, Frederick divested himself of any remnants of what might 
just possibly have been interpreted as a thorough and overall plan of 
crusade. He had sought to overcome the poor preparation and pitfalls 
of his German venture, and in particular put great efforts into the 
construction of a fleet, but his plans were improperly laid and not 
fully thought through. 
Frederick's crusade was short by contemporary standards -a 
mere eight months if we consider just the period of time the emperor 
actually spent in Syria - but it was not inconsequential. It 
confirmed Christendom's fixation with Jerusalem (which had been 
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distracted in 1202-4, and complicated in 1218-21 by the attack on 
Egypt), and established negotiation as a not wholly unacceptable 
means of securing concessions from the Muslims. However distasteful 
the truce in which it resulted might have appeared to the patriarch 
of Jerusalem, and to the Templars, it suffered only minor violations, 
and was terminated solely by the death of al-Kämil in 1238. It was 
not the most spectacular crusade ever despatched to the East, nor the 
best planned, but it did reach its destination, and through it, if 
not in the manner in which the papacy had anticipated, Frederick at 
long last fulfilled his vow of crusade. 
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Appendix 1 
Chronology of important dates 
26 December 1194 Birth of Frederick II 
Easter 1195 Henry VI takes the cross 
28 September 1197 Death of Henry VI 
9 December 1212 Frederick crowned at Mainz 
25 July 1215 Frederick crowned at Aachen 
and takes the cross 
4/5 November 1219 Damietta taken by Christian army 
22 November 1220 Coronation of Frederick and Constance 
in Rome 
8 September 1221 Damietta returned to the Muslims 
June 1222 Death of the Empress Constance 
March 1223 Conference of crusade leaders at Ferentino 
25 July 1225 San Germano conference 
9 November 1225 Frederick's marriage to Isabella in Italy 
1226/7 Fakhr al-Din heads Egyptian embassy to Sicily 
18 March 1227 Death of Honorius III 
July 1227 Thomas of Acerra departs for the Holy Land 
8 September 1227 Departure of crusade army 
29 September 1227 Frederick's first excommunication 
11 November 1227 Death of al-Mucazzam 
26 April 1228 Birth of Conrad 
6 May 1228 Death of Isabella 
28 June 1228 Frederick's departure from Brindisi 
20 July 1228 Frederick's arrival in Cyprus 
3 September 1228 Embarkation at Famagusta for Syria 
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7 September 1228 Arrival at Acre 
15-23 November 1228 Move to Jaffa 
11 February 1229 Disclosure of peace terms 
18 February 1229 Treaty sworn between Frederick and al-Kämil 
17 March 1229 Crusaders enter Jerusalem 
18 March 1229 Frederick wears the crown 
19 March 1229 Departure from Jerusalem 
22-26 March 1229 Move from Jaffa to Acre 
1 May 1229 Frederick sets sail from Acre 
3 May 1229 Frederick signs document at Tyre 
May/June (October? ) Muslim attack on Jerusalem 
10 June 1229 Frederick arrives at Brindisi 
28 August 1230 Reconcili ation with Gregory IX at Ceprano 
9 March 1238 Death of al-Kämil 
20 March 1239 Frederick 's second excommunication 
13 December 1250 Death of Frederick II 
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Appendix 2 
Translation of the Patriarch Gerold's extract from the Old French 
text of the treaty concluded between al-Kämil and Frederick II, HDFS, 
iii. 86-7. 
1. The sultan gives to the emperor or his baillis Jerusalem the 
Exalted that he may do with it whatever he wishes, whether fortify 
[ aarnir] it, or anything else. 
2. The emperor must not touch the Geemelaza, which is the Temple of 
Solomon, nor the Templum Domini, nor anything in the entire 
precincts, nor must he allow any Frank of whatsoever race he may be 
to enter into the places mentioned [motit]; they shall remain with 
nothing changed in the hands and custody of the Saracens who shall 
hold them to make their prayers and proclaim their religion without 
anyone preventing them or gainsaying them in any way, and the keys to 
the gates to the precincts of these aforementioned places shall be in 
the hands of those who are there to serve the places, and nor shall 
they be taken from their hands. 
3. No Saracen shall be forbidden from freely making the pilgrimage 
to Bethlehem. 
4. And if there is any Frank who has a firm belief in the exalted 
and dignified character of the Templum Domini and who wishes to visit 
it and say his prayers there, he may do so; and if he does not 
believe in its height and its dignity, he must not be allowed to 
enter in any part of the precincts. 
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5. If any Saracen does mischief in Jerusalem to fellow Saracens he 
should be tried in the Saracen manner. 
6. The emperor will not help any Frank whatsoever in any fashion in 
any intention he may have of whatsoever kind neither to fight a 
Saracen nor to make war against any Saracens who are mentioned in 
this truce, nor will he incite them nor send [segra] any of them in 
any of the regions mentioned in order to do battle, nor will he give 
his consent to them in any fashion, nor will he aid them either with 
troops or goods or men. 
7. The emperor will divert all those who intend to do injury to the 
land of the Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil and in the land which is 
mentioned in the truce, and he will defend them with army and his 
possessions and his men and as much as lies within his power. 
8. If any Franks whatsoever intend to contravene any of the 
undertakings [fermites] recorded or specified in this truce, the 
emperor is bound to defend the sultan and take up arms [doster] and 
to divert them from it with his army, and his goods and his men. 
9. Tripoli and its territory, Krak, Chastel Blanc, Tortosa, Margat 
and Antioch, and whatever is in their truce (territory? i. e. terre 
rather than trive] shall be as it was in war and in truce and on the 
emperor it should be [incumbent] that he shall forbid his people and 
his army and his dependants [aprendans] and those Franks who come 
there, whether natives [ rp ives] or coming from outside, to assist the 
lords of these aforementioned places in any designs they may have on 
Saracen territory. 
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